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7intRoduction
This book is about gamification, and much more. The publication intends 
to explore the concept of gamification, its history and applications, its im-
plications for theory and practice. It also aims at doing more than simply 
mapping a trend, or providing guidelines for the design of gamification 
apps. In this book the concept of gamification will be rethought, through 
several distinct approaches and a multitude of questions.
But first, what is gamification? Gamification can be approached in at 
least two ways. First, as a general process in which games and playful ex-
periences are understood as essential components of society and culture. 
From this perspective we could look at how practices and rituals, belong-
ing to different historical and cultural contexts, might take the form of or 
resemble a game. Roger Caillois, while drawing on anthropology, biology 
and the study of myths, has shown how the playful might in fact belong to 
living beings of any kind, and not be limited to the human sphere. It might 
also be less of a process of rationalisation, and more of an instinctive reac-
tion to the surrounding environment, a form of adaptation that connects life 
and death into one single thing (Caillois 1960, 1961 and 1964). Before him, 
Johan Huizinga had already argued that play is an essential component in 
8the formation of societies and civilisation (1949 / 1938). From this perspec-
tive, gamification may be viewed as a much broader phenomenon, and as a 
concept not nearly as novel as many would have us believe.
More recently, however, gamification has also been used to describe a 
much more limited practice. This second and more widely-known mean-
ing has been brought forward by marketing gurus and designers over the 
last few years. It is this latter sense that has led to a great number of defini-
tions on gamification. It is also this second meaning that drives us to discuss 
gamification in the context of this publication. Sebastian Deterding, Rilla 
Khaled, Lennart Nacke and Dan Dixon have proposed a tentative history of 
the term: “ ‘gamification’ as a term originated in the digital media industry. 
The first documented use dates back to 2008, but gamification only entered 
widespread adoption in the second half of 2010” (Deterding et al. 2011, 1).
In other publications we can read that extensive use of the term has 
been reported from 2010, but its origins are probably to be found in a Brit-
ish consultancy company, Conundra Ltd., founded in 2003 by Nick Pelling, 
a game designer, who claimed to be specialising in gamification (Werbach 
and Hunter 2012). The no longer active Conundra Ltd. focused on help-
ing “manufacturers evolve their electronic devices into entertainment plat-
forms” (Conundra Ltd. 2014). Its core business focused on advising compa-
nies interested in attracting new customers on the implementation of game 
features into the companies’ products and services. This type of activity was 
called “gamification” on Conundra’s website (ibid.). More recently the idea 
of “gamifying” a business seems to have re-emerged, not necessarily directly 
as a result of Pelling’s first attempt but in a very similar vein.
Over the last few years the marketing and consultancy sectors have been 
promoting gamification as a potential source of revenue. This period has 
also witnessed the emergence of several events and publications that have 
contributed to defining gamification. Gabe Zichermann’s and Cristopher 
Cunningham’s book Gamification by Design: Implementing Game Mechanics 
in Web and Mobile Apps (2011) is one of the most popular in the business 
context, as is Zichermann’s website Gamification.co and the associated an-
nual conference Gamification Summit held annually in San Francisco since 
2011. Jane McGonigal’s work, expounded in her contribution at the TED 
Talk series in 2010, is also concerned with “selling” gamification to corpo-
rations. In her book Reality is Broken: Why Games Make Us Better and How 
9They Can Change the World (2011) she mostly looks at her own work as 
a consultant for McDonald’s, the Olympic Games organising committees, 
and other companies for whom she organised marketing campaigns based 
on alternate reality games. In McGonigal’s view, gamification is not only a 
new goldmine for designers and business people; it is also a tool that has the 
power to change the world.
In her understanding, gamification is a concept that describes a new 
age where gamers can collectively use their problem-solving skills not only 
to solve puzzles within a digital game but also to approach social and po-
litical issues in the real world. Gaming, according to McGonigal’s vision, 
could and should play a redeeming role. Game designers could become the 
new social entrepreneurs, and citizens become gamers. From this perspec-
tive, gamification thus becomes a technique for enabling greatly ambitious 
change. Reporter Alex Konrad on the Fortune segment of CNN Money de-
scribed gamification as a sort of new “Wild West” on the 17th of October 
2011: “gamification is the hot new business concept, with many of the world’s 
most admired companies signing on” (Konrad 2011).1 On the 10th of Oc-
tober Rachel Emma Silverman of the Wall Street Journal also declared that 
companies all over the world were already jumping onto the gamification 
bandwagon (Silverman 2011).
It seems that gamification is now the keyword for a generation of so-
cial entrepreneurs and marketing experts, in perfect and timely combina-
tion with the re-evaluation of participatory practices (as also recorded in 
the art and cultural sector, see Bishop 2012) and the trends of quantification 
and self-governance (often categorised under the label of the Quantified Self 
movement). Thus, the question remains: Does gamification need to be re-
thought? Is there something wrong with it? Or to put it differently, why do 
we need this book in the first place?
Let us start by saying that, according to its many promoters and “evan-
gelists”, there is nothing wrong with gamification at all. Quite on the con-
trary, although the keyword might now be a bit more rusty than a few years 
ago, consultancies and workshops on this topic are still popular, as well as 
academic courses and training programmes. In the blogs, workshops, and 
1  Konrad’s emphasis.
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publications on the topic it seems that gamification is working so well that 
the last thing it needs is second guessing. Consumer loyalty, issues related to 
finance and governance, workers’ productivity, training and development – 
these are only some of the areas that are allegedly being positively revolu-
tionised by the emergence of gamification.
However, if we have to summarise why gamification needs to be re-
thought in a sentence, it would be: Precisely because it “works”. The number 
of statements produced in support of the rise of gamification and the wide 
adoption of this concept, in both private and public sectors, force us, think-
ers and players, to consider what exactly is at stake in its emergence. What 
could it possibly be that makes such an enthusiastic narrative apparently 
fulfil itself so perfectly? How come the ideas surrounding gamification hap-
pened to confirm themselves with no need for further discussion?
The number of critiques of gamification is in fact already quite large. 
As outlined by Ian Bogost in several contexts (2011a, 2011b), gamification 
has little to do with the design of games (or an allegedly salvific process), 
and much more with the exploitation of consumers. It frustrates the prac-
tice of game design and reduces playing to a stimulus-response experience; 
whereas, games, and video games in particular, have been trying to differen-
tiate and complicate the meanings of play in a digital culture. Gamification 
so far has been a bad word for those involved in the study and understanding 
of video games, as it has been associated with a process of appropriation of 
the values of digital gaming by marketing and business interests. It seems 
that gamification “works” only in the eyes of those who have been inventing 
and promoting it in the first place. In other words, gamification needs to 
either disappear or be rethought, if it wants to gain the respect of those who 
have been working with games over the last decades.
This book proposes to keep the word, but change its meanings and the 
ideas associated with it. While gamification might work just fine as it is now 
for those who have been evangelising about its redeeming properties, it is 
also too limiting a concept for conveying political statements, artistic values, 
educational content or any sort of unconventional message through games.
The first section of this book is a collection of articles that try to grasp 
how gamification appears to be rooted in a specific understanding of the 
concept of behaviour, as something to be affected through the design of a 
game-like environment. Behaviour has been extensively discussed in nu-
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merous texts on gamification. Niklas Schrape proposes looking, through 
Foucault, at how gamification might work as a method to regulate individ-
uals and their social lives. It also works as a pleasant regulator of behaviour 
because it offers positive feedback (rewards, leaderboards, etc.) rather than 
negative penalties (fines, prison, etc.). Schrape first looks at how airline fre-
quent-flyer programmes operate. Extrapolating this example, he sketches a 
libertarian and dystopian society that would result from the domestication 
of human beings via governance mechanisms modelled on customer loyalty 
programmes, putting the very concept of democracy in crisis. In such a sce-
nario, the very concept of free will can be disputed and questioned.
Paolo Ruffino looks instead at engagement, another keyword in the 
studies on gamification, and proposes to rethink the models underpinning 
the discourses on gamification and its capacity to affect the behaviour of 
players. Ruffino looks at the work of Tim Ingold and his reading of Bergson 
and Heidegger and argues that participation, dwelling and co-existence 
could be seen as alternative ways of thinking about engagement: less as a 
transitive process that goes from games to their players and more as an in-
transitive status that needs to be narrated in order to be of any value. He then 
proposes recuperating, from the theoretical perspective he offers, the notion 
of life itself, a topic rarely debated in relation to gamification, which could 
instead help us in the invention of a creative way of approaching games both 
in our playing and research practices. Ruffino explores the implications of 
switching the focus from the idea that games “affect us” on the possibilities 
offered by thinking of games as things we live with and within. He concludes 
by showing how some artistic projects could be seen as examples of different 
ways of being engaged with both video games and gamification.
Life and movement are also relevant in the following contribution by 
Maxwell Foxman, who provides a deep look at one of the most notorious 
gamified applications, Foursquare. The author’s main concern is to explore 
what it is that drives players to engage with an app like Foursquare, and 
how it affects the ways in which movement and body presence are under-
stood. He argues that Foursquare alters the experience of moving about on 
the streets of a city and establishes a form of communication based on bodily 
proximity. It is a form of expenditure, as Bataille would put it, which pre-
serves competition and rivalry, but now entirely based on movement.
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Joost Raessens examines how gamification could be seen in the context 
of a more general “ludic turn”, which affects society and culture at many 
different levels. This century, Raessens notes, has seen several different 
kinds of “turns”: We have seen the linguistic turn, the digital, followed by 
the material one and many others. To what extent could we say that we are 
now experiencing a playful turn – in the sense of a cultural shift that brings 
playful experiences to the centre of the use, design, and study of media and 
technologies? Raessens argues that this perspective could in fact be useful 
in understanding contemporary Western culture, drawing on several exam-
ples from a variety of contexts. Gamification could then be understood as 
another example of this more general process. The ludification of culture, 
as Raessens puts it, thus becomes a strategic concept for understanding and 
making sense of current changes in contemporary culture.
The second part of the book looks at the history of games as a poten-
tial source for formulating different definitions of gamification. Similarly 
to Raessens, Mathias Fuchs intends to put gamification into a cultural-his-
torical context. Fuchs offers a retrospective on the use of games in various 
spheres of social life, including religion and economy. The ways in which 
games permeate these aspects of culture is not, according to Fuchs, a pre-
rogative of the digital era. It is in fact an ongoing and continuous influence, 
which also generates similar forms of hysteria towards the ludicisation of 
society in different ages. Gamification becomes, through the historical over-
view offered by Fuchs, the name of a relatively recent development in a much 
longer process, whose origins are difficult to trace, but which nonetheless 
presents interesting similarities with the hopes and concerns raised today in 
the discourses surrounding gamification.
Points and rankings, another oft-debated part of gamification, are the 
subject of Felix Raczkowski’s contribution. The author perceives this aspect 
as a legacy of behaviourism and psychiatry as these disciplines developed 
during the 1960s. He then argues that a critique of gamification has to deal 
with this theoretical heritage, which is not always made explicit but indeed 
nevertheless informs a great many of the current discourses on the topic. 
The author proposes, for instance, that the enthusiastic views on the effects 
of gamification and gamified apps might in fact be consistent with this back-
ground. The complex position of the player, who is mostly expected to fol-
low precise guidelines in order to win the game, also raises issues about the 
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value of these kinds of playful practices since they appear to be capable of 
altering the user’s behaviour. Raczkowski also suggests that gamification can 
and should be critiqued from an historical perspective, looking at the intri-
cacies of its origins and the ideas that have made it possible, at one point in 
history, to institutionalise the practice of making games with the purpose of 
affecting players’ behaviours.
The third section of the book looks at gamification in relation to the 
contexts of making and playing. This area is approached in different ways by 
the authors. Fabrizio Poltronieri brings to video games and gamification the 
concepts of communicology, apparatus, technical images, and post-history, 
as initially proposed by Vilém Flusser. An historical overview is presented 
from Flusser’s perspective in order to argue that gamification might repre-
sent a phase in a post-historical era, one where the projection of realities on 
the natural world plays a dominant role. Poltronieri’s proposal shows the 
potential for studying digital games in general by applying Flusser’s theories, 
which he brilliantly presents and introduces to the readers in all their com-
plexity. In this paper the context in which games are played and understood 
moves radically from the usual understanding of both video games and 
gamification, opening up many potential consequences for game studies.
Gabriele Ferri looks instead at competition and antagonism in gamifi-
cation, at how these are usually presented in the apps and systems that rely 
on gamification techniques and how they have been understood thus far. 
Ferri proposes a semiotic perspective on the issue of competition, re-evalu-
ating concepts such as the actant and the semiotic square. He also proposes 
distinguishing between what he calls “interstitial” and “exclusive” gamifi-
cation; the former being an activity that is carried out simultaneously to 
other activities, and the latter being instead a text that completely absorbs 
the player. From this theoretical background, Ferri establishes some crucial 
distinctions in the varied field of gamification and explores how competi-
tion could become a key element in understanding the different values and 
meanings at stake while rethinking gamification.
Thibault Philippette offers a reading of gamification based on the work 
of Jacques Henriot and his sciences du jeu or “play studies”, whose work, 
according to Philippette, could be used to reconsider some of the basic con-
cepts of gamification as proposed by designers and gurus of the concept. 
The main problem Philippette is concerned with is the arbitrary distinction 
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between games and non-games, a distinction implied in the definition of 
gamification as the use of game elements in a non-game context. While this 
distinction is arbitrary, it also reveals a rather static view of games, which 
could instead become more interesting if opened up to other kinds of 
definitions. Philippette suggests the very idea that games that can influence 
the non-game context could be re-interpreted following Henriot’s theories 
on play.
Daphne Dragona introduces the fourth section of the book, which is 
focused on forms of antagonism and opposition to gamification. Dragona 
illustrates what she defines as “counter-gamification”. Counter-gamification 
is not a precise practice; it is not defined in guidebooks, workshops, or tu-
torials. It is instead a form of appropriation of playful elements by artists 
in order to promote radical and oppositional values. Dragona comments 
on several projects, less known than the marketed apps that strongly rely 
on gamification techniques, but still based on a game-like environment. 
Dragona’s ambition is to map the territory outside the most well-known 
forms of gamification and expand it by including alternative practices of po-
litical disobedience that come to be organised as games. Dragona expresses 
the need to oppose the current trends of gamification and to expand what 
could potentially be defined as an alternative use of games. Dragona’s main 
focus is on the effects of gamification on social networking sites and on the 
process of “datafication”, which generates forms of resistance from users and 
artists.
Matthew Tiessen expands Dragona’s perspective by asking to what 
extent gamification can be viewed as desirable by players and society 
in general. To what extent are gamification apps to be “played” rather 
than accomplished and fulfilled to receive pre-established rewards? How 
much enjoyment is expected from playing with gamified apps? If gamifi-
cation is mostly about directing players’ behaviour then it also results, 
Tiessen suggests, in the objectification of human agency and in the elimina-
tion of choice in the practices of playing. Gamification risks leaving players 
in a passive condition rather than giving them an active role in choosing 
how to change themselves and the worlds surrounding them.
The final part of the book explores issues related to design, with three 
important contributions that offer original ways of thinking about how to 
use gamification. The authors have in fact explored those techniques and 
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reinvented them in order to forge a new approach to the creation of playful 
environments. None of them offer a proper step-by-step guide, as might be 
expected in a typical gamification textbook. Instead, they discuss their expe-
rience and practice as a way of reimagining the use of games in a non-game 
context, and as a theoretical contribution to the debates on gamification.
Sonia Fizek looks at how gamification might look like in the “post-bull-
shit” era, when the focus on points, leaderboards and more generally on the 
one-size-fits-all approach will be over. Fizek argues that emergent playful-
ness, a concept she elaborates by drawing on the work of Eric Zimmerman 
mostly, might be a more interesting concept to look at, rather than the de-
sign techniques proposed so far by gamification experts. However, it is also a 
much more complex concept, difficult to grasp and yet more capable of cap-
turing the interest of the players. Gamification gurus themselves, Fizek says 
and as has emerged in some of the most recent conferences on this topic, are 
not completely satisfied with the practice they are supporting and contribut-
ing to establish. There is a shared feeling that gamification, as it is now, might 
be missing the point, and be successful only in very precise and much more 
limited circumstances than what originally had been proclaimed possible. 
Fizek’s proposal is to expand the concept of play and fun and to introduce 
new forms of engagement in the practice of gamification.
Scott Nicholson turns to the relation between “grinding”, a concept 
mostly used in massively multiplayer online role-playing games, and gamifi-
cation. Grinding consists of accumulating points and improving the player’s 
statistics. Nicholson argues that many gamification apps and systems tend to 
re-purpose a similar approach in a different context. However, these specific 
types of role-playing games also have an “endgame” component, where play-
ers, once all has been achieved that could be possibly accomplished, con-
tinue to exploit the game’s open-worldness, caring less for game tasks and 
focusing more on non-progression-motivated play. If the endgame approach 
were applied to gamification, Nicholson argues, we could see very different 
ways of designing and playing. The author explores these alternative modes 
of gamifying things through a text that offers both a theoretical understand-
ing of gamification and exceptionally useful suggestions for designers.
Last but not least, Sebastian Deterding closes the publication with 
a re-interpretation of his original definition of gamification as the “use of 
game design elements in non-game contexts”, as formulated with colleagues 
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Dixon, Khaled, and Nacke in 2011. Here he presents six critiques of the cur-
rent dominant models for the understanding of gamification, starting from 
the deterministic models of game design that he considers to be replicated 
in this new context. Deterding proposes an optimistic view of gamification, 
that still preserves its transformative and critical values but from a more 
complex, relational, and emergent perspective. He names this new form of 
design “eudaimonic”, an autotelic practice which is equivalent, in Aristotle’s 
original view, to the “good life”. The instrumental element that gamifica-
tion all too often brings to games and work risks perpetuating a “bad life” 
instead, one where self-discovery and pleasure rarely happen. Instead, an 
eudaimonic view of gamification could bring a “good” way of living and 
playing, one where joy and satisfaction are at the centre of a responsible 
practice. Gamification, according to Deterding, could become the name of a 
play practice that truly helps human beings in fulfilling their own lives and 
those of others, but it needs to change in order to do this – it needs to be “re-
thought”. His text can be read as a final and conclusive manifesto for anyone 
who is involved in gamification, from a theoretical or practical standpoint.
In conclusion, we hope this publication will revamp the debate on 
gamification as a much more general concept for the study and adoption of 
games, or game-like environments, and their influences in contemporary 
life. This is also the ambition and goal of our research centre, the Gamifi-
cation Lab, where we have just started to investigate the many implications 
of game technologies, and their ethical, political, artistic, and educational 
values. We believe that gamification has the potential to become a common 
term for thinking about and doing games – both practices seen as depen-
dent on and in communication with one another. We hope this book will 
raise questions on this subject and contribute to further innovative research 
directions for gamification.
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gamification  
and goveRnmentality
by niklas Schrape
intRoduction
This article suggests a research perspective that investigates the techniques 
of gamification as a symptom for an emerging new mode of governmentality 
(Foucault 2007 / 2004 and 2008 / 2004) that depends on the global infrastruc-
ture of digital computer-networks. Together with choice architectures (Thaler 
and Sunstein 2008) and big data techniques (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 
2013; Paharia 2013), gamification belongs to a set of methods that aim to 
regulate individuals and society in ways, hailed as libertarian paternalism 
by its proponents (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). This mode of regulation takes 
Michel Foucault’s concept of a liberal governmentality to the extreme. Within 
it, the subject is constructed as a free player in a defined rule-space. So far, 
the biopolitically appropriate behaviour of the players had to be ensured by 
negative feedback-techniques like punishment and deterrence. Now, gamifi-
cation allows for effective behaviour regulation via positive feedback. Points, 
badges and leaderboards are more pleasant than prisons and executions. The 
carrot beats the stick. The only price to pay is total surveillance.
22
However gamification did not start out as a dystopian control technique 
but rather a marketing ploy. Many of its techniques were invented in order to 
foster brand loyalty. So let’s start at the beginning.
BRand loyalty
Gamification originally was – and predominantly still is – a marketing 
buzzword. Several definitions exist but in its broadest sense scholars like 
Deterding et al. (2011), Fuchs1 and Escribano (2012) agree: Gamification 
describes the permeation of non-game contexts with game elements. Several 
different understandings of this concept exist, but the most common one 
is to understand gamification as a set of techniques to regulate behaviour 
via game rules for strategic purposes. At least this is the dominant usage of 
the notion in marketing discourse. This becomes evident in the whitepa-
per Gamification 101 by the company Bunchball, one of the most successful 
proponents of gamification techniques: “At its root, gamification applies the 
mechanics of gaming to non-game activities to change people’s behavior” 
(Bunchball 2010, 2).
In the marketing context, gamification techniques do not aim to change 
the way people think, but how they behave. The importance of this fact can-
not be overstated: many traditional marketing techniques, like advertising, 
aim to influence the thoughts, attitudes, and beliefs of the consumer. In this, 
they follow the paradigm of classical rhetoric. Aristotle distinguished three 
categories of rhetorical means in his The Art of Rhetoric (1991): logos (ra-
tional argumentation), pathos (emotional appeal) and ethos (the image and 
the expression of the orator). Rhetorical persuasion, therefore, cannot only 
be achieved by appealing to the mind, but also to emotions and to pre-ex-
isting notions about the speaker. But regardless of the means of persuasion, 
changing the mindset of the listener is always the objective.
1 Mathias Fuchs in his presentation from March 8, 2013 at the Serious Games Conference 
in Hannover, titled “Einführung in das Phänomen Gamification” (Introduction to the 
Gamification Phenomenon). See also: http://www.biu-online.de/de/presse/newsroom/
newsroom-detail/datum/2013/03/13/serious-games-conference-2013-erfolgreich-
es-comeback-nach-einjaehriger-pause.html (accessed February 27, 2014).
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Most modern advertising techniques share the same goal: they aim to 
influence the consumer’s attitudes, beliefs, and feelings about products. The 
classic four steps to describe the intended consumer reaction to an adver-
tisement are attention, interest, desire, and action (AIDA) (cf. Kotler et al. 
2011, 808). The acronym was coined as early as 1921 by C.P. Russell. While 
this idealised process has been reframed, condensed, and complemented 
several times in the history of marketing, its general characteristics have 
persisted. Persuasion is understood as a process in which the intended con-
sumer behaviour (the action) is the result of a previous cognitive and affec-
tive processing: First, the consumer has to notice the advertisement. Then 
his or her interest in the product has to be raised by promises of advantages, 
features or qualities. If successful and if the consumer can connect the char-
acteristics of the products to his or her own needs, a desire arises. This desire 
can be understood as a cognitive and affective complex, it encompasses a 
rational understanding and evaluation but also emotional components (e.g. 
attraction to the model on the poster). Only if there is a desire and if the 
consumer is capable of attaining the product, may he or she actually perform 
the purchase.
Even if persuasion cannot be limited to a linear process, there is no 
doubt about the objective of the advertisers: they want the consumers to 
think and feel about products just they way they planned it. They want to 
create and to communicate a desirable image. In advertising, the behaviour 
of a consumer (e.g. to regularly buy a specific brand and not another) can be 
interpreted as deriving from an instilled attitude towards a product. 
A predictable behavioural tendency towards purchasing a specific 
brand is interpreted as “consumer loyalty” or “brand loyalty” in marketing 
literature.2 Commonly, brand loyalty is understood as the commitment of 
a consumer to a certain brand. This concept is perfectly illustrated by the 
memorable dialogue between George Clooney’s character Ulysses Everett 
2 Both terms are in use. The online-dictionary of the American Marketing Association 
(2014) defines brand loyalty as: “1. The situation in which a consumer generally buys the 
same manufacturer-originated product or service repeatedly over time rather than buying 
from multiple suppliers within the category. 2. The degree to which a consumer consist-
ently purchases the same brand within a product class.” 
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McGill and a salesman in the Coen Brothers’ adaption of Homer’s Odyssey, 
titled O Brother Where Art Thou? (Coen and Coen 2000).
Pomade Vendor: [. . .] here’s your pomade [. . .]
Ulysses Everett McGill: Hold on, I don’t want this pomade. I want Dapper 
Dan.
P.V.: I don’t carry Dapper Dan, I carry Fop.
U.E.M.: Well, I don’t want Fop, goddamn it! I’m a Dapper Dan man!
The attitude that Ulysses Everett McGill shows towards his favourite brand 
of pomade can be considered the epitome of brand loyalty – he connects 
his very identity as a man and human being to the brand of pomade. Thus, 
loyalty becomes a matter of the heart, a question of defining oneself via the 
use of specific products. The loyal consumer of a branded product partakes 
of its image.
gamified loyalty
Gamification processes, however, promise a far more direct way to getting 
at the behaviour and therefore the loyalty of the consumer. Simple examples 
are the frequent-flyer programs, described in Bunchball’s whitepaper (2010) 
as a primal form of gamification. 
The most successful of these is the Miles & More programme by 
Lufthansa and other airlines of the so-called Star Alliance.3 Here, aircraft 
passengers can gather points through their flights, appropriately labelled as 
miles. There exist two kinds of miles: “award miles”, which can be invested 
in various upgrades and benefits, and “status miles” that can be collected in 
order to climb up in a hierarchy of levels: 35,000 miles are rewarded with 
the “frequent-flyer status” (level 1), represented by a silver card, giving ac-
cess to the business lounges as well as several smaller benefits. 100,000 miles 
lead to a golden card, the so-called “senator status” (level 2), and access to 
the senator lounges as well as an exclusive telephone service hotline for in-
stance. Finally, after collecting the unlikely amount of 600,000 miles in two 
years, the passenger is allowed to call him or herself a member of the elected 
3 More information under: http://www.miles-and-more.com (accessed May 8, 2014). 
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HON-circle (level 3), and is granted a card in pure black, a personal assistant 
and limousine service in selected airports (and access to an even more ex-
clusive telephone service hotline). The tangible benefits of the levels are quite 
small, but the promise of status and exclusiveness itself seems to work as a 
driving force of motivation. 
Recently, Lufthansa and Star Alliance even added a kind of badge sys-
tem in the form of so-called “status stars” on the frequent-flyer, senator, and 
HON-circle cards. Like military emblems, these stars are printed directly 
on the card for all to see.4 This public visibility of status and loyalty rewards 
is one of the decisive characteristics of gamification as Zichermann and 
Cunningham emphasise:
In the old days (pre-2008) if a person preferred Cuisinart over KitchenAid, 
for example, how was that bias expressed? How did she get her friends to 
understand this loyalty choice? First, her friends needed to be standing 
in the kitchen near the product itself. Then, a conversation would have to 
introduce the subject. This process was called word-of-mouth marketing 
[. . .] Loyalty is no longer private. It is no longer a matter of standing in a 
kitchen next to your favorite mixer. It is public, and millions are viewing it.  
(Zichermann and Cunningham 2011, 9)
The traditional way to publicly demonstrate loyalty to a certain brand was to 
repeatedly use a product or service for all the world to see (e.g. sitting with 
an Apple MacBook in a coffee shop). The brand preferences are visible in 
the very act of use. But gamification techniques allow it to monitor product 
usage, to memorise this information, and to compress it into publicly visible 
signs (like badges, levels or status stars). Thus, brand loyalty and preferences 
become apparent, independent from the actual use of the product or service. 
Consequently, every partaker in gamification programmes attains a visible 
history of product usage. In the case of the frequent-flyer programmes, the 
status cards are the carriers and visual displays of this personal history with 
the brand. The individual status of every passenger, measured in miles and 
4 See: http://www.miles-and-more-promotion.com/statusstars/en/index.html 
 (accessed May 7, 2014).
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materialised in cards and stars, derives from his or her memorised history 
with the brand. Suddenly, consumption transforms from a momentary ac-
tion to a process that carries its own history and displays it publicly.
According to Bunchball, the promise of status makes all the difference: 
Brand loyalty does not depend on a company’s image anymore. Gamifica-
tion techniques like the frequent-flyer programmes can be understood as 
strategic instruments to manipulate the behaviour of people towards prod-
ucts and services while circumventing their very attitudes towards them. 
The personal history with a brand creates a commitment that is independent 
from its image or the consumer’s satisfaction: “And they’ll [the passengers] 
go out of their way to stick with the vendor where they have the most points 
and status – even when disappointed with the actual service” (Bunchball 
2010, 3).
Another film with George Clooney illustrates the power of such a 
gamified loyalty: Up in the Air (Reitman and Turner 2009) by director Jason 
Reitman. In this movie, Clooney plays Ryan Bingham, a travelling “downsizer” 
who is basically hired by companies to fire their employees. Ryan Bingham 
is a frequent flyer and a participant in the frequent-flyer programme of 
American Airlines (AAdvantage).5 He dearly loves his status and feels a deep 
sense of loyalty towards the airline, and also to the Hilton hotel chain, which 
participates in the programme. In fact, his main life goal consists in gath-
ering miles, as this dialogue with his young assistant Natalie Keener (Anna 
Kendrick) attests:
Ryan Bingham: I don’t spend a nickel, if I can help it, unless it somehow 
profits my mileage account.
Natalie Keener: So, what are you saving up for? Hawaii? South of France?
R.B.: It’s not like that. The miles are the goal.
N.K.: That’s it? You’re saving just to save?
R.B.: Let’s just say that I have a number in mind and I haven’t hit it yet.
N.K.: That’s a little abstract. What’s the target? [. . .]
R.B.: It’s ten million miles.
5 See: https://www.aa.com/AAdvantage/aadvantageHomeAccess.do?anchorLocation=Di-
rectURL&title=aadvantage (accessed May 1, 2014.)
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N.K.: Okay. Isn’t ten million just a number?
R.B.: Pi’s just a number [. . .] I’d be the seventh person to do it. More people 
have walked on the moon.
N.K.: Do they throw you a parade?
R.B.: You get lifetime executive status.
If frequent-flyer programmes can be considered prototypical gamification 
techniques then the character of Ryan Bingham exemplifies how gamifica-
tion can foster a new kind of loyalty. Such gamified loyalty might motivate 
a certain sense of identity, but its immediate object is not the brand as such, 
but rather the point system attached to its consumption. Ryan Bingham’s 
life-goal is to gather miles. The primary object of his desire therefore is the 
frequent-flyer programme itself and the status it promises. But because of 
that he develops a behaviour pattern that he retrospectively interprets as 
loyalty. This becomes apparent in a romantic conversation with his future 
casual relationship Alex Goran about his new status card:
Alex Goran: Oh, my God. I wasn’t sure this actually existed. This is the 
American Airlines...
Ryan Bingham: It’s a Concierge Key, yeah.
A.G.: What is that, carbon fibre?
R.B.: Graphite.
A.G.: Oh, I love the weight.
R.B.: I was pretty excited the day that bad boy came in [. . .]
A.G.: This is pretty fucking sexy.
R.B.: Hope it doesn’t cheapen our relationship.
A.G.: We’re two people who get turned on by elite status. I think cheap is 
our starting point.
R.B.: There’s nothing cheap about loyalty.
Ryan Bingham feels rewarded for his loyalty and draws his self-esteem from 
this recognition. His one life-goal is to gather more than 10 Million miles 
as one of just seven persons in the world. In fact, his sense of identity stems 
to a certain degree from his understanding himself to be being loyal. Ryan 
Bingham believes in gamified loyalty.
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Ryan Bingham’s concept of loyalty is a product of the gamified marketing 
 programmes of airlines and hotel chains. For him, loyalty can be measured 
in points. It is a variable in a game, something that can be calculated and 
fed into computational models. His attitudes towards brands seem to be the 
result of a behaviour pattern, motivated by a formal system of game rules – 
because of gamification, the very concept of loyalty transformed for keeps.
aiRPoRt PoliticS
But gamification does not only transform crucial concepts of our society like 
loyalty. It holds the potential to transform the very social space itself. The 
frequent-flyer programmes might be symptomatic in this regard. 
The structure of status signs (different cards, status stars), exclusive areas 
(the various lounges), and privileges (special service-hotline and limousine 
service) creates an artificial hierarchy within the social space of the airport. 
This hierarchy is the precondition for the experience of status: the access 
to the exclusive lounges and the privileges has to be restricted – otherwise 
it would be worthless. In reverse the hierarchy has to be protected through 
means of surveillance and discipline: Star Alliance’s economy class passen-
gers without Miles & More cards may not enter the senator lounges. They 
have to be excluded, in order to protect the exclusiveness for the privileged. 
Therefore, the lounges are separated from the rest of the airport through 
borders, guarded by friendly personnel in uniform. Like in a border control 
of a nation-state, the crosser has to present the correct ID-card in order to 
attain access. 
But the status cards differ in one crucial aspect from the ID-cards of the 
nation-states: an ID-card does not memorise data beside what is printed on 
it. In contrast, the frequent-flyer card functions as an externalised memory 
of a person’s past as passenger – condensed into a number of miles, an at-
tained level (type of card), and visible badges (status stars). While the cus-
toms officers at a nation-state border-control cannot attain much knowledge 
about a traveller’s past by looking at his or her ID-card, the employee of the 
airline has immediate insight into the passenger’s past.
This reliance on history and the past marks the crucial difference be-
tween the hierarchies imposed by the frequent-flyer programmes and the 
traditional class system of the airport (the distinction of first class, business 
class, and economy class). While the class system is actualised in the mo-
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ment of the purchase, the frequent-flyer hierarchies persist over time. Any 
passenger can decide to spend all of his or her money at once to experience 
first-class comfort for one single time. Thus, the affiliation to a class is real-
ised in the moment of transaction. It is ahistorical, not depending on the for-
mer decisions of the passenger but only on his or her willingness to invest. In 
contrast, it is impossible to buy oneself into to the senators lounge. One has 
to earn the right to climb up one step in the frequent-flyer hierarchy. This 
hierarchical belonging is completely dependent on an individual’s past-deci-
sions and personal history with the airline.
The existence of memorised and publicly visible individual histories 
marks a tremendous transformation of the very nature of the social space 
of the airport. In 1992 Marc Augé published the original French version of 
Non-Places. Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity (1995), in 
which he presented the airport as prime example for his thesis. According to 
him, our contemporary society is more and more saturated with non-places, 
places devoid of social relations and history from which a sense of iden-
tity could stem.6 Airports, motorways, train stations, chain hotels and many 
other such non-places are somewhat artificial, anonymous, and governed by 
rules that dictate behaviour (e.g. “wait in line”). They are no places to stroll 
around but simply to pass through – logistically organised as effective as 
possible. 
Just one year later, in 1993, Lufthansa started the Miles & More pro-
gramme and changed the nature of the non-place for good. The programme 
became a tremendous success: in 2011, it counted more then twenty million 
participants worldwide (Lufthansa 2011). In a certain way, the programme 
can be interpreted as answer to the lack of history and identity that Augé de-
scribed. For the enthusiastic participants of the Miles & More programme, 
the airport is no longer an ahistorical place devoid of social relations. Quite 
the contrary, it is a deeply hierarchical field for social contests about status 
and privilege. The airport is the very source of identity. But these identities 
6 “If a place can be defined as relational, historical and concerned with identity, then a space 
which cannot be defined as relational, or historical, or concerned with identity will be a non-
place. The hypothesis advanced here is that supermodernity produces non-places [. . .]” 
(Augé 1995 / 1992, 77–78).
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and histories are products of strategic designs. Moreover, they are automati-
cally generated through tracking and monitoring techniques, put into num-
bers, and stored and processed by computers. They are pure data. And the 
citizens of the airport are living within these data structures.
Airlines are not the only ones who collect and store data about their 
subjects. States do it too – a well-known fact since the Roman census in the 
times of Jesus. But this kind of data is concerned with statistical social de-
mographics and does not involve evaluations of individuals. States do keep 
track of the deeds of their subjects, however this should only encompass 
information about the transgression of legal boundaries – at least in dem-
ocratic ones: it should be about what a subject did wrong, not about what 
it did right. Not all state officials need to know how much tax money an 
individual generated, how many children he or she conceived, or to what 
extend he or she has been otherwise a particularly good citizen. What they 
do need to know, however, is if the person in front of them is a danger to 
society and its laws. This information is stored in the crime record, a record 
about former punishments.
Punishment can be considered to be a negative feedback technique. 
Through punishments, states try to discourage their subjects from commit-
ting crimes – the logic of deterrence. Punishment diminishes unwanted be-
haviour. In contrast, gamification techniques, like those implemented in the 
frequent-flyer programmes, exploit positive feedback. They aim to enforce 
actions that are considered to be favourable. They amplify desired behaviour.
gamification and Big data
What becomes obvious at this point is that the frequent-flyer programmes 
are not only amongst the earliest examples of successful gamification but 
that they also are symptomatic for a novel mode of behaviour regulation. 
This regulative technique is dependent on constant monitoring and da-
ta-collection. Only the existence and accessibility of this data allow for the 
implementation of positive-feedback mechanisms. The frequent-flyer pro-
grammes and gamification techniques in general are therefore intrinsically 
linked to another common buzzword of today: big data.
The term big data emerged in the early 2000s in the context of sciences 
like astronomy and genomics that collected unprecedented amounts of data 
about their subject and were forced to develop new computerised methods 
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to process it (cf. Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013, 6–7). Since the late 
2010s the term dissipated as a buzzword into marketing and economics. 
There exists no consensual definition but most practitioners agree on the 
following characteristics:
Big data refers to things one can do at a large scale that cannot be done at 
a smaller one, to extract new insights or create new forms of value, in ways 
that change markets, organizations, the relationship between citizens and 
governments and more. But this is just the start. The era of big data chal-
lenges the way we live and interact with the world. Most strikingly, society 
will need to shed some of its obsession for causality in exchange for simple 
correlations: not knowing why but only what. This overturns centuries of 
established practices and challenges our most basic understanding of how 
to make decisions and comprehend reality. (Ibid.)
According to these authors, big data revolutionises society in the most 
fundamental way. This may be typical Silicon Valley hype but the concept 
nevertheless highlights some important shifts: the computer technology 
permits us to store and process information in a way that was simply not 
possible before, allowing for novel ways to analyse it. Most importantly, to-
day’s computing power makes it a lot easier to base decisions on stochas-
tically stable correlations between factors without knowing the underlying 
causal relations and principles. To some degree, the manager of an airline 
does not need to know what the customers expect and why they choose the 
one airline and not the other. What he or she does need to know, however, 
is whether a certain bonus or badge in the frequent-flyer programme corre-
lates with a higher use of their airline.
Gamification is a symptom of our contemporary society in which every 
aspect is being captured and processed by computers and digital networks. 
It relies on a specific techno-historical situation, characterised by global per-
vasions of nearly every fibre of the society’s body with networked computer 
technology. This development has recently been described by several theore-
ticians as cybernatisation (cf. Tiqqun 2001, Mersch 2013). According to the 
German media philosopher Erich Hörl (2011) it even led to a new kind of “en-
vironmentality”: The omnipresent digital technology merged into the back-
ground of society. We are embedded within it. It became our environment. 
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The new state of nature is a cybernetic one. The existence of such a seemingly 
self-evident, unquestioned and apparently natural cybernetic environment 
is the precondition for gamification and big data techniques. The opportu-
nities to gather huge amounts of data, to track movements and behaviour 
patterns, to award points for deeds and tasks, and to compare them in social 
networks, they all are only made possible by the pervasiveness of digital net-
works and computational processes.
Only because of the omnipresent information technology, companies 
like Bunchball can sell universal gamification engines to be implemented in 
various businesses. In his book Loyalty 3.0. How to Revolutionize Customer 
and Employee Engagement With Big Data and Gamification (2013), Rajat 
Paharia, the CEO of Bunchball, describes the new condition of ubiquitous 
mediation and data generation as great opportunity:
[. . .] we’re now living our lives online – community, entertainment, work, 
finances – everything we do is being mediated by technology and, as a 
result, is throwing off reams of data (big data) about our activity. Smart 
companies, forward-thinking companies, are feeding this user-activity 
data into gamification systems, which use data-driven motivational tech-
niques [. . .] to drive engagement, high-value activity, and loyalty. (Ibid., 5)
Paharia advises using data mining techniques, including predictive model-
ling, in order to forecast the behaviour of groups, and sentiment analysis to 
extract and to filter out information from natural language communication. 
The picture he is painting might seem dystopian for many readers, but for 
him as a professional marketer, the new world of permanent and ubiquitous 
data-generation is a dream come true: “With big data, a business can learn a 
lot about what you do, where you do it, when you do it, and what you like” 
(ibid., 40–41).
The use of big data in gamification reveals itself as deeply linked to the 
issue of surveillance. This becomes obvious in Paharia’s description of out-
lier detection, meaning statistical deviators from norms, that would help to 
“expose bad behaviour” (2013, 48). He hails big data as opportunity to mon-
itor one’s own personnel in order to attain a “360-degree view” of every in-
dividual and to “use this data to predict such things as which employees are 
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at risk for leaving, who are going to be top and bottom performers, who is 
likely to get injured and file for workers’ compensation [. . .]” (ibid., 59–61).
But Paharia does not want to regulate the employees’ behaviour through 
negative feedback techniques like punishment. He strives for an effective 
regulation through motivation by the means of points, badges, and leader-
boards – the positive-feedback mechanisms of gamification. For him, the 
existence of big data is the precondition for an effective use of gamification 
mechanics: 
[. . .] gamification, is motivating people through data [. . .] Streams of big 
data on user activity are sent to the business, and in real time, the business 
feeds that data to a gamification engine that processes the data, feeds it 
through a set of rules, updates all the necessary statistics, and then re-
sponds to users with real-time feedback and other data-driven motiva-
tional techniques. (Ibid., 68)7
 
Paharia’s concept of gamification is far removed from romantic idealisations 
of playfulness. This gamification is a technique for behaviour regulation. It is 
not achieved through disciplinary means (e.g. loan-reductions for employ-
ees who cannot reach target productivity) but via codified positive-feedback 
mechanisms. The feedback is conceptualised to be anonymous: Paharia does 
not imagine a manager who personally praises the work of an employee, he 
envisions an automated feedback-system based on the computer evaluation 
of measured performance. Such a feedback-system can easily be up-scaled 
to fit the needs of large workforces or to address huge target groups.
Paharia extends the logic of the frequent-flyer programmes to all mar-
ket sectors. In his view, the behaviour of the customers and employees of any 
given company should be monitored in the same way that passengers’ are. 
The 360-degree profile of consumers and staff takes the place of the status 
card in the airport. All decisions shall be tracked in order to identify pat-
terns of behaviour and in order to influence it with motivational techniques. 
These techniques derive from a specific understanding of management. He 
clearly envisions the manager as a panoptic governor of workforces and 
7 Paharia’s emphasis.
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consumers. While the big data techniques are the governor’s tools to watch 
over the subjects, the gamification mechanisms are the means to regulate 
their behaviour. 
gamification and liBeRtaRian PateRnaliSm
Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (2013, 7) make the claim that big data de-
mands we think in correlations not causalities. This mirrors the observation 
that gamification techniques aim to influence the behaviour and not the at-
titudes of their target group. In the age of big data and gamification, analysts 
do not have to ponder why something is the case, and no one cares what the 
consumers think about brands and products. Reasons are not as important 
anymore. Questions of “why?” and “how?” are sealed in black boxes. The 
new primary focus is on the quantifiable outcomes of a process: the correla-
tion between factors and the behaviour of consumers.
With its black-boxing and its focus on outcomes and behaviour, gami- 
fication appears to be a resurrection of the psychological school of behav-
iourism. Its techniques do not stand in the tradition of advertising as they 
do not aim to change consumers’ attitudes. Instead they can be considered 
as advancements of behavioural marketing and management techniques. A 
simple example of such a technique is the placement of a product in a super 
market: high-price products are placed at eyelevel in the shelves, low-priced 
products at the bottom. The reason being that it is more convenient for buy-
ers to see and to grasp what is right in front of their nose than to bend down. 
For a similar reason, milk and butter are always put at the very opposite ends 
of the multideck cabinet: thus buyers have to pass by a lot of tempting prod-
ucts in order to get to the essentials. In both cases, products are strategically 
positioned in space in order to influence the behaviour of consumers.
Such behavioural marketing techniques have recently been described as 
“choice architectures” by the behavioural scientists Richard Thaler and Cass 
Sunstein in Nudge. Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happi-
ness (2008). They even invent a job description for persons who design such 
choice architectures: “A choice architect has the responsibility for organizing 
the context in which people make decisions” (ibid., 3). For them architec-
tures of choices are inevitable: “[. . .] there is no such thing as a ‘neutral’ de-
sign” (ibid.), they claim, and therefore the design should be made consciously 
with an eye on the intended effect. Their prime example is a school canteen. 
see also 
Raczckowski
p. 147, 155
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Here, the healthy food should be put in eye-high 
and right next to the cash point – not the sweets. 
They admit that the children would basically be 
tricked into buying the intended food. But for 
Thaler and Sunstein every other organisation of 
the shelves would also be a choice architecture – 
so why should the owner of the canteen not consciously make “the right” 
decision that improves the wellbeing of the children?8
Gamification systems often involve the conscious creation of choice 
architectures: frequent-flyer programmes e.g. comprise options for partic-
ipants to invest their award miles in services and products of partner com-
panies. Award miles work much like a currency. But they differ from money 
in at least two fundamental regards: on the one hand, they cannot be spent 
anonymously and each investment will create new data that marketers can 
monitor. On the other, they cannot be spent for everything but only for the 
products and services that have been selected. The award miles can only 
be invested in a strategically designed micro-economy of business partners. 
The participants can only choose between the options given to them. And 
these options are embedded within a carefully built choice architecture. 
Gamification and choice architectures are concerned with the same task: to 
influence people’s behaviour in intended ways. Both techniques aim not to 
change mindsets but only visible and measurable performance and conduct. 
Thaler and Sunstein deduce a political style of governance from their 
behaviouristic reasoning: libertarian paternalism. While the concept might 
seem paradoxical at first glance it follows neatly from their observation that 
it is impossible not to design choices in any given social situation. Libertar-
ian paternalism implies that, for example, the state grants its subjects the 
freedom of choice, but designs all possible options in such a way that they 
will decide in an intended way. The subjects should feel free but their behav-
iour is regulated. This principle is familiar to all players of computer games: 
the choices at hand are quite limited in most games but some do a good 
8 Of course, the question arises what qualifies as “the right” architecture of choices. What 
are the criterias behind our judgments about right and wrong? Surprisingly, Thaler and 
Sunstein don’t ask these questions.
“Fitter, healthier and 
more productive,  
A pig in a cage on  
antibiotics.”
- Radiohead (Fitter Happier)
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job of hiding the limitations, thus giving the player the illusion of freedom. 
In a similar way, the children in the canteen are free to choose whatever 
food they want, but they can decide between the given options, and the pro-
claimed healthy one is positioned in the most convenient way. For Thaler 
and Sunstein there exists no contradiction between freedom and regulation:
The libertarian aspect of our strategies lies in the straightforward insist-
ence that, in general, people should be free to do what they like – and opt 
out of undesirable arrangements if they want to do so [. . .] We strive to 
design policies that maintain or increase freedom of choice [. . .] The pa-
ternalistic aspect lies in the claim that it is legitimate for choice architects 
to try to influence people’s behavior in order to make their lives longer, 
healthier and better. In other words, we argue for self-conscious efforts, by 
institutions in the private sector and also by government, to steer people’s 
choices in directions that will improve their lives. (Ibid., 5)
Thaler and Sunstein’s political ambitions are much more than mere boasting: 
In 2010, the British Prime Minister David Cameron set up a Behavioural 
Insight Team9, commonly called the “nudge unit”, in order to explore the 
potentials of Thaler and Sunstein’s concepts for governance. According to an 
article in The New York Times, the Whitehouse is currently considering to 
set up a similar programme in the United States (cf. Bennhold 2013).
Like choice architectures, gamification is envisioned by its proponents 
as universal remedy to make the world a better place, as made especially 
obvious in the talks and writings of Jane McGonigal: “What if we decided 
to use everything we know about game design to fix what’s wrong with real-
ity?”(2011, 7) For McGonigal, gamification holds the potential to motivate 
every individual to behave more responsibly, to cope better with problems, 
to feed on better nutrition, to be less messy etc. But most of the gamifica-
tion techniques entail surveillance. Evgeny Morozov mentions a particularly 
striking example in To Save Everything, Click Here (2013, 2): BinCam, the 
gamified trash can that takes pictures of dumped waste, posts them online, 
9 For more information see: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/behaviour-
al-insights-team (accessed May 1, 2014).
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and awards points for correct separation while exposing unwanted behav-
iour. For Morozov (ibid, 1–6), this and other gamification techniques are 
examples of what he calls “solutionism” – the belief that technological in-
novations would not only solve all possible problems but more importantly 
the tendency to identify all possible situations and states as problems in the 
need of solving. 
In the eyes of Morozov, David Cameron and his nudge unit must ap-
pear as wonderful examples of solutionism. But the European Commission 
jumped on the same bandwagon in their current Horizon2020 programme, 
when they decided to set up a call for research and innovation called “Ad-
vanced Digital Gaming / Gamification Technologies”. Here, consortia of 
academic institutions and commercial enterprises are invited to hand in 
proposals for joined innovation programmes regarding “digital games and 
gamification mechanics in non-leisure contexts” (European Commission 
2014). The text explains that “digital games can [. . .] make a real change in 
the life of a large number of excluded groups, enhancing their better inte-
gration in society” (ibid.) thus praising games and gamification mechan-
ics as tools for political means. The call draws heavily from an issue of the 
European Commision’s in-house science-service Joint Research Centre’s 
“JRC Scientific and Policy Reports”. It describes the political values of “digi-
tal game-based approaches” encompassing gamification and concludes that 
these techniques “show potential in addressing issues of policy concern in-
cluding wellness and aging, education and employability of poor learners, 
improved quality of training and skill development in industry, and civic 
participation” (Centeno 2013, 11).
As honourable as these goals might be, it becomes obvious that in the 
eyes of the European Commission, gamification is a tool for Foucauldian bi-
opolitics: a way to reduce the statistical average of people dying from diseases 
related to obesity, to increase the percent of citizens with appropriate skills 
in reading, writing, arithmetic, or IT that suffice the needs of the market, etc 
(Foucault 2008 / 2004). The enthusiasm of nation-states and supra-national 
organisations to make use of techniques like choice architectures and gam-
ification might indicate that there is more in play than mere solutionism. 
These techniques could indeed be harbingers of a novel style of governance.
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gamification and goveRnmentality
Behind the EU’s interest in gamification lies the same reasoning as in Thaler 
and Sunsteins book (2008). Gamification and choice architectures both 
are examples of governance techniques that are actually quite accurately 
described by liberal paternalism. Drawing on Foucault, both emergent tech-
niques can be analysed as signs of a shift in the dominant mode of govern-
mentality.
With “governmentality” Foucault described specific, historically situ-
ated rationalities of governing (2007 / 2004 and 2008 / 2004). He invented the 
concept independently and probably unaware of the one of governance in 
the political sciences, as defined here by Mark Bevir:
[G]overnance refers [. . .] to all processes of governing, whether under-
taken by a government, a market, or network, whether over a family, tribe, 
formal or informal organization, or territory, and whether through laws, 
norms, power, or language. Governance differs from government in that 
it focuses less on the state and its institutions and more on social practices 
and activities. (Bevir 2012, 1)
Broadly speaking, governmentalities could be described as paradigms of 
governance in the sense of Kuhn (1962). A historically specific governmen-
tality does not only encompass particular governance techniques but also 
the underlying principle, idea, or model behind them. 
Foucault originally coined the term to characterise a specific type of 
governance aimed at the statistical regulation of a state’s population through 
biopolitics, specifically: 
the attempt, starting from the eighteenth century, to rationalize the prob-
lems posed to governmental practice by phenomena characteristic of a 
set of living beings forming a population: health, hygiene, birth rate, life 
expectancy, race [. . .]. (Foucault 2008 / 2004, 317)
Later, he used the concept in a much broader way, which allowed him to 
distinguish different historical modes of governmentality. He discerns to-
day’s governmentality from the Christian and medieval concept of “pastoral 
power” (cf. Foucault 2007 / 2004, 161–185). In those cases, the ruler was 
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considered analogous to a shepherd and conversely the subjects as members 
of a flock that had to be taken care of by worldly and religious means (e.g. by 
confession, penance, and indulgence). This differs vastly from the political 
rationality of the “reason of state”, which developed in early modernity. In 
this Machiavellian doctrine, ruling was conceptualised as rational calcula-
tion of advantages against competing European powers. Every state’s goal 
was to maximise its economic and military power at the cost of the others, 
while preserving internal security through disciplinary means. In reverse, 
every subject’s duty was to maximise the wellbeing of the state. And in order 
to guarantee this appropriate behaviour, the subjects had to be under the 
control of the police.
With the rise of modern economics and liberal thought, a different ra-
tionality of what it meant to rule emerged: the idea that economic power 
stems from a growing, healthy, and educated population with a strong work 
ethic. The wellbeing of the state suddenly depended much more than before 
on the size of its population and the conditions they live in. In consequence, 
the management and administration of population became a fundamental 
part of governance – the birth of biopolitics. In stark contrast to the medi-
eval feudal lords in the time of pastoral power, the individual citizen is now 
unknown to the rulers: not the single subject is the object of regulation but 
the statistically determined collectives of citizens.
Moreover, the “discovery” of seemingly natural market laws in eco-
nomic theory led to the conviction that the optimisation of state power via 
economic prosperity could paradoxically be realised through a limitation of 
regulatory activities. The logic of liberalism demanded that the state guar-
antees the free play of the market to maximise its gains. But in order to let 
the market dynamic unfold, the state’s subjects had to be granted freedoms. 
Thus, the state re-defined its function. It became, in fact, the game master 
and rule keeper of the free play of the market and its citizens. Fittingly, 
Foucault describes this concept of a natural and beneficiary economy as an 
“economic game”:
This is the idea that the economy is basically a game, that it develops as a 
game between partners, that the whole of society must be permeated by 
this economic game, and that the essential role of the state is to define the 
economic rules of the game and to make sure that they are in fact applied. 
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What are these rules? They must be such that the economic game is as ac-
tive as possible and consequently to the advantage of the greatest possible 
number of people [. . .] (Foucault 2008 / 2004, 201–202)
For Foucault, this mode of liberal governmentality is still dominant. It is 
not restricted to actual political institutions like legislative, executive, and 
judiciary organs. It encompasses all institutions and discourses that reg-
ulate the behaviour of the subjects. The order and prosperity of a state is 
obviously not only dependent on some laws and their enforcement by the 
police, courts, and prisons. It is equally dependent on schools, universities, 
hospitals, and much more. The state does not control all of these institutions 
directly but it creates the conditions and the legal boundaries for them, in 
which they are free to act. All its regulatory techniques can be described as 
the definition of game rules. Thus liberal governmentality gives rise to a very 
specific kind of society:
[. . .] a society in which there is an optimization of systems of difference, 
in which the field is left open to fluctuating processes, in which minority 
individuals and practices are tolerated, in which action is brought to bear 
on the rules of the game rather than on the players, and finally in which 
there is an environmental type of intervention instead of the internal sub-
jugation of individuals. (Ibid., 259–260)
It is the paradox of liberal governmentality that it has to enforce disciplinary 
means in order to not only guarantee but to produce the very freedom that is 
its necessary precondition of existence. Freedom might be the precondition 
for prosperity but an excess of freedom can endanger it. For instance, the 
freedom to grow as a company can become dangerous for the free play of the 
market if a monopoly is established. Thus freedom is bound to surveillance 
and discipline.
As in his study Discipline and Punish (1977 / 1975) about disciplinary 
techniques, Foucault refers in his work on governmentality to the liberal phi-
losopher Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and his “panopticon” as epitome of 
disciplinary means – a visionary architecture that allows for perfect surveil-
lance of inmates in prisons. But Bentham did not want to restrict the use of 
this panopticon to the penal system. As the subtitle of his book Panopticon; 
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or the Inspection-House shows, the panopticon should be implemented in 
various institutions of the state, from mental institutions and factories to 
schools: 
[. . .] a New Principle of Construction Applicable to Any Sort of Estab-
lishment, in Which Persons of Any Description Are to Be Kept Under 
Inspection; and in Particular to Penitentiary-Houses, Prisons, Houses of 
Industry, Work-Houses, Poor-Houses, Lazarettos, Manufactories, Hospi-
tals, Mad-Houses, and Schools [. . .]. (Bentham 1995 / 1787)
Omnipresent surveillance might appear contradictory to the idea of liber-
alism for many contemporaries. But not for Bentham, one of the fathers of 
liberal thought, and one of the earliest proponents of universal human rights 
and gender equality. For him, ultimate transparency of everyone to everyone 
is the precondition for the prevention of crimes, the guarantee for civilized 
behaviour, security and thus for freedom. In the Benthamian philosophy, 
surveillance and freedom are inextricably linked.
Contrary to his older interpretations, Foucault (2008 / 2004, 67–68) 
therefore interprets the panopticon in his work on governmentality not 
only as a disciplinary technology but also as one to produce freedom. For 
Bentham, only omnipresent surveillance of all subjects guarantees security, 
and only security guarantees freedom. The responsibility of the state would 
be to intervene wherever the freedom (as free play within defined rules) is 
endangered. Thus Bentham dreamed of a spy system in order to monitor all 
the citizens, to prevent them from crimes, and to encourage them to exhibit 
righteous behaviour (cf. Bentham 1843).
In Bentham’s time, perfect surveillance of all the state’s subjects was ut-
terly impossible. But today, the situation has changed. His vision of the pan-
opticon is obviously similar to Paharia’s praise of the potential of combined 
big data and gamification techniques. Both are advocating a technology that 
allows monitoring and tracking individuals in order to regulate their behav-
iours. Moreover, most of the information about every individual would be 
made public in the form of high scores in social networks, badges, leader-
boards or frequent-flyer status cards – with the public transparency for every 
individual thus achieved competition is then fostered. Bentham and Paharia 
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both aim to create a surveillance infrastructure to secure the free play of 
market mechanics and the efficiency of the workforce.
There is, however, a crucial difference between Bentham’s and Paharia’s 
visions: the means of regulation. Bentham and also Foucault concentrate 
on direct or indirect disciplinary means, but Paharia dreams of establishing 
a motivational system. Disciplinary techniques like punishment or deter-
rence can be considered to be negative feedback: Behaviour that is out of 
line is punished, a given collective is normalised within a defined range of 
allowed differences. Gamification techniques, in contrast, are positive-feed-
back techniques – they encourage desired behaviour via points, badges, and 
leaderboards.
The fundamental difference can be exemplified with the frequent-flyer 
programme discussed above: In airports like in liberal societies, the space 
is structured by borders, separating public from non-public areas, includ-
ing or excluding individuals. But the separated areas in the liberal society 
exist mostly to confine the excluded and the punished, thereby posing de-
terrence to everyone else. They are materialisations of negative feedback. 
But the exclusive areas in the airport exist to privilege the elite, motivating 
the excluded to strive for access. The passengers in the senator lounges are 
not dangerous individuals to be jailed or unwilling workers that have to be 
locked-up in the factory, they are privileged customers who are granted sta-
tus and exclusiveness for being loyal to their airline. They are not disciplined 
to behave correctly or punished because they did not behave so, they are 
rewarded for their past behaviour – thus motivated to continue. The senators 
lounge is a materialisation of positive feedback.
a new goveRnmentality
Gamification and choice architectures are hailed as universal remedies by 
their proponents. This surely is hype. The use of points, badges and leader-
boards has always been common in the military, schools, and to some degree 
even at the workplace (cf. Nelson 2012). Tasks have been transformed into 
games for centuries, as Mathias Fuchs demonstrates. Point systems and to-
ken economies as control methods were already tested in mental institutions 
in the 1960s. What is new, however, is the degree to which such techniques 
can be put to use today. Until recently, the dominant technique of behaviour 
regulation was negative feedback. Now, big data and gamification allow the 
see also 
Fuchs
p. 119–140
and
Raczckowski
p. 150–153
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broad implementation of positive-feedback techniques in various sectors 
of society. This could foreshadow a new mode of governmentality, charac-
terised by the constant monitoring of every individual’s behaviour and its 
regulation through designed options and positive-feedback mechanisms. It 
could be the fulfilment of liberalism. 
The possibility to monitor nearly every move, action, and decision of 
any given subject is not only a blessing for companies who want to man-
age their customer relations, secure their brand loyalty, and maximise the 
effectiveness of their workforce – it also allows for seemingly humane tech-
niques of governance. Gamification makes it possible to effectively moti-
vate intended behaviour in a pleasant way, without the need to appeal to the 
mind or reason. It aims at the regulation of behaviour while circumventing 
attitudes. A passenger does not have to appreciate the image or reliability of 
an airline in order to be loyal, as long as status cards and senator lounges are 
promised. But if that is the case in marketing, it is also true for governance 
techniques: If someone is motivated to choose carrots over bacon by badges 
and leaderboards, he or she does not need to know why carrots are healthier 
but only that they give more points. It might no longer be necessary to teach 
children the value of eating healthy food in order to attain the biopolitical 
goal of a healthy population. Insight is no longer relevant, if all that is tracked 
and regulated is behaviour. The age of reason finally comes to an end.
This, however, could deeply transform our understanding of a demo-
cratic and free society. The Habermasian notion of a deliberate democracy 
might always have been illusionary. But this ideal has been powerful and 
performative over centuries. From Jesus to the proponents of Enlightenment 
to Marxist activists, the education of people was always considered to be a 
venerable goal. Individual insight promised a change in behaviour and thus 
the potential for change in society. Now it seems that people do not have to 
be illuminated but simply regulated by points and badges in order to make 
them fitter, happier, and more productive. In fact, the world could be trans-
formed into an airport.
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fRom engagement to life, 
oR: how to do thingS with 
gamification?
by Paolo Ruffino
intRoduction: what iS the PRoBlem with  
“engagement”?
Let us first outline the meaning of engagement, as it is presented in the 
literature on gamification. In those texts, engagement is one of the most used 
keywords. One of the best known texts about gamification, Gamification by 
Design (Zichermann and Cunningham 2011) starts precisely with a defini-
tion of the notion of engagement:
The term “engagement”, in a business sense, indicates the connection be-
tween a consumer and a product or service. Unsurprisingly, the term is 
also used to name the period in a romantic couple’s relationship during 
which they are preparing and planning to spend the rest of their lives to-
gether. Engagement is the period of time at which we have a great deal of 
connection with a person, place, thing or idea. (Ibid., xvi)
However, for Zichermann and Cunningham, this definition is problematic 
as it is too vague and difficult to apply in a marketing context. Therefore, 
they propose to create a metric to break down engagement: 
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We would be better off thinking of engagement as being comprised of a 
series of potentially interrelated metrics that combine to form a whole. 
These metrics are: recency, frequency, duration, virality, ratings. Col-
lectively, they can be amalgamated as an ‘E’ (or engagement) score.  
(Ibid., xvi)
Engagement is presented here as a “score”. The need to count, number and 
evaluate appears quite often in gamification. It is frequently brought for-
ward in order to record data and compare results. In one of the most often 
mentioned examples of gamification, what comes to be quantified is “life” 
itself. This is in fact what NikeFuel (2012), a recent development of the 
(2006) series of sport applications developed by Nike, states in its advertise-
ment:
Our minds, our bodies and our experience all tell us that movement is life 
and that the more we move the more we live. It’s something athletes have 
understood from the beginning. The kind of movement it takes to im-
prove your game is the kind of movement it takes to improve your life. But 
unlike sport, life doesn’t come with convenient ways of measuring move-
ment. So we developed one. NikeFuel: a single universal unit uniquely de-
signed to measure the movement of the entire human body for the entire 
human race, whatever your weight, whatever your gender, whatever your 
activity. It’s that simple and that revolutionary. So get out there, find what 
fuels you and get moving. (Nike Inc., 2013)
NikeFuel is a service based on a wearable technology that counts, via an ac-
celerometer, how much the body moves during its daily activities. In so do-
ing it provides a number, which is supposed to quantify movement – and life, 
which is allegedly the same thing. Again, what can be seen here is an attempt 
to engage sport practitioners, and potentially beginners, through a service 
that quantifies what would be otherwise difficult or problematic to quantify.
In this paper I will suggest that this specific idea of engagement, as it 
is presented in the books on gamification and its applications, has in fact 
a problem with the notion of life. Participation and involvement of the 
players should have an impact, in the theories of gamification, on their daily 
lives. However the ways in which this impact is performed brings about a 
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rather limiting concept of life, one that remains static rather than being in 
movement. 
What sort of notion of life and movement is performed by gamification 
apps? Nike+, for instance, connects to a mobile device and records, via GPS, 
and an accelerometer the path and pace of a runner. Nike+ is a system that is 
designed to receive and record already predicted signals; it rewards precise 
events, which are already expected by the simulation. It works as a system 
for recording and reviewing runners’ performances, and compares them 
with each other, on a local or global scale. The runner/player of Nike+ is 
brought to comply with a frame of rules, which works as a regulatory frame, 
where only specific events are expected, saved, calculated, and evaluated. 
Through this practice of compliance, the runner/player of Nike+ is normal-
ised, and regulates him or herself in order to maintain and progress in a 
process of constant self-normalisation. As Foucault notes (1977), discipli-
nary practices tend to optimise the body and stimulate its submissiveness. A 
mobile application such as Nike+ produces docile bodies while disciplining 
their sport activity and punishing their eventual failure. Failure here comes 
to be defined not only as failure to improve the body’s performance, but 
more subtly as failure to produce the expected data, to update the system as 
frequently as possible and to provide information about the body. Nike+ is 
not a game to play, but mostly to update.
There are many other examples of gamification apps that propose to 
motivate the player in sport and fitness practises. On a similar note, the 
game SuperBetter (2012), designed by Jane McGonigal, works in a similar 
fashion, while attempting to regulate physical and mental health. The goals 
to achieve (losing weight, running a marathon, connecting with friends and 
relatives and similar ones), and the tasks offered to reach such goals, pre-
scribe a limited set of possibilities for improving one’s life. Games such as 
Nike+ and SuperBetter tend to limit the possibilities of play, and can also 
be seen as conservative images of a way of living. Both games, or gaming 
platforms, offer a unique path to the achievement of well being, where what 
is defined as good for the body is catalogued and presented as necessarily 
positive.
It is from these considerations about the conservative visions of life that 
come to be performed by gamification apps that I propose to rethink our 
own possibilities for critical participation. I will suggest that reconsidering 
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life and movement can be crucial in rethinking engagement, gamification, 
and more generally the performativity of video games. I will do so through 
the work of anthropologist Tim Ingold, who has been closely inspired by 
Bergson’s notions of intuition, creativity, and vitalism. Bergson’s idea of life 
as movement, strikingly similar to Nike’s slogan, will be presented in its rad-
ical difference to what Nike and the gamification gurus have been proposing 
so far. Before going through the theories of Ingold and Bergson, I will look 
at how different perspectives on what gamification supposedly is and does 
have been expressed in the academic field. I will conclude the final section 
by pointing out how a certain idea of the performativity of video games, of 
their agency and effects, could be seen as replicated in ways that are not too 
greatly dissimilar from what gamification gurus have been promoting.
cRitiqueS of gamification
As a response to the emergence of gamification, one of the reactions in the 
academic world interested in digital gaming has been to propose a more 
moderate understanding of this newly emerging phenomenon, possibly 
eliminating the marketing aspects involved. It is from this context that 
Sebastian Deterding and colleagues have proposed a relatively simple defi-
nition of gamification: “gamification is the use of game design elements in 
non-game contexts” (Deterding et al. 2011, 2). The above quote has been 
accepted in the academic discourse over the last couple of years as a good 
description of the term gamification.
As reported by Deterding and colleagues, gamification is not the only 
term used to label the practice of adopting game design techniques in a non-
game experience:
Parallel terms continue being used and new ones are still being intro-
duced, such as “productivity games”, “surveillance entertainment”, “fun-
ware”, “playful design”, “behavioral games”, “game layer” or “applied gam-
ing”. Yet “gamification” has arguably managed to institutionalize itself as 
the common household term. (Ibid., 1)
The paper by Deterding and colleagues helps to define gamification beyond 
the enthusiastic talk that usually transpires in the uses of the term since Jane 
McGonigal made it popular through a series of TED talks and her book 
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Reality is Broken: Why Games Make Us Better and How They Can Change 
the World (2011). However, gamification has received a relatively large num-
ber of more or less consistent definitions and studies of the origin of the 
term and its political implications (Nelson 2012; Fuchs 2012; Jacobs 2012; 
Mosca 2012). This is partly due to the concept’s background. Gamification 
is in fact mostly a marketing concept, developed and promoted by designers 
and business consultants. In this context a clear and simple definition soon 
became a necessity in order to sell gamification to existing businesses (and 
sometimes also to public institutions). It is for this reason, probably, that 
most texts on gamification take the form of guidelines and instructions on 
how to gamify a certain experience. The term has been further defined in the 
academic context as well, simply replicating the how-to approach of many 
publications (e.g. “Gamification” module at Pennsylvania University, held 
by prof. Kevin Werbach, also seen in Werbach and Hunter 2012) or, occa-
sionally, articulating what else could be involved in the phenomenon (“Re-
thinking Gamification” workshop at Centre for Digital Cultures, Leuphana 
University, May 2013). 
Deterding and colleagues attempt to define gamification, but say little of 
what gamification does and what it could do, which I believe are much more 
relevant questions. These are in fact questions more directly challenging the 
discourse on the potential effects of digital games, which is what the promot-
ers of gamification insist on. The attempts to further elaborate what could be 
at stake with gamification are not many, and the present paper aims precisely 
at addressing this point. New definitions of gamification, in fact, would not 
yet tell us why we should be interested in it, and what we could make of it.
Ian Bogost has attempted to address a more nuanced question about 
gamification, firstly by saying that, from what we have seen so far, the tech-
nique should be renamed “exploitationware” (2011a) – or elsewhere, and 
more explicitly, “bullshit” (2011b) – and secondly by exploring the potential 
uses of video games in his text How to do Things with Videogames (2011c). 
His first argument can be summarised as follows. Gamification has little to 
do with the design of games, as it tends to reduce them to a predictable se-
ries of mechanisms to attract players / customers. Such mechanisms include 
the use of leaderboards, rankings, and badges to award the best players, 
as well as quick and unchallenging tasks to encourage players and make 
them feel gratified. However, Bogost argues game design (or at least “good” 
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game design) has been trying to complicate such techniques by introduc-
ing more varied tasks, demanding a variety of skills from the players and 
possibly questioning the experience of playing through complex narratives. 
Gamification does not attempt to achieve any of these goals, as it is uniquely 
interested in maximising the activity of the users, and potentially turning 
them into “better” customers, or unpaid contributors to their business. 
Therefore, according to Bogost, it should not be embellished by the word 
“game”, and should be more correctly called “exploitationware”.
Bogost also adds that “serious games” is instead a much fairer nomen-
clature than gamification. Bogost has supported on several occasions those 
games that show a political or activist agenda (for instance, in his work on 
“persuasive” games, 2007). Serious games, in fact, combine two apparently 
contradictory words to describe a challenge to the design of games through 
which players are supposed to question their own knowledge and beliefs. 
The serious aspect serves to distinguish these emerging kinds of video 
games from more facetious forms of entertainment (Bogost 2011a, 2011b). 
Bogost expands his view on serious games in the text How to do Things with 
Videogames (2011c). Here the reference to Austin’s How to do Things with 
Words (1962) is explicit, and so is the attempt to introduce a debate on the 
potential of video games from a perspective that is possibly more nuanced 
than the one seen in the context of gamification. This means, according to 
Bogost, that a better understanding of the potential of digital games entails 
an expansion of the number of things attainable from them: not only to be 
used as entertainment tools, or as part of marketing campaigns and self-help 
applications, as proposed in gamification, but also as objects with an artistic 
value, or as elements of social and political campaigns, and much more.
In How to do Things with Videogames, Bogost lists and analyses some 
of the possible uses for digital games that have recently emerged, including 
games with political content, promotional games displaying in-game adver-
tisements, games used for propaganda or activism and those with artistic 
purposes. He also discusses, through several short chapters, how games 
could provoke “empathy”, “reverence”, “relaxation”, “disinterest” and “drill”, 
among many other effects. Bogost argues that we can understand the rele-
vance of a medium by looking at the variety of things it does: “we can think 
of a medium’s explored uses as a spectrum, a possibility space that extends 
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from purely artistic uses at one end [. . .] to purely instrumental uses at the 
other [. . .]”  (2011c, 3).
Bogost’s answer to the debates on the potential of the medium of the 
video game is to avoid binaries and oppositions between serious and su-
perficial technologies. He proposes instead what he calls an ecological un-
derstanding of the medium, inspired by McLuhan and Postman’s theory 
of media. In this view, according to Bogost, media affect the environment 
where they are introduced at a variety of levels, not necessarily to be eval-
uated in positive or negative terms. Bogost’s response to gamification, and 
more broadly to the idea that video games can be used for achieving specific 
effects, contests the institutionalisation and appropriation from the side of 
the marketing context of the alleged transformations of the medium cur-
rently happening through the emergence of gamification. However, it does 
not yet tell us how the binaries he evokes could be further complicated and 
possibly surpassed, and therefore does not propose a way of thinking about 
video games that could be seen as radically different from what McGonigal, 
Zichermann and colleagues evangelise about.
The question of what we can do with video games receives a more varied 
response from Bogost, when compared with any of the gamification gurus. 
However, what persists is the idea that the medium of the video game has 
a certain impact on its users – an impact which could be more or less pre-
dicted and channelled through design.
While this and similar approaches to the study and design of video 
games can work well for specific purposes,1 I would like to propose differ-
ent questions, and not just for the sake of proposing something different, or 
because different is “good for its own sake”. I think instead that a process of 
rethinking gamification, while maybe not urgently needed in the marketing 
sector, is quite indispensible for the debates about the medium of the video 
game, where the performativity of games (and the theories about them) has 
yet to be investigated properly. 
1 See for example how the theories by Ian Bogost have been discussed in the debates on what 
is known as procedurality; seen as a method for both the critic and the design of video 
games that want to “communicate messages to players” through “rhetorical strategies” and 
arguments, each allegedly deriving from a specific component of a video game (Treanor et 
al., 2011). 
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In the following section, I will consider the question of gamification as 
proposed by both its gurus and detractors, and as rephrased by Bogost, with 
reference to Austin: as “how to do things with video games?” I will discuss 
how the anthropological perspective proposed by Tim Ingold (2010, 2011) 
can suggest how to rethink gamification, and not necessarily against the cur-
rent proposals originating from the non-academic contexts. The reason why 
Ingold’s perspectives could prove useful in this context is that they directly 
address how objects and things (the distinction soon to be debated) come to 
be constituted, and with what implications. I will argue, via Ingold, that the 
discourses on gamification tend to produce objects (gamified apps) allegedly 
composed of identifiable parts that can each potentially affect players. The 
theories against gamification contribute to this process of objectification by 
expanding it to the entire medium of the video game. I will now discuss how 
we could think differently about gamification in particular and video games 
in general. 
gamification and the life of thingS
I will be addressing this issue through the contribution provided by Tim 
Ingold, whose work, although not explicitly related to games or video 
games, questions the concept of performativity from an anthropological 
perspective. In the discourses about gamification the focus is on the agency 
of games: games can “do something” to their players, they have a certain 
power to affect players in a more or less predictable way. As Ingold would 
put it, agency is a term often brought into a debate in order to resuscitate the 
concept of materiality. In this view, objects have a certain material presence 
that does something to us; they have a certain agency with regard to the 
surrounding environment. However, Ingold suggests, while thinking in this 
way we tend to be suffocated by “the dead hand of materiality” (Ingold 2011, 
28). Ingold here means that agency and materiality are not only forms of ab-
straction that overshadow the nuanced relations between human beings and 
the surrounding environment, but, as concepts, they also actively produce 
this distinction. The distinction remains even when agency and materiality 
are nuanced and complicated and this is why they (metaphorically!) strangle 
our thinking. Through Ingold, I will question how this distinction is also 
replicated in the discourses on gamification, and I will attempt to articulate 
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a different reading of gamification by re-imagining the relation between hu-
man beings (players or game scholars) and video games.
In Ingold’s perspective a crucial role is played by the distinction be-
tween objects and things, which he draws on Martin Heidegger’s essay “The 
Thing” (1971). The distinction is useful in the context of my work because it 
helps to move from understanding engagement as the result of a cause-and-
effect relation (one in which video games do something to us or us to them). 
While drawing on Heidegger’s essay he comments:
The object stands before us as a fait accompli, presenting its congealed, 
outer surfaces to our inspection. It is defined by its very “overagainstness” 
in relation to the setting in which it is placed (Heidegger 1971, 167). The 
thing, by contrast, is a “going on”, or better, a place where several goings 
on become entwined. To observe a thing is not to be locked out but to be 
invited in to the gathering. (Ingold 2010, 4)
Ingold follows from this that things are constantly in contact with each other 
through their surfaces. This contact is what makes it possible for “things” to 
“gather” and participate in each other’s presence. Imagining the environ-
ment to be populated by objects suggests the image of an excavated world, 
similar to a piece of Swiss cheese (Ingold 2011, 24). Objects are seen here 
to be separated and abstracted from the environment. In this view, objects 
need to be “resuscitated” by what is commonly called “agency”. Instead, 
Ingold argues, things fill the environment and are entangled with one an-
other, in “a meshwork of interwoven lines of growth and movement” (Ingold 
2010, 4). Things are alive, as much as we are. The perspective offered by Ingold 
is more than an attempt to avoid a sort of horror vacui of an environment 
where objects are “cut” and surrounded by an empty space. There is still, for 
Ingold, the need to make sense of our own participations, as “things” our-
selves, participating in the world. He sums up his point saying, “[i]n effect, 
to render the life of things as the agency of objects is to effect a double 
reduction, of things to objects and of life to agency” (ibid., 7).
It is not my purpose to consider what Ingold names a “double reduc-
tion” to be necessarily negative, strangling, or a “dead hand”. It can in fact 
be said to be working fine in those contexts where engagement is intended 
as an effect, something that video games can do to their players. However, I 
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find Ingold’s theory interesting for the ways in which it thinks about partic-
ipation as “living” with and “within”, as a sort of co-existence, which I see as 
radically different from thinking in terms of engagement as “doing some-
thing to someone”. Through Ingold, we no longer pose the question of what 
video games (and gamified apps) can do to us, but of what it means to par-
ticipate and live in a world populated by video games.2
Life is here a crucial concept for Ingold, and he explicitly mentions 
Bergson and his Creative Evolution as one of the major influences for his 
work (ibid., 13). From Bergson, Ingold develops the notion of life as move-
ment and duration. Bergson argues that we, as humans, tend to capture the 
things around us intellectually, interrupting the flow of life to freeze, con-
trol, and transform things into forms. However, this process loses sight of 
movement. The intellectual faculty of our mind is accompanied by the in-
tuitive faculty, which we rarely exercise but which persists and occasionally 
comes through. Intuition, for Bergson, originates from the “vital impulse” 
shared by all living species. While intelligence is analytical, in that it divides 
and recomposes things in order to give us the knowledge we need to satisfy 
our needs, intuition instead gives us the knowledge of how things are in 
constant movement and always in the process of becoming other (Bergson 
1914 / 1907). 
Creativity is that which accounts for the continuity of life, the move-
ment of things, and at the same time for the discontinuity of such things, the 
2 Which is not the same question that Bogost proposes in Alien Phenomenology, Or, What 
It’s like to Be a Thing (2012). Bogost proposes an analysis of how objects, or things, expe-
rience the world surrounding them. In his attempt to reflect on what experience could 
be like outside of an anthropocentric view, and how this could lead to different morals 
and ethics, Bogost does not eliminate the essential alien quality of the objects/things he 
uses as examples. To interrogate ourselves on the “ethics of the spark plug, the piston, the 
fuel injector, or the gasoline” (Bogost 2012, 75) when looking at the engine of a car, can 
indeed be a different question from seeing how a car engine is entangled with human ac-
tivities. However, it is not yet telling us much about how the plug, piston, injector and gas-
oline “happen to us”, how come they have been divided as such, as separate and abstracted 
objects, and how such process of “cutting” the environment makes sense to us, what is at 
stake in it, and how it could be otherwise: In other words, we do not yet know from such an 
analysis of “aliens” how we are participating in the analysis itself, how we are in contact – 
physically, intellectually, or intuitively – with the engine of a car, or any other system. 
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diversity of matter that we tend to intellectually fixate in time and space. Our 
task, for Bergson, is to reconnect with the intuitive faculty and participate in 
the life of things, in order to reach absolute knowledge. What does it mean, 
then, for us, to creatively participate in such a “flow of life”? It means, first of 
all, that the very idea of the agency of objects of any sort (words, technolo-
gies, human beings, etc.) has to be rethought as being less a transitive action 
(doing something to someone else) and more a dynamic state of being, a 
property that allows things “to be alive” in the world. 
BRinging life into gamification (and game StudieS)
But what does it mean to be alive? More importantly, how can this be helpful 
for a study of gamification, or the study of video games more generally? In 
this section I will further articulate these questions through the work of Tim 
Ingold, Patrick Crogan and Henry Bergson. First I will discuss how Ingold 
sees the “world” or environment as composed of “materials”, and how this 
aspect recuperates a narrative side of theory as that which makes sense (and 
in fact constitutes) the properties of the things around us. With Crogan I will 
connect this way of looking at our engagement and presence in the world 
with a study of video games (and of what we can do with them). I will then 
investigate, through Bergson (in fact, a main reference in Ingold’s work), 
how this ultimately brings to the notions of movement and freedom as nec-
essarily connected to the ways in which we engage with the world. 
What I have addressed thus far as a problem of rethinking our engage-
ment with games is formulated by Ingold in different terms, as a problem of 
understanding life. The meanings of being alive, and ways of bringing things 
to life, are the main concerns of Ingold’s anthropological endeavour. He 
argues that the question of “life” is inherently connected to the physical pres-
ence of things in the environment, and that this question is hindered by the 
theories of materiality. Ingold argues that materiality is a concept derived 
from a sort of “academic perversion” (2011, 20). Ingold draws on Gibson’s 
theory of perception to suggest that it is in the problem of the boundary 
that materiality demonstrates its inconsistency. If we consider objects to be 
in contact, physically, with the external environment, to be immersed in 
different “materials”, then the boundary appears to be artificial. However, 
the problem, for Ingold, is not really in the artificiality of the boundary, but 
rather in what it offers in the understanding of our presence in the world, 
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and what it eliminates: “[M]aterials do not present themselves as tokens 
of some common essence – materiality – that endows every worldly entity 
with its inherent ‘objectness’ rather they partake in the very processes of the 
world’s ongoing generation and regeneration [. . .]” (ibid., 26).
Shifting the focus to materials, rather than materiality, is what allows 
Ingold to re-evaluate the human presence in the environment, an aspect he 
finds to be articulated, in the theories of agency, in a distinction human ver-
sus matter. He takes the example of a stone, which can become wet by being 
dropped in water. After a certain amount of time, water will evaporate and 
the stone will be dry. The appearance of the stone has indeed changed, and 
so have its properties. The wet stone will feel and sound different from the 
dry one. What can we say then of the “materiality” of the stone? Has the dry 
stone more “stoniness” than the wet stone? Ingold argues:
There is no way in which its stoniness can be understood apart from 
the ways it is caught up in the interchanges across its surface, between 
medium and substance [. . . T]he stone has actually changed as it dried 
out. Stoniness, then, is not the stone’s “nature”, in its materiality, nor is 
it merely in the mind of the observer or practitioner. Rather, it merges 
through the stone’s involvement in its total surroundings – including you, 
the observer – and from the manifold ways in which it is engaged in the 
currents of the lifeworld. (Ingold 2011, 32)
If the observer is also considered to be part of that same “lifeworld” of the 
things around him or her, then the distinction in quality and hierarchy be-
tween subject and object comes into dispute. Ingold ultimately proposes a 
different narrative of engagement, one that does not have much to share with 
the narrative that has been emerging in contemporary video game culture 
thus far, but that could tell us something about how we engage, also, with 
digital games. What he offers is indeed a different way of thinking about our 
own immersion in the world, as thinkers, doers, scholars, producers, and 
consumers. These practices, however, are thought less as transitive actions 
and more as what results from a co-presence of live materials.
The crucial aspect in Ingold’s theory that I would like to bring into the 
debate on gamification is that what ultimately comes to re-evaluation is the 
narrative aspect of theory. Rather than looking for the essential properties 
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of objects and their supposed effects, Ingold 
encourages the creation of narratives of those 
same properties in which different forms of 
participation are presented. However, those 
same narratives are immediately revealed as 
necessarily strategic and partial. They in fact 
actively constitute, each time they are per-
formed, the properties of which they talk about, by cutting a series of lines 
(as Ingold, 2007, puts it) to form new things. In this way Ingold recuperates 
the performative potential of theory, as that which is capable of bringing 
things to life through a narrative of our participation with them. 
How can this perspective prove useful when rethinking gamification, 
and how can it contribute to the study of digital games in general? Draw-
ing on Ingold’s approach to theory can prove useful when trying to counter 
the conservative side of gamified applications, as discussed earlier. In fact, 
Ingold does not simply propose a way of looking at things, but also to nar-
ratively rethink those same things and bring about new ones, possibly more 
interesting and, if needed, less conservative. Gamified systems, of which 
Nike+ and SuperBetter are examples, can in fact be seen as conservative 
tools, where unexpected and original ways of thinking about a specific prac-
tice are ruled out. But also, possibly, they are inevitably so. The struggle to 
eliminate uncertainty appears in the very origin of cybernetics and digital 
simulations. This is what Patrick Crogan argues in his text Gameplay Mode: 
War, Simulation and Technoculture (2011) through an analysis of the histor-
ical and ideological relations between the video game industry and military 
developments.
Crogan’s text can be seen as creating a link (although not intended 
by the author) between the Ingold’s theory and the field of game studies. 
Crogan in fact, while trying to reconsider the foundations of the approaches 
to the study of video games, similarly concludes in favour of a re-evaluation 
of the performative aspect of theory and its capacity to bring about spe-
cific realities. Crogan points out that the study of video games has tended 
towards an uncritical acceptance of the ideology of cybernetics (Crogan 
2011, 145). In Espen Aarseth’s (1997) original proposal for a study of “cyber-
texts” this meant the dismissal of a semiotic approach in the study of com-
puter games in favour of a study of the interpretation of “cybernetic signs”, 
What if we consider 
gamified systems  
to be part of that same world 
that it is claimed they  
are affecting?
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arbitrarily determined by the relation between a coded, invisible level and an 
expressive, visible level (ibid., 24–41). From Aarseth’s approach, computer 
programming determines not only the ways in which cybertexts, including 
computer games, are structured but also their interpretation: “[T]he concept 
of cybertext focuses on the mechanical organization of the text, by positing 
the intricacies of the medium as an integral part of the literary exchange” 
(ibid., 1). However, Crogan argues that the “intricacies of the medium”, as 
Aarseth puts it, derive from a specific ideology. It is the same ideology that 
has been framing military research and the study of simulations, as systems 
for the pre-emption of possible future events. His proposal is to counter, 
from an academic and artistic perspective, what he describes as:
[The] overarching tendency of the program industries to standardize and 
predetermine the nature of access and utilization of their products. Nev-
ertheless one can play, and design and co-create [. . .] or becoming the 
bugs, artifacts, mods, critical and creative readings and appropriation, 
and other accidental becomings that alter what we can do with games, 
what games do with us, and what they give us to think about what we are 
doing with them now and tomorrow. (Crogan 2011, 174–175)
Similarly to Ingold, Crogan also proposes to bring the focus on our possibil-
ities for reading creatively. Crogan’s contribution to the recurring question 
of how to do things with games, and of what they do to us, which I have 
argued is also the basis of the discourses surrounding gamification, is useful 
and relevant for a variety of reasons. First, Crogan highlights how the logic 
of the “war on contingency” subsumed by the military-industrial complex 
is not only important in the development of forms of digital entertainment, 
but is also present in the ways we (gamers and scholars) tend to make sense 
of these entertainment forms. Second, he proposes that one possible way of 
thinking outside of such weltanschauung is to rethink the physical presence 
of the players and the materiality of games and game technologies. The prob-
lem of materiality and of our physical and intuitive participation is seen by 
Crogan in the light of an historical and ideological background that shapes 
both the medium of the video game and the theory about it.
I would like to expand on these suggestions and connect Crogan’s analy-
sis of the medium of the video game with Ingold’s proposal for an anthropo-
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logical rethinking of the concepts of performativity, materiality, and agency. 
I believe that these two perspectives, distant from each other with regard to 
the objectives they aim to achieve, can in fact contribute by saying some-
thing different about gamification.
I think that what calls for some alternative modes of thinking is the 
rather unproductive dead-end into which gamification and its critique have 
confined themselves. Drawing on the introduction to this paper, the state-
ment “movement is life”, presented by Nike in the advertisement of Nike-
Fuel, is interpreted by the sport company as if being alive could somehow be 
a problem: “[L]ife doesn’t come with convenient ways of measuring move-
ment”, says the advertisement (Nike Inc., 2013). Nike’s response to this prob-
lem is that each singular activity of the body should come to be quantified 
and counted by the application. In doing so NikeFuel disregards movement 
as a process of knowledge, as wayfaring (in Ingold’s terms), and applies in-
stead a notion of movement as homogenous, and divisible into homogenous 
unities. In this sense, movement is spatialised here, as the notion of scientific 
time introduced by Bergson in his Time and Free Will: an Essay on the Imme-
diate Data of Consciousness (2001 / 1889). Bergson proposed that to account 
for duration we cannot limit ourselves to the scientific time but also allow 
an intuitive understanding of time and space. Scientific time, the kind of 
time we measure and quantify, is expressed through numbers. As such, it is 
based on the idea of a homogenous space as it implies the presence of a unit 
of measure, which is juxtaposed to the next unit, as if temporal units were 
linearly disposed. Spatialised time also brings the notions of determinism 
and causation, as individual moments are seen as one being the effect of the 
other, following one another in a cause-effect relation. 
The production of a “single universal way to measure all kinds of activ-
ities [. . . to track] your active life” (Nike, Inc., 2013) is another way of reg-
ulating movement, and in fact also performatively produce, in a Foucaltian 
sense, a notion of life as measurable and traceable through data. By tracing, 
measuring and quantifying, NikeFuel, and gamification in general, freeze 
movement and life through the separation and invention of fixities, through 
what Bergson would define as an intellectual approach, and replicating the 
notion of time that Bergson identifies as belonging to ancient Greek phi-
losophy (and Zeno’s conception of time and space in particular). Bergson’s 
contribution is highly relevant in the context of this paper because it is 
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ultimately concerned with the possibility of freedom within such a notion 
of time.
By introducing a question about life, rather than engagement, in the 
discourses about the things that we can do with games (and gamification) 
I have tried precisely to propose that we have freedom, that is, a multitude 
of possibilities of movement (not only physical but intuitive and creative). In 
the final part of this paper, I will attempt to map some possible ways for such 
forms of intervention which exemplify how a different way of “doing things 
with games” might take form. In these examples, taken mostly from the art 
context, our engagement with video games is understood through a different 
configuration, which inquires – rather than merely replicating – the duali-
ties and separations that tend to frame the processes of understanding of 
digital games. These proposals investigate the materials which video games 
are made of, and the significance of dwelling and playing in a world of mate-
rials. Yet, they also propose temporary fixities, cuts in an ongoing process of 
mediating our presence in such a world.3 
gaziRa BaBeli and game aRthRitiS: game StudieS By 
diffeRent meanS
The works I would like to introduce are by the artist Gazira Babeli (an avatar 
in the game Second Life) and a piece by Matteo Bittanti and the collective 
IOCOSE. In these investigations, conceived and presented mostly within the 
context of art galleries and festivals, I believe a suggestion can be found as 
to what else game studies could be, and on what is at stake in finding an 
alternative.
The work by Babeli that I would like to introduce is a piece she made in 
2006, entitled Come to Heaven. I will propose to look at this performance as 
a potentially different perspective on the relationship between digital games 
3 The perspective I propose while looking at these two examples is strongly inspired by 
Sarah Kember and Joanna Zylinska’s work Life After new Media: Mediation as Vital 
Process (2012). I do not articulate this reference much further in this context, for the sake 
of brevity, but I encourage exploring their approach. Kember and Zylinska look at possible 
ways for “doing things” with media, as a form of invention and scholarly critique. The 
theoretical foundation for their intervention is also strongly inspired by Bergson’s vitalism, 
although much more fully developed in their text than in this paper.
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and the materials they are made of, the ways in which games are played 
and how they can be understood to reach unexpected results. I suggest 
that thinking about video games in the terms proposed by Babeli entails, 
possibly, looking less at the performativity of games and more at games as 
“performers”. In the example I will now introduce I believe this happens in 
quite an interesting way. I propose that this artistic investigation explores the 
materials of which video games are made, and our co-existence with these 
materials, in a way, which is radically alternative (although not intentionally, 
considering its date of publication) to the ways in which the question of per-
formativity is currently debated with regard to gamification. 
Babeli was a code performer, and avatar in Second Life (2003) – her 
artistic career was intentionally stopped a few years ago, so it is appropriate 
to talk about her in the past tense, as a dead artist. Her work investigated 
the possibility of performing in a digital online environment such as Second 
Life. In Come to Heaven (2006), one of the pieces I find to be most relevant 
to her career, Babeli lets her avatar (her “body” in the digital simulation) fall 
from a very high point in the sky of Second Life. While falling, the 3D model 
of the avatar tends to lose its integrity, and generates a series of unpredictable 
glitches.4 
Babeli’s work centres on one essential property of digital simulations. 
That is, digital simulations, by participating in the “war on contingency” (as 
proposed by Crogan), will replicate the same script with the same identical 
results, regardless of the spatial and temporal context where the script is per-
formed. Babeli’s intervention consists in allowing her avatar to automatically 
repeat the same script, which forces the avatar to fly up to the highest point 
in the digital simulation and then freefall down to the ground. She repeated 
the same script on different computers, with different hardware and at differ-
ent times of day (i.e. with different Internet connection speeds and traffic).
The outcome of her work is a series of still images of the falls. The 
performance stresses the graphic engine of the game and the graphic ca-
pabilities of each of the computers on which the same code is performed 
(or, rather, “performs”). Babeli highlights the unpredictability of the engine 
4 Documentation of Babeli’s Come to Heaven is available online at: http://www.gazirababeli.
com/cometoheaven.php (accessed May 6, 2014). 
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itself, which mixes the textures of the 3D model in different ways each time 
it is run. At stake here is not only a way of playing with the logic of the script. 
Babeli, more interestingly, questions the iterability of the code, which makes 
it reliable and worthwhile, through the material from which the computers 
are made. 
Babeli’s crucial move is that she does not play the video game Second 
Life, but rather sets it up to perform itself. She is not producing, or consum-
ing the game. Babeli’s intervention is not, simply, a form of re-appropriation 
of the game product, or a form of “active consumerism”. Indeed, she had to 
program the script beforehand, take the screenshots and so on, but the inter-
esting part of the work is when the hardware performs such a script, when 
the game plays itself and makes itself visible for the materials from which it 
is made. It becomes crucial, in Babeli’s concept, to document and report not 
only the screenshots of the performance but also the precise hardware that 
has been performing in each instance. Graphic cards, CPUs, and RAMs are 
the performers, communicating with the Second Life servers in California, 
and unpredictably generating graphic deformations while overheating and 
“crashing”. As Babeli comments, “[. . .] millions of meters away, at a very 
high speed. The effect obtained on the graphic card of the computer is hard 
to anticipate and it depends on the creativity process of the card itself. Yes, 
cards go bananas [. . .]” (Gazira Babeli 2006).
Letting cards go bananas is, potentially, one of the many ways to in-
vestigate how the narrative of pre-emption (as Crogan would put it), which 
underlies the computer script, can be narrated otherwise. Babeli’s work does 
not offer an answer, neither it does crystallise into a technique for “doing 
things with games”. It rather offers a temporary perspective on what else 
scripts, and video games, are, what they are made of, and how our ideas about 
them can be challenged by inquiring into such material presence. Babeli 
offers what Crogan, through Samuel Weber, has defined as a “theatrical” 
gesture (Crogan 2011, 141), which questions our participation in the video 
game Second Life, looks at what this participation is made of and how does 
it happen rather than, too simply, framing the answer on a cause-effect or 
producer-consumer binary.
Another example that similarly inquires about the ways in which we live 
and co-exist with video games is Game Arthritis. Game Arthritis is an art 
project presented at the Venice Biennale in 2011 by Matteo Bittanti, adjunct 
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professor at the California College of the Arts, and the collective IOCOSE, 
of which I have myself been a member since its inception in 2006. Game 
Arthritis (2011) is a photographic documentation of a “systemic study of 
video game induced diseases”.5 It investigates the topic of the alleged effects 
of video games, particularly from the angle of medical and scientific dis-
course. Moreover, it questions the ways in which we tend to narrate what 
video games do to us, and us to them. The project is inspired by, and directly 
refers to, a series of publications that, until the early 2000s, claimed that 
video games would affect an entire generation of teenagers by altering their 
bodies due to prolonged use of video game interfaces. From a Foucaultian 
perspective, game arthritis and the other differently named disorders (the 
“3D Optical Disorder”, “Playstation Thumb”, “Wii Shoulder Dislocation” and 
so on) could be seen to have been brought about by authoritarian statements, 
such as articles in medical journals on the evidence of their emergence, and 
reinforced by mainstream newspapers and video game magazines. However, 
game arthritis and other disabilities are also symptomatic of a deterministic 
narrative, which permeates both the scientific and mainstream discourse. 
According to this view, video games can harm people – a narrative not nec-
essarily dissimilar, in its logic, when reverted through a positive connotation 
(as in Jane McGonigal’s “video games will save the world” slogan). Game 
Arthritis, the art project, displayed in 2011, what should have been the sci-
entific evidence of the studies published in the early 2000s. No evidence has 
ever been found, despite the diseases being analysed in peer-reviewed sci-
entific journals. The photographic “documentation” shocks the viewer with 
its disturbing images, which should appear familiar (as this is what we have 
been told video games can do to our bodies) and yet unfamiliar at the same 
time, as an actual image to prove the alleged effects of digital games has 
never been provided. Also, the images of Game Arthritis do not match the 
current trend of describing video games through positive and celebratory 
narratives as an art form, or as good for health and in preparing the pro-
fessional class of the next generation (as enthusiastically argued, in the first 
5 Documentation of the artwork by Bittanti and IOCOSE is available at http://gamearthritis.
org (accessed May 6, 2014). More information and references are available on IOCOSE’s 
website at http://www.iocose.org/works/game_arthritis (Accessed May 6, 2014).
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consistent study, by Beck and Wade 2004). It proposes what appears to be 
a sort of conspiracy narrative, according to which the game industry has 
been hiding evidence that would have proved the concerns of the scientific 
community. 
Game Arthritis summarises, through a series of images, a potential nar-
rative of our physical relation with the hardware of the medium. At the same 
time, however, it disputes our tendency to abstract such a relation, allow-
ing deterministic discourses to become institutionalised interpretations. It 
mocks the ways in which video games are transformed into “objects” with 
clear and identifiable effects. Game Arthritis’ move is to ridicule such ab-
straction proposing occurrences, examples of players actually affected by 
their continuous contact with the materials of which video games are made. 
Yet, it is precisely by switching the focus from an abstract discourse to the 
contingent embodiments of which the various “game arthritides” are made 
that game arthritis, the disease that officially existed until about a decade 
ago, is revealed to be a rather uncanny and probably biased narrative.
Game Arthritis is not only a project about the properties of the materials 
from which video games are made; it is mostly about the narratives that we 
(both scholars and gamers) tend to formulate to make sense of our engage-
ment with such materials. The focus is on the human, on the ways in which 
we participate in an environment populated by things, and how we tend to 
abstract them as objects and then resuscitate them by giving them agency, or 
a “sparkle of life”, as Ingold puts it. In Game Arthritis the question is about 
(and the joke is on) us.
When we start thinking about the properties of the materials of video 
games as narratives, then we can also imagine stories, which are intention-
ally false. However, their falsity sheds light on what video games are for us 
and what else they could be. In conclusion, I believe that an approach sim-
ilar to the one proposed by these two examples could also be adopted more 
extensively in the study of games, rather than being exclusively undertaken 
in the artistic context. It would mean focusing less on the alleged effects of 
video games and the ways in which we can channel those effects through 
design, instead concentrating more on what sort of “things” we could bring 
about by living with and through video games. Following Bergson’s notion 
of creativity as that which reconnects to the intuitive faculty of the mind 
and participate in the life of things, I propose to name this potential detour 
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in the study of the medium of the video game as “creative game studies” – a 
proposal that needs, however, to be articulated more extensively in a sepa-
rate context.
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how to win fouRSquaRe:  
Body and SPace in a gamified woRld
by maxwell foxman
I desired to do something truly unprecedented for our housewarming. The 
festivities began Saturday morning at Artichoke Pizza. We called it “The Al-
phabetical Tour of Alphabet City”. The goal was simple: in twenty-four hours, 
traverse twenty-six restaurants and bars throughout the lower Manhattan 
neighbourhood, in alphabetical order. 
I rarely sat and only spoke briefly to the ever-increasing group of guests at 
each locale. Instead, I was preoccupied typing out the name of each venue we 
entered on my smartphone. I “checked-in” to each spot using the social media 
application Foursquare, which utilised GPS to verify my location and allowed 
me to compete with friends and strangers over how many places we frequented. 
Each check-in, furthermore, was linked to other social media platforms, 
namely Facebook and Twitter, enabling other users online to meet up with us 
even as we progressed at our frantic pace. I relished each check-in as the soft-
ware awarded me points.
The next day, we were joined by a few celebrants for brunch at our fi-
nal destination, Zum Schneider. Recovering over German sausages in the beer 
hall, we three stalwarts who made it to every venue bragged and congratulated 
each other, in awe of our achievement. Through the bounty of the social media 
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applications employed, our exuberant adventure and the spoils of our social 
competition had been recorded for all to envy. At some point, I recall thinking 
to myself not so much that the Alphabetical Tour was just a great party and a 
social success, but that I had won. I wasn’t sure what I had won, but I certainly 
had the score to prove it.
1 getting into the game
The Alphabetical Tour was not particularly unique in a city like New York 
where bars abound and crawls between them are commonplace. Atypi-
cal was the extravagant amount of time, money, calories and brain cells I 
expended for a bit of merriment, and the role the then year-old program 
Foursquare (2009) played in shaping our adventure. Its presence punctuated 
moments throughout the day and evening, and not only broadcasted where 
I was along the route, but also became a topic of conversation during the 
event itself.
Foursquare, in many ways, has become the corporate embodiment of 
gamification. Its use of location-based technology and mobile media makes 
Foursquare the perfect target for admonishments about the exploitation 
of users through game-like elements, the facility for surveillance and the 
promotion of conspicuous consumption. We realised such apprehensions 
during the tour. However, knowing full well its potential ramifications, why 
did I, like millions of others, use Foursquare? The sheer zealousness of the 
celebration highlights how I was willing to disregard concerns about ma-
nipulation for reasons that are at once difficult to define yet fundamentally 
important to that day. The desire for a glorious experience outweighed any 
rational judgments.
While much of the research surrounding the proliferation of gamifi-
cation into non-playful settings and the design of Internet applications has 
centred on either the potential effects of game elements on the populace, or 
the growing cultural acceptance of games and play, the experience of gamifi-
cation has been less explored. As the Alphabetical Tour illustrates, this phe-
nomenon is subtle yet distinctive, involving new forms of communication, 
and exploits some of our most elemental urges: to compete, to win, to forge 
a path to glory.
This article will deal with the experience of gamification, specifically 
through the lens of Foursquare. After first situating the application within the 
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larger discourse of gamification, it will become evident that, while Foursquare 
has never purported itself to be a game, it remains a quintessential example 
of a tool that capitalises on user behaviour through the employment of ex-
plicit and implicit game-like functions.
Superficially, Foursquare appears to reduce a user’s environment to a 
series of icons and locations that flaunt capitalism and a culture of “cool” 
within primarily urban and suburban settings and constituencies. This per-
ception also intensifies claims that Foursquare is merely a waste of time.
I will argue instead that Foursquare rescripts ordinary experience into 
one of expenditure and glory by allowing its users to bring an ethos of com-
petition into their existence. Through Foursquare, life becomes a conduit for 
fierce play, communicated less through words than through presence, a kind 
of “proximal communication”.
Because the application maintains a constant presence within everyday 
life, this form of communication becomes as much part of the bodily ex-
perience as an outwardly communicated act. Through a phenomenologi-
cal approach, along with personal anecdotes to support it, I will show how 
Foursquare engenders what I call a “state of play” in which the motivating 
forces of play are not only felt in the virtual space of a “magic circle”, but also 
punctuate and pervade mundane activities, ultimately characterizing the ex-
perience of gamification more generally.
2 gamification and itS diScontentS
Gamification might have been a rhetorical inevitability with the ascension 
of digital and video games in the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
Game Studies scholars, such as Jesper Juul and Eric Zimmerman, endeav-
oured to carve out a distinct field for the study of games, connecting them 
to the realm of play, or “ludology” (Frasca 1999), a term attributed to Johan 
Huizinga, who attempted to track the pervasiveness of play in society in 
Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture. As a consequence, at 
its theoretical roots, Game Studies underscores play’s potential universality 
and its broader application to cultural contexts.
The study of gamification has helped to disclose the discontinuities be-
tween perceptions of games and play and their impact on society. Advocates 
foresee games helping to mitigate adverse social conditions (McGonigal 2011; 
Zichermann and Cunningham 2011). For instance, current projects make 
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weight loss (Block 2012) and the awareness of climate change (Fox 2013) 
a game. Others assail the insidious and unbridled enthusiasm to capitalise 
on “game elements” for corporate greed.
While the potential societal effects of play and gamification deserve 
much attention, the experience of the player and what motivates him to 
engage with gamified programs remains a less travelled frontier. If the in-
vocation of gamification opened up a Pandora’s box of predictions about a 
gameful world, it is worth asking what it is like to live in it.
3 why Study fouRSquaRe?
Founded in 2009 by Dennis Crowley and Naveen Selvadurai, Foursquare has 
developed along with the proliferation of gamification, becoming the quin-
tessential example for academics interested in both gamification and mobile 
media (de Souza e Silva and Frith 2012; Deterding et al. 2011; Frith 2012; 
Frith 2013; Glas 2013; Whitson 2013). The premise of the application is sim-
ple: Users check in primarily with smartphones to various venues, ranging 
from their homes to bars, restaurants, stores, parks and other public settings. 
Venues are assigned both by the company and created by users. Users are 
rewarded for checking-in with points posted on a virtual “leaderboard” of 
friends. They may also achieve “mayorships” and badges on rarer occasions. 
The foremost reason for using Foursquare as a case study is to examine 
the paradoxical relationship between the systems that make up the applica-
tion and the experiences of the user. That the application fosters competition 
over leisure appears not only to be impractical in a utilitarian sense, but 
also blatantly exploitative due to the company’s knowledge of users’ loca-
tions. The by-product of Foursquare is a valuable commodity: a record of 
the whereabouts of users, including the timing and frequency of their every 
excursion, which has recently enabled Foursquare to offer businesses the 
ability to advertise to users when in close proximity to their establishments 
(Tate 2013). However, the experience of the user remains somewhat divorced 
from this capitalist ploy. Users willingly volunteer information, submitting 
to “Big Brother”, while revelling within the constraints of the system. Public 
disclosure and control are produced from the bottom up.
Foursquare, like other gamified applications, lies provocatively on the 
border between being a game and social media. Games are defined by Katie 
Salen and Eric Zimmerman, in Rules of Play: Game Design Fundamentals, as 
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“a system in which players engage in an artificial conflict, defined by rules, 
that results in a quantifiable outcome” (Salen and Zimmerman 2003, 83). 
Although their definition is meant to be functional, it emphasises the game-
like quality of the application. Foursquare encourages competition through 
rewards while retaining the basic components of social networking sites, 
which “(1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, 
(2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and 
(3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others 
within the system” (boyd and Ellison 2007, 211).
Even as it sets the stage for friendly competition, the program is mar-
keted as a singular tool to connect people throughout cities via location- 
based technologies, offering coupons and deals for those who frequent 
participating restaurants and bars. This somewhat prosaic goal neither ex-
plains Foursquare’s appeal to at least 40 million users (Foursquare 2013), nor 
its growing ubiquity among retailers throughout cities in the United States. 
The essential functions of the program, the check-in and the subsequent re-
wards, provide a peephole into the application’s appeal.
4 fun-ctionS of fouRSquaRe
While comments, the uploading of photos and other social elements com-
mensurate with social media like Facebook have been added since the end of 
2010 (Van Grove 2010), the primary function of Foursquare has always been 
the check-in with corresponding rewards. This is the causation that drives 
the Foursquare experience. Upon close observation, the check-in function is 
tinged with both implicit and explicit means of feeling a sense of glory; the 
user competes and potentially wins by performing the act.
The check-in is not an inherently competitive act. In Foursquare, once 
recognised, the user is informed of his successful check-in and rewarded. 
The importance of the check-in is not only related to registering the user’s 
presence at the venue, but also the value ascribed to the act of registering. 
Users only receive rewards, points and trophies when the GPS software on 
their phones traces them to the vicinity of the particular venue. 
Since the majority of places where the user checks in are retail estab-
lishments and public venues (Bawa-Cavia 2010), Foursquare is frequently 
associated with consumption, underscoring its business / marketing model. 
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Check-in restrictions can be circumnavigated by users with few conse-
quences. They can check in from a mobile internet browser version of the 
application, or emulate a GPS signal on a computer.1 These practices invoke 
a kind of “cheating” that is somewhat unusual within the context of social 
interaction.2 Rather than being innocuous, the check-in is actually a playful 
and competitive act, the standard by which rewards are given fairly or illicitly. 
Foursquare’s rewards adhere to Salen and Zimmerman’s game defini-
tion, providing a quantifiable outcome for particular actions. Each prize is 
appropriated toward competitive ends, bestowing bragging rights and pro-
moting a kind of glory. Jordan Frith describes users cultivating their activi-
ties around cities in order to obtain particular badges and mayorships (Frith 
2013, 251), which are prominently displayed on the profile page of each user. 
Badges, which are given for specific sets of check-ins such as registering 
in the same place three times in one week, or checking-in to five different 
Mexican restaurants, define the achievements of a user and the breadth of 
his activity, or the type of player he is. Foursquare’s reward system expanded 
in 2011 with the addition of levels to specific badges (Parr 2011). The repeti-
tive completion of the same task now garners even more benefits.
A mayorship is granted to a user for frequenting and achieving an abun-
dance of check-ins at a particular venue, more than any other user within a 
60-day period. The glory that comes from a mayorship is highly localised. 
Particularly in cases where friends frequent the same venue, they become 
cognisant of each other’s mayorships and can vie over them. Mayorships 
garner other tangible and intangible awards. Both mayors and friends of 
mayors receive extra points for their check-ins at establishments for which 
they are mayor, as well as occasional mayoral perks from venues. In the case 
of restaurants, often a free drink or appetizer is the mayor’s reward for each 
check-in, a fair honorarium for a loyal patron who, at any time, is in danger 
of losing his position.
1 It should be noted that if a user checks in with the browser version of the application, they 
are able to receive points and badges, but not mayorships.
2 The most notorious case of cheating in Foursquare can be found in the case of Indonesian 
“Jumpers” who gained notoriety by checking-in to venues in the United States, en masse, 
from Indonesia (Glas 2013).
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The most constant form of competition and reward is the leaderboard, 
which appoints a numerical score, seen only among friends, for the user’s 
check-ins over the prior week. Users receive points for a variety of pre-
scribed reasons, ranging from bonus points for checking in to new venues, 
to attaining a mayorship, to checking in over multiple days or weeks at a 
particular type of establishment. Other points are awarded completely arbi-
trarily, such as extra points for the inauguration of the Year of the Dragon on 
the lunar calendar, or on a user’s anniversary of joining Foursquare. Accu-
mulation of points does not lead to achieving any specific reward; points are 
only significant because the leaderboard is built into the overall structure of 
the program. Like the high scores in an arcade game, the leaderboard tally 
records and perpetuates the overall glory of the user. Furthermore, because 
the score reflects only the past week’s activity, it constantly resets, establish-
ing perpetual competition among users. Since the scores on the leaderboard 
are only shared among friends, the entire reason for its existence is local-
ised glory and competition. The leaderboard seems to be Foursquare’s most 
“game-like” feature with obvious allusions to scoreboards and video game 
scoring systems. 
As can be seen from this brief synopsis of Foursquare, the possibility 
for competition and play is explicitly fostered, in the case of the leaderboard 
and mayorships, or potentially, in the case of badges and the check-in itself. 
More than anything, like other gamified systems, these rewards are meant 
to motivate users, to induce them to play. However, both the consequences 
and experiences of these functions for the user are lacking in this analysis.
5 concePtionS, conSumPtion and conteStS
Foursquare activity appears to stem more from the act of checking-in than 
the rewards received. Publicizing a particular space at a particular time, es-
pecially in an urban setting, automatically carries socio-economic connota-
tions. The software promotes a certain kind of conspicuous consumption, 
allowing users, as hackneyed as it may sound, to appear cool. 
The desire to be seen at particular places is popular in urban set-
tings, where knowing the trendiest spot is often competitive. Historically, 
the data about Foursquare showed that the primary locales checked-into 
were commercial establishments, such as restaurants, bars and art galleries 
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(Bawa-Cavia 2010).3 This evinces a natural inclination that the average Four-
square user wants to be seen and “in-the-know” more generally. In a July 
2010 Urbagram study, check-ins were concentrated in areas where restau-
rant culture and high retail consumption thrived, such as downtown areas 
of Manhattan, Williamsburg, and Park Slope. In other cities, such as Lon-
don and Paris, this same study found similarly that “Nightlife” and “Food” 
venues were the primary places where users were checking in, with Paris 
also having slightly more frequent check-ins at both art galleries and parks 
(ibid.). 
However, Carnegie Mellon’s “Livehoods” project, started in 2012, both 
updated and complicated the findings of the Urbagram study (Livehoods 
2013). The project visualised the activity of Foursquare users in different 
US and Canadian cities with fascinating results. In different neighborhoods, 
distinctly diverse activity occurred. For instance, while a number of grocer-
ies made up the most checked-in sites of New York’s predominantly residen-
tial Upper West Side, Brooklyn’s hipster enclave Williamsburg featured two 
bars in its most popular check-ins. In other words, the check-ins mirrored 
the particular demographics of each neighbourhood, rather than being ho-
mogenous throughout New York City (ibid.). 
Livehoods contradicted the preconceived notions of conspicuous con-
sumption associated with the check-in, describing different ends based on 
the users’ locales. Users may choose to forego some check-ins in favour of 
being seen at others. For instance, I rarely see users check in at home. This 
is supported by Frith’s determination that players predominantly check in 
“to score points, earn badges, present themselves to others, and remember 
where they have been” (Frith 2012, 189).
Foursquare’s activity, consequently, is prompted by personal use, for 
personal reasons. Furthermore, this personal choice drives Foursquare’s eco-
nomic model. After all, Foursquare generates its revenue through advertis-
ing; its software is free. Foursquare’s existence is sustained by the continued 
use of its players, whom it must stimulate in order to maintain an audience 
for advertisements and from which to collect information. Users must ex-
3 As of 2013, the most popular check-in spot within the United States was airports 
(Shankman 2013).
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pend on behalf of the program. Such exertion has led PJ Rey to describe the 
activity as “playbor”. The term, which he derived from Julian Kücklich’s 2005 
study of the modding of video games, means making “productive activity an 
end in-itself (namely, fun) . . . The object of production is no longer to create 
value; instead value becomes a mere by-product of play” (Rey 2012). 
Certainly, the activity in Foursquare encompasses this definition. The 
play of the check-in belies the effort people expend on behalf of the program. 
Rey partially invokes playbor to dissolve the traditional notions of economy 
in capitalist systems, in which work and play are separate. Rather than sim-
ply a device to promote frivolous conspicuous consumption, within the con-
text of playbor, Foursquare becomes an outlet for work, causing play to lose 
“its innocence” (ibid.). However, Rey acknowledges that the experience of 
play has its own value, including the symbolic capital of intangible rewards. 
What motivates “playborers” (ibid.) then does not derive from traditional 
capital models, but instead from intrinsic incentives that come from play 
itself, namely personal choice and competition. If not driven by capitalism, 
an ontological investigation of exchange within society may explain the mo-
tivation for such competition: glory.
6 comPetition and gloRy
Becoming mayor in Foursquare can be associated with a certain amount of 
boasting. Mayorships allow users to compete over their favourite haunts. So 
strong was my desire to obtain mayorships, that I sought them from any num-
ber of places. I became mayor of my grandmother’s condo, as well as the “gym” 
in my mother’s basement (actually just a stationary bicycle). Many friends were 
similarly mayors of their local delicatessens, bagel shops and apartment build-
ings, rather than the hippest restaurant or nightclub. These trumped up mayor-
ships still had value, with a friend complaining if another had pre-empted the 
mayorship of their apartment. In fact, when I was nearing the assumption of 
the mayorship at the completely fictitious “Arsenal HQ” (the Foursquare title 
given to the bar where Arsenal FC fans met to watch soccer games), the head of 
the supporters’ group half-seriously threatened me if I overtook his mayorship. 
His sincerity was enough for me to abandon my quest for that position.
Playbor certainly characterises my pursuit for mayorships. Mayorships 
require persistent checking-in to venues, and as described in the above 
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account, the additional labour of making up both factual and fictional places 
in which to check in. The reasons for the effort are related to competition. 
Since competition is so prominent within Foursquare, its importance 
and nature warrant further exploration. This analysis will begin to position 
Foursquare within the realm of game play and to substantiate user partici-
pation. It explains, not only how people play Foursquare, be it as playbor or 
otherwise, but also why they put so much effort into the program.
Salen and Zimmerman refer to the importance of conflict as both “in-
trinsic” to the game and the means by which players achieve their goals 
within the confines of the game (Salen and Zimmerman 2003, 265). Johan 
Huizinga indicates in Homo Ludens, “[t]hus competitions and exhibitions as 
amusement do not proceed from culture, they rather precede it” (Huizinga 
1971, 47). Huizinga sees the contest as a prescribed event, not dissimilar 
from play: “Like all other forms of play, the contest is largely devoid of pur-
pose. That is to say, the action begins and ends in itself, and the outcome 
does not contribute to the necessary life-processes of the group” (Ibid., 49). 
The desire for glory, to win at the contest, remains a part of the economy 
of play, motivating play, as well as proffering a result when play occurs. It is 
a means of rethinking the “value” of Foursquare. Users will check in to more 
places for renown as opposed to receiving some tangible economic boon. 
The users’ check in is rewarded with glory, for bragging rights, the “exalted 
phenomena that we can never fully understand but can only experience” 
(Leibovitz 2013, 75). 
The goal of the Foursquare user therefore diverges from capitalist eco-
nomic purposes in the competition for glory. Expenditure, the dispensing of 
time and energy into the Foursquare experience, with no economic value in 
return, galvanises the Foursquare user and is implicit within Rey’s playbor 
model. Participation in Foursquare, in regard to traditional economic mod-
els, is to some degree a bona fide waste of time. As in any game, its economy 
is dictated by the rules of and desire to play, rather than any rational capital-
ist motivation.
This expenditure echoes Georges Bataille’s analysis in “The Notion of 
Expenditure” that: 
A certain excitation, whose sum total is maintained at a noticeably con-
stant level animates collectivities and individuals. In their intensified 
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form, the states of excitation, which are comparable to toxic states, can be 
defined as the illogical and irresistible impulse to reject material or moral 
goods that it would have been possible to utilise rationally (in conformity 
with the balancing of accounts). (Bataille 1985, 128) 
Excitement is then caused when the user expends. Interaction with the soft-
ware, for the sake of glory and competition, exposes the user to more activities. 
The user does not react to the software as a promotional tool. Foursquare 
has created a mode of consumption that marries advertising and traditional 
marketing with anti-productive activity, namely competition and glory.
Bataille’s expenditure also explains the reasons why users play, a kind 
of economy of competition, independent of capitalist models. As he puts it: 
[T]he creation of unproductive values; the most absurd of these values, 
and the one that makes people the most rapacious, is glory. Made com-
plete through degradation, glory, appearing in a sometimes sinister and 
sometimes brilliant form, has never ceased to dominate social existence; 
it is impossible to attempt to do anything without it when it is dependent 
on the blind practice of personal or social loss. (Ibid.) 
Glory, according to Bataille, is inherently a part of human interaction and 
culture.
6.1  the Potlatch
Bataille, Huizinga and foundational anthropologist Marcel Mauss all men-
tion glory in their dissection of the potlatch ceremony. The potlatch was 
one of the first tribal systems of exchange studied by anthropologists. While 
based partially on economics, the practice permeated all aspects of society 
including “initiations, marriages, [and] funerals” (Bataille 1985, 121).
The potlatch was a ceremony of competition and expenditure, with the 
goal of “humiliating, defying, and obligating a rival” (ibid.) through the giv-
ing of gifts and the sacrificing of wealth. The goal of the potlatch was to give 
away one’s excesses with the expectation that some day a gift of greater value 
would be returned, and by receiving that gift, another of even greater value 
was obligated. 
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Bataille states that the potlatch “is linked to the possession of a fortune, 
but only on the condition that the fortune be partially sacrificed in unpro-
ductive social expenditures such as festivals, spectacles, and games” (ibid., 
123). This sacrifice of excesses and expenditures relates to Foursquare in that 
users are ranked by how much they give in excess to the game. In this way, 
Foursquare mimics the potlatch gift culture when friends turn their daily 
activities into spectacles of expense.
The reasons for the potlatch were entwined in a society of self-perpet-
uated loss and destruction, endemic to the human condition, what Bataille 
believes to be the “reckless, discharge, and upheaval that constitutes life . . .” 
(ibid., 128). Glory came from the much more intrinsic need to humiliate, to 
win and ultimately expend excesses. Bataille further expounds that all forms 
of “order” and “reserve” in society are merely temporary states to facilitate 
glorious expenditure (ibid.). 
Foursquare’s software, by Bataille’s estimations, serves a natural need: 
when seeking glory wherever he can, the user needs order and meaning to 
freely expend. Foursquare supplies an ordered pattern to everyday life, so 
that the user may find the means to compete and potentially feel the sense of 
liberty afforded by his expense. This begins to rationalise Bataille’s “states of 
excitation” in the excessive “play” of Foursquare. 
Competition can be incorporated into just about anything, and potlatch 
interaction enveloped numerous aspects of daily life. Bataille and Mauss 
state that the potlatch was woven into all forms of exchange. It was “re-
served for forms which, for archaic societies, are not distinguishable from 
exchange” (ibid., 123). For Mauss, all of these systems of giving, of glory and 
sacrifice are integrated. They are part of what makes up these early anthro-
pological societies (Mauss 2000/1950). For Bataille, expenditure extends to 
the entire biosphere, which he characterises in terms of “a play of energy that 
no particular end limits: the play of living matter in general, involved in the 
movement of light of which it is the result. On the surface of the globe, for 
living matter in general, energy is always in excess” (Bataille 1991/1949, 21).
Foursquare taps into something quite fundamental if it is indeed making 
use of excess and expenditure. The expenditure on behalf of Foursquare is 
not explicit, however – and the rewards bestowed are intangible. The compe-
tition between players acts as a kind of public sacrifice between users. 
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Mauss also broadens the scope of the potlatch to a wider gift culture, 
which he argues persisted in a subdued manner into nineteenth century Eu-
rope, long before the current interest in the “gamification” of everyday life. 
Citing an exchange among the Maori people, Mauss states that the gifts given 
are “a tie occurring through things, is one between souls, because the thing 
itself possesses a soul, is of the soul” (Mauss 2000 / 1950, 12). In relation to 
Foursquare, such an atmosphere pervades and capitalises on the structures 
of the program. The application’s architecture allows the competition to ex-
pose users’ lived experience, where they went and what they did, thereby 
making their expenditure on the game’s behalf, at least rhetorically, of the 
soul. The everyday becomes the gift that the users sacrifice and exchange. 
The giving, rewarding and playing for the sake of Foursquare is based upon 
everyday existence. The result of these exchanges, in Mauss’ perspective, was 
a frenzy of excitement. 
Bataille, clearly acquainted with Mauss, refers to the state of excitement 
in his own models and Huizinga, also aware of such a state, pronounces 
“the potlatch spirit is akin to the thoughts and feelings of the adolescent” 
(Huizinga 1971, 60). In the same text, Huizinga considers the study of the 
potlatch as both a social and religious experience, similar to Mauss, and, as 
such, places the potlatch within the realm of what he calls the “magic circle”.
6.2  the Real Shape of the magic circle
The magic circle acts as a bridge in explaining the spiritual and societal 
worlds in which competition and the gift economy exist. The theoretical ba-
sis of the magic circle lies within the work of Huizinga, who manufactured 
the term when studying the play element in culture. For Huizinga, the circle 
represents the place of comfort, which one enters to play. Huizinga enu-
merates several important points in describing this circle: first, the circle 
provides a sense of freedom. Second, Huizinga identifies play (the state of 
entering the magic circle) as “distinct from ‘ordinary’ life both as to locality 
and duration” (Huizinga 1971, 9). While this view has been faulted for too 
narrowly defining the act of play (Zimmerman 2012) and has been amended 
and redrawn by game studies scholars (Juul 2008; Zimmerman 2012), the 
potency of the hypothesis lies in the fact that the magic circle “creates or-
der, is order” (Huizinga 1971, 10). Huizinga explains further: “For archaic 
man, doing and daring are power, but knowing is magical power. For him all 
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particular knowledge is sacred knowledge—esoteric and wonder-working 
wisdom, because any knowing is directly related to the cosmic order itself ” 
(ibid., 105). 
The magic then partly derives from what is known. Huizinga connects 
this to the feast and competition, glory and, implicitly, the potlatch (ibid.). 
The magic circle becomes, within this context, the landscape of what is 
known, a moment in space where things can be predictable.
The power of knowing, and in the case of Foursquare, knowing about 
particular venues, knowing where friends are, knowing where one is in re-
lation to friends, is predicated by the compulsion to enter the magic cir-
cle. Control of that order, to some degree, through contest and competition 
might be seen as the desired goal of the game. But it remains dissonant with 
the experience of the user, who must learn how to play through their proper 
experience of the game. This notion aligns with phenomenologist Hubert 
Dreyfus’ theory of “maximal grip” (Dreyfus 2002, 367), in which the body 
naturally acquires proficiency at skills and tasks to the point where players 
are no longer cognisant of the necessary skills to perform / play. In explain-
ing the phenomenon of games, Dreyfus explains that expertise, or know-
ledge of a game, is achieved when a player reaches maximal grip. Thus, the 
delight of games comes from the developing level of knowledge, which a 
player experiences each time he engages with the game.
The “magic” of the magic circle can then be defined by the experience 
of the players, who engage with a game, not rationally comprehending what 
has occurred, but “knowing” the experience through their bodies, their lived 
experience, which is not static, but ever-changing. As Foursquare now re-
veals itself to be part of the magic circle, providing an order to life congru-
ent with gift economies and expenditure, a study of this inexplicable bodily 
engagement, this magic, brings to light a theory behind the user experience 
within this particular social network. 
7 PRoximal communication
As my workload steadily increased during my Master’s career and with my free 
time limited, I felt obligated to decline friends’ invitations to spend time with 
them. I soon developed a new ritual to steal moments of relaxation. After a full 
day immersed in academia, I would inevitably reach a burnout point in the 
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evening and use the opportunity to sneak out for a quick, low-key dinner with 
my girlfriend, now wife. 
Meanwhile, each time my girlfriend and I would surreptitiously visit a 
restaurant or bar, I instantly wondered how I could check in to Foursquare. 
Since many of my friends use the social network, I feared my log of check-ins 
would offend their social sensibilities. With the flick of a virtual switch on my 
smartphone, I would check in “off the grid”, a private check-in option that al-
lowed me to acquire the same points as if I checked-in publicly. 
I kept at it, noting my standing on the leaderboard within the top 10 of my 
friends. However, my score dropped precipitously after Foursquare revised its 
policy to one point per off-the-grid check-in, as opposed to the 5 to 10 points 
per public check-in, with the claim that this change would encourage “friendly 
competition” (Foursquare 2012). My leaderboard score slipped, inciting sur-
prise from my friends and incurring a blow to my ego. Suddenly, the choice to 
check in off the grid became a decision I had difficulty making, and indeed my 
off-the-grid check-ins were reduced to nearly zero after the policy change. I felt 
a mixture of guilt and resentment each time I checked-in off the grid, stemming 
not only from hiding my whereabouts from friends, but also for not getting 
credit for my illicit excursions.
While the “magic” of playing Foursquare is linked to competition and 
glory, it also embraces its antithesis, defeat. The experience of Foursquare is 
felt rather than contemplated, coupled to the competition of play and the 
personal and social components of everyday life. The check-in becomes 
absorbed into daily experience, becoming part of one act: registering one’s 
presence in a particular location, and along with it the frenetic competition 
and glory of the magic circle.
This begins to explain the individual experience of Foursquare: the user 
gets lost in play throughout his daily activity. That this activity is perpet-
ual also makes the experience different from that of ordinary gameplay. The 
player of a video game or board game has a rarefied experience, while the 
user of Foursquare has an experience ultimately integrated into ordinary life.
Expenditure and reward through Foursquare allow the experiences of 
the user to be of service to him, by bringing these aspects of play into his 
daily routines. This interpretation implies that Foursquare has the potential 
to change our most mundane actions from meaningless to meaningful by 
furnishing the tools to understand them within a larger set of involvements.
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This playfulness extends beyond personal achievement to interaction 
with others through Foursquare’s social network. Socialising through Four-
square is not based primarily on comments or even text-based conversation 
of any kind, which would be the norm within a social network. Although 
friends in Foursquare do not usually “chat” back and forth through text, 
nonverbal interaction regularly occurs. This communication is based on 
presence and gathering in relation to users’ proximity. This form of “proxi-
mal communication” should be defined as communicating through a user’s 
presence within a particular space and time.
My first awareness of proximal communication occurred a number of 
years ago, when I noticed my growing jealousy over my friends’ check-in 
routines. I would watch their activity as I worked at home. As groups of my 
friends successively checked-in to the same place, I would take note of it. 
They would not necessarily advertise their goings-on through other social 
media outlets, such as commenting on Twitter 
or Facebook. Rather, they would merely check 
in as each of them arrived. No verbal or written 
communication was necessary. The opposite of 
my decision to check in off the grid, the act conveyed a specific meaning of 
friends congregating and interacting at a given moment, of which I was not 
a part. 
Proximal communication, however, is not confined to social sniping or 
jealousy. Its spirit is much more basic. A perfect example was a habit of my 
former roommate, who would often stop by unannounced to say hello when 
I was out on a date with my girlfriend. In these casual visits, a complex series 
of proximal communications were articulated. By checking-in, I was stating 
that I was available, present and wanting to socialise, without saying any of 
those things specifically. 
Proximal communication is not merely communication over a virtual 
network with text, but a communication of time and space. Communication 
and interaction are physical and active, based on the check-in. This commu-
nication is also contingent upon a number of factors, including gathering, 
relationship to space and the meaning that space may have to other users 
and friends. Proximal communication embodies these relationships and re-
lays them silently. Most significantly, proximal communication points to the 
importance of real-world location within the context of Foursquare. Space 
Foursquare transforms play 
from a moment in life  
to an ever-present state.
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and gathering here shapes the platform. The experience of proximal com-
munication is further sustained by notions of glory and competition, which 
provide an easy means of “knowing” within this non-verbal communication.
To understand Foursquare is to comprehend the experience of using it 
and the mediating role of engaging with the platform, which teeters provoc-
atively along the edges of games and play. As a consequence, the experience 
often pervades everyday life in unexpected ways that deviate from both the 
paradigms of fun and games, as competition encounters everyday life.
Users remain in a state of anticipation for punctuated moments of glory, 
which both can be premeditated and arrive when least expected. The fre-
netic excitement conjured within the magic circle, when extended beyond a 
singular bounded moment in time and place, when it appears unexpectedly 
at any moment and time, becomes a potent force. As such, the presence of 
proximal communication lies at the very foundation of the Foursquare ex-
perience, transforming life from a moment of play to an ever-present state 
of play.
8 State of Play
Foursquare is not strictly a game. It neither provides the boundaries of a 
game, nor does it correspond with the feelings of safety or order, the rarefied 
experience, that might be perceived in a game. Paradoxically, Foursquare 
does impart a sense of magic by creating a state of play within mundane 
activities. I use the term state due to the nature of the program itself. Its 
use of proximal, as opposed to written or verbal communication, renders 
an experience that is felt within the real world. The term play is purposely 
selected to counter the critiques of gamification, which rightfully argue that 
providing rewards and badges to anything is merely a superficial exercise in 
the utilisation of game elements.
The key to Foursquare’s success is more elemental. The use of the soft-
ware for the sake of expenditure (for the sake of play) causes a state of play 
that has less to do with engendering productive activity and more with 
transforming mundane activity and chaos into play. The experience within 
this platform furnishes structure and meaning in our lives through the same 
means as the magic circle. 
Foursquare then not only enacts a state of play, but also a “state of 
magic”, not a circumscribed or rarefied magic circle, but the experience of 
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the “knowing” found inside it, within the script of our everyday life. Further-
more, unlike the magic circle, there is no skill set required to understand the 
rules of the state of magic or the need to experience it with the expertise of 
maximal grip. It can be entered into and almost immediately understood.
Foursquare operates, unabashedly, as a promotional tool through which 
it creates a state of play for the sake of advertising and consumption. By 
designing the program around a very ordinary and unproductive activity, 
simply where we go, Foursquare has found a perfect arena in which a state of 
play can be enacted. The user is aware of the intentions of the company, but 
uses the application because of the state of play it creates, not because of its 
overt manipulation. This state of play is not exclusive to Foursquare. While 
other gamified platforms comprise other types of interaction, covering a 
wide spectrum of daily activity, the state of play and proximal communica-
tion discussed here are often present as well. While such states might not be 
as obvious, they are drawn out of us by the software itself. As a consequence, 
when exploring the pervasive effects of gamification on the populace, and 
even play more generally, as this article and personal accounts highlight, 
there is the need to unearth what is deep within us when we play and fathom 
the power of play on our daily experiences.
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the ludification of cultuRe
by Joost Raessens
1 intRoduction
Most of you, including those who do not engage in media studies, are famil-
iar with the subject of this article: the concept of play.1 Just open your news-
paper and see how this concept imposes itself, both in word and image. Take 
for example the Dutch cabinet formation in 2010: “Formation Rules Out of 
Date” de Volkskrant announces (Voermans 2010). And NRC Next points out 
that the “formation game is not played properly” and that the process shows 
signs of “rough play” (Peters 2010). Imagery in de Volkskrant similarly uses 
the play metaphor to denote the political situation. Dutch politician Geert 
Wilders is depicted as a puppeteer pulling the strings at whim while the po-
litical arena is reduced to his playground. Rules: no Muslims, no leftist elite 
and no judges. Closing time – or how long will this cabinet stay in power? 
– ask Mr Wilders.
1 This article is based upon my inaugural lecture, delivered in 2010 and published by Utrecht 
University in 2012 (Raessens 2012).
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Figure 1: Puppeteer Wilders, 2010. 2
A second example – this time from the field of media studies – is offered 
by the film Slumdog Millionaire (Beaufoy 2008). It is remarkable that this 
particular film was the big winner at the Academy Awards – the Oscars – in 
2009. Suspense in the film largely depends on the format of a major televi-
sion genre, the game show, and more specifically the quiz show: the Indian 
version of Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? (Big Synergy 2000). At the begin-
ning of the film, we have an opening ritual that introduces protagonist Jamal 
Malik, which is followed by the actual game, the quiz, while the film ends 
with a closing ritual showing how the winner Jamal is congratulated by the 
presenter and handed a check with the amount of money he has won. Media 
scholar John Fiske calls this format of “ritual-game-ritual” (1987, 265) an 
enactment of capitalist ideology. The suggestion is made that – regardless of 
2 Jos Collignon’s drawings were published in de Volkskrant, September 9, 2010 and October 
7, 2010. I am grateful to Jos Collignon for providing both drawings. Collignon had fore-
sight; as of April 21, 2012 the government fell because Wilders withdrew his support. 
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the differences – everyone would have the same opportunities. That differ-
ences in the standard of knowledge are often associated with differences in 
social backgrounds would thus be hidden from view. This is indeed how the 
film could be interpreted. The people in the film who in increasing numbers 
follow the show watch in amazement as Jamal correctly answers each new 
question yet again. But director Danny Boyle plays a double game. Ingen-
iously he interweaves the storyline of the quiz with the narrative of Jamal’s 
life. By thus addressing Jamal’s social background he manages to show the 
film’s audiences how this bum from the slums gleaned his superb knowledge 
from the streets to win the quiz show.3
These two examples highlight most of the features of the play concept 
that I want to discuss in this article: the importance of rules, the idea that 
rules can be changed, the playful nature of cultural domains such as politics 
and media, the understanding that play is often less open than it looks (it 
3 For a fuller analysis of Slumdog Millionaire, see Raessens (2009a).
Figure 2: Playground Wilders, 2010.
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is Mr Wilders’s playground), the worldwide popularity of game shows, in 
other words: the cultural significance of play. To study and understand these 
features, we need a playful turn in media theory as I will argue in this article.
Since the 1960s, when the word ludic became popular to denote playful 
behaviour and fun objects – think for example of the Dutch counterculture 
movement Provo and the Situationist International of founding member 
Guy Debord – playfulness has gradually become a central category of our 
culture. The popularity of computer games is a striking example in this re-
spect. A lot of people play games, young and old, male and female.4 The 
game industry plays an increasingly important role in the Netherlands, as 
it does in other countries. The city of Utrecht is gradually changing into the 
gaming capital of Europe, hosting the Festival of Games, the Dutch Game 
Garden as a boost to the Dutch game industry, and U-GATE, the Utrecht 
Center for Game Research and Technology.5 Although computer games 
draw a lot of attention, they are not the only manifestation of this ludifi-
cation process. Play is not only characteristic of leisure, but also turns up 
in those domains that once were considered the opposite of play, such as 
education (e.g. educational games), politics (playful forms of campaigning, 
using gaming principles to involve party members in decision-making pro-
cesses, comedians-turned-politicians)6 and even warfare (interfaces resem-
bling computer games, the use of drones – unmanned remote-controlled 
planes – introducing war à la PlayStation). Such playfulness can also be 
witnessed in the surge of using mobile phones and the playful communica-
tion resulting from this – think of texting and twittering. As linguist Andrea 
Lunsford argues, “writing has become amazingly creative. It is playful and 
experimental” (Houtekamer 2009, 4).
4  See www.theesa.com (accessed May 6, 2014).
5 For an overview of the Dutch gaming ecosystem, see van Grinsven and Raessens (forth-
coming). For more information, see these websites: www.festivalofgames.nl, www.dutch-
gamegarden.nl and www.u-gate.nl (all accessed May 6, 2014).
6 The German Pirate Party and Beppe Grillo’s 5 Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle) are two 
examples. For an analysis of the German Pirate Party, see the German blog Carta (carta.
info), in particular the contributions of Bieber (2009) and Lange (2012). For the 5 Star 
Movement, see Turner (2013).
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I have described this development earlier as the “ludification of culture” 
(Raessens 2006). One specific part of this more general process is referred to 
by the term gamification (Deterding et al. 2011): the integration of game el-
ements in products and services with the aim to advance user involvement.7 
The economist Jeremy Rifkin refers to this development as follows: “Play is 
becoming as important in the cultural economy as work was in the indus-
trial economy” (Rifkin 2000, 263). And the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman 
argues that playfulness in our ludic culture is no longer confined to child-
hood, but has become a lifelong attitude: “The mark of postmodern adult-
hood is the willingness to embrace the game whole-heartedly, as children do” 
(Bauman 1995, 99).8
It’s important to address the question whether the “ludification of cul-
ture” refers to, or is meant to be interpreted as, an ontological or an episte-
mological claim. The claim would be ontological if it would refer to a “new 
phase of history characterized so much by play that we can deem it a play 
world” (Combs 2000, 20).9 Or, as Eric Zimmerman and Heather Chaplin 
claim in their Manifesto for a Ludic Century: “the 21st century will be defined 
by games” (Zimmerman and Chaplin 2013).10 To me, their claim seems dif-
ficult to prove because it is too general a statement. One thing we should do 
is focus on more specific questions, such as whether today’s cinema is more 
(or less) playful than it was, say, ten years ago. In this article my claim is on 
7 We in the Netherlands have known this phenomenon of gamification since 1959, when 
the amusement park De Efteling introduced the figure Holle Bolle Gijs that rewards chil-
dren for cleaning up their waste. Dutch Supermarket chain Albert Heijn mined the 2012 
European football championships to create a “men against women” pool on Facebook. 
Participants could predict the results of matches. Winners received a discount on AH 
products. For more examples, see: www.gamification.org (accessed May 6, 2014).
8 Bauman’s emphasis.
9 Combs’ emphasis.
10 Taking Zimmerman and Chaplin’s claim serious that “the ludic century is an era of games”, 
would mean that also their manifesto should be considered to be a game, or as Dutch the-
orist Jan Simons puts it in relation to the manifesto of Dogma 95: “as a ‘move’ in the game” 
of, in the case of Lars von Trier, competing modes of film making (Simons 2007, 25). Such 
an approach would transform the field of media theories into an agonistic domain within 
which manifesto’s (such as Manifesto for a Ludic Century) and articles (such as this one) are 
part of a (theoretical) battle of all against all. My article for this book can be considered to 
be a counter-move in the game we media theorists play.
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the other hand foremost epistemological. I argue that the concept of play can 
be used as a heuristic tool to shed new light on contemporary media culture, 
as a lens that makes it possible to have a look at new objects and study them 
in a particular way. The concepts of play, and the ludification of culture play 
a crucial role in what I call the “ludic turn in media theory” (Raessens 2012). 
Both concepts enable me as a theorist to identify specific aspects of today’s 
culture, and to construct a specific conceptual perspective on today’s media 
culture. Zimmerman and Chaplin’s claim is both too broad and too narrow: 
it is too broad because it has as its focus the twenty-first century, it is too 
narrow because it starts from a games perspective. My approach is just the 
opposite, I specifically focus on media (theory) and the ludic or playful turn 
that is taking place in that specific field.
2 the Study of Play
Considering man and his world as playful certainly is no recent phenome-
non; it is of all times and all cultures. In 1795 Friedrich Schiller, for example, 
emphasized the importance of the play instinct for mankind. Well-known is 
the dictum from his On the Aesthetic Education of Man, one of the most im-
portant philosophical works of early German romanticism: “Man only plays 
when he is in the fullest sense of the word a human being, and he is only fully 
a human being when he plays” (Schiller 1967/1795, 107).11 Schiller expects 
no salvation from politics; only play, especially the game of art, can be ex-
pected to humanise society. Next to reasoning (homo sapiens) and crafting 
(homo faber) it is playing (homo ludens) that takes up the centre of atten-
tion. Philosophers such as Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Gadamer, 
Marcuse, Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari – most of whom are considered 
as precursors or representatives of postmodern thought – follow Schiller in 
their appreciation for the notion of play.12 Not only philosophy, however, 
but also the (natural) sciences, social and behavioural sciences, geosciences 
11 Schiller’s emphasis.
12 See the special issue “Gaming and Theory” of the journal symplokē 17(1-2) from 2009. The 
issue contains contributions that “engage the various intersections of the idea and prac-
tice of digital gaming and critical theory” (page 5). The work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari is particularly alluded to.
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and the full width of the humanities have in recent years testified to an every 
growing interest in the notion of play.
Strikingly, the conceptual framework of play used to meet with little 
systematic research in media studies. Four developments at the end of the 
last century changed this, however: socio-cultural changes, changes in the 
media themselves, changes in media studies, and institutional changes in ed-
ucation and research. The first change made it possible to envisage research 
into the concept of play, the second made it desirable, and with the third and 
fourth it became a matter of reality.
Let us start with the socio-cultural changes. In his article “Play and 
(Post)Modern Culture” Lourens Minnema (1998) offers an interesting ex-
planation for the growing interest in play in nineteenth- and twentieth-cen-
tury culture. Minnema points to the fact that, since modernity, Western cul-
ture has come to consist of many sub-domains – such as politics, economics, 
law, education, science, technology, and art – each possessing relative au-
tonomy and a specific set of rules. We see our contemporary (post)modern 
culture “as a game without an overall aim, as play without a transcendent 
destination but not without the practical necessity of rules agreed upon and 
of (inter)subjective imagination; as a complex of games each one having its 
own framework, its own rules, risks, chances, and charms” (ibid., 21). It is 
this type of social-cultural change that made it possible to envisage research 
into the conceptual framework of play.
Second, we are witnessing changes in the media themselves, for exam-
ple in the areas of film, TV, and new media. Since the 1990s, a new type 
of playful film narrative has enjoyed great popularity. Play is central to 
so-called puzzle films (Buckland 2009) such as Lost Highway (Lynch and 
Gifford 1997), Run Lola Run (Tykwer 1998) and Memento (Nolan 2000). 
The films feature plots of such intricacy that viewers feel they are solving 
a puzzle.13 New developments in the field of TV such as the online video 
sharing website YouTube enable users to “play” or mimic television, and to 
look like a professional (Feely 2006). Not only do YouTube users play the 
13 In their analysis of contemporary film, Simons (2007) as well as Leschke and Venus 
(2007) similarly employ the concept of play. Also see “Playing Games With Story Time” in 
Bordwell and Thompson (2008) and Juul (2008).
98
television game, but conversely the broadcasting companies play the You-
Tube game by launching websites such as Uitzending Gemist14, an internet 
protocol based replay service which enables viewers to watch shows they 
have missed on television. As I will argue below, mimicry is an important 
feature of play. Another example of what could be called the gamification 
of television is offered by second screen applications and apps such as the 
Heineken Star Player app, which enables viewers of Champions League 
matches to gamble on the outcome of an attack on Facebook. New media 
appear to exemplify this process of ludification: think of both commercial 
and serious computer games, playful communication via mobile phones, or 
social media like Facebook where identities are constructed in a playful way. 
Creating and maintaining communities form the core of these sites, which 
offer users the possibility to playfully express who they think they are and, 
more importantly, how they can be seen as more attractive in the eyes of fel-
low users. Following the view that it is the rules that constitute game worlds, 
one could conclude that this process of ludic identity construction can only 
take place within the formats developed and controlled by Facebook: a kind 
of multiple-choice test with a limited number of possible responses, little 
free play or improvisation (paidia), despite the suggestion of otherwise, and, 
on closer inspection, a lot of rule-governed discipline (ludus).15 All in all, 
these changes in media – in film, television, as well as new media – made it 
desirable to investigate the conceptual framework of play.
Third, as I suggested above, play until recently occupied only a modest 
position in media studies. This is changing, however, which has to do with 
the alterations in the way game and media studies relate to one another. That 
relation has three forms, which for the major part can be situated histori-
cally in terms of three stages. At its incipience, game studies emphatically 
sought a position outside media studies, clearly searching for an identity of 
14 See www.uitzendinggemist.nl (accessed May 6, 2014).
15 The terms and paidia and ludus are further explained below. The idea that Facebook as 
a sort of Big Brother closely monitors our purchasing behaviour (data mining) so as to 
enable advertisers to target users specifically is perhaps balanced by the fact that the very 
formats Facebook uses enable user groups to lie more convincingly about the selves they 
present, making it harder to figure out what individual users really, actually like. This 
might be the paradox of Facebook.
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its own. Any overtures from the part of film or literary studies were seen as 
an attempt to colonise this new domain. In 2001, Espen Aarseth in his edito-
rial for the new online magazine Game Studies stated that computer games 
had an aesthetics of their own and could not be reduced to a type of film or 
literature, and that the “colonising attempts” of both film and literature stud-
ies at absorbing computer games would continue until game studies have 
established itself as an independent academic field (Aarseth 2001). And for 
its part, media studies merely tolerated the newcomer. In the second stage, 
game studies and media studies opened up to one another. Within the Dig-
ital Game Research Association (DiGRA), for example, the special interest 
group Digital Games and Film was set up, creating a platform where game 
and film scholars could collaborate.16 Leading publications such as Screen-
Play: Cinema / Videogames / Interfaces (King and Krzywinska 2002) would 
have been unthinkable or merely marginal only a few years before: in this 
book the authors explore the ways in which film and computer games are 
related to one another. The third stage is the one we are in now and also the 
one that particularly is of interest to me here. Not only is game studies grad-
ually becoming an integral part of media studies, but play is also increasingly 
seen “as a tool for the analysis of the media experience” (Silverstone 1999, 
59). Play is increasingly regarded as a central notion for understanding me-
dia culture (Neitzel and Nohr 2006; Thimm 2010).17 In this third stage, re-
search into the conceptual framework of play has become a matter of reality. 
Fourth, this is also reflected in the institutional changes in education 
and research. New disciplines, such as new media studies and computer 
game studies, are being established in art and media departments (academic 
as well as vocational education), which invest a lot of their research and 
teaching into the theory of play. Take for example the activities going on 
within the GAP Center for the Study of Digital Games and Play, which is 
16 See www.digra.org (accessed May 6, 2014). In 2003 Utrecht University hosted “Level Up”, 
the first DiGRA conference (Copier and Raessens 2003).
17 In recent issues of ToDiGRA (Physical and Digital in Games and Play), G.A.M.E. (Re-
framing Video Games in the Light of Cinema), and Media Fields (Playgrounds), we see this 
focus on the concept of play: researchers refer to “playful media”, they want to answer the 
question “what is ludic at the cinema” and study what they call “mediated play spaces”. 
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affiliated with Utrecht University.18 And also knowledge institutions such as 
the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research NWO, the independ-
ent research organisation TNO, the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and 
Sciences KNAW, and the Netherlands Study Centre for Technology Trends 
STT are involved in either researching play or facilitating such research. 
Game studies thus have gradually become an integral part of the Dutch ac-
ademic community.19
To sum up then, changes in culture and society, in media, in the rela-
tion between game studies and media studies, as well as in the educational 
and knowledge institutions have each in turn made it possible to envisage 
research into the conceptual framework of play, have made such research 
desirable, and have made it become a matter of reality.
3 Play
Having situated the state of affairs regarding research into the conceptual 
framework of play, there are three remaining questions to address: what is 
play, which forms does play take up in contemporary media culture, and 
what do I mean to say when I refer to the ludic, playful turn in media theory? 
Let us begin with the concept of play.
To capture this concept, I want to focus on one of the most important 
books in the current debate about play: Johan Huizinga’s Homo Ludens. This 
book was first published in 1938 and since then has been translated into 
many languages. It is considered the most influential modernist exposition 
of play and continues to remain – mind you, more than seven and a half dec-
ades after the first edition – the inevitable reference point for any “serious” 
discussion of play. Undeniably, the book’s on-going impact has to do with 
18 See www.gamesandplay.nl (accessed May 6, 2014).
19 See for example three studies investigating so-called serious games: the TNO report 
Serious Gaming (van Kranenburg et al. 2006), and the explorative reports Serious gaming: 
Vergezichten op de Mogelijkheden (van Uden 2011) and Play On: Serious Gaming for Future 
Seniors (Bakkes et al. 2012), a study on healthy ageing, by the Netherlands Study Centre for 
Technology Trends STT. The impact of playful media on the construction of identities was 
central to the NWO-funded research project Playful Identities (2005–2010, led by Valerie 
Frissen, Jos de Mul and Joost Raessens). This article builds on the results of this project. 
Also see note 21.
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its large ambition and scope. As the subtitle “A Study of the Play-Element of 
Culture” makes clear, it was Huizinga’s ambition to demonstrate that the rise 
and evolution of culture occurs in and as play.20 In the first chapter Huizinga 
offers a definition of the phenomenon of play, which has since been quoted 
in almost any book on play. Play is: 
[. . .] a free activity standing quite consciously outside “ordinary life” as 
being “not meant”, but at the same time absorbing the player intensely and 
utterly. It is an activity connected with no material interest, and no profit 
can be gained by it. It proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time 
and space according to fixed rules and in an orderly manner. It promotes 
the formation of social groupings. (Huizinga 1955 / 1938, 13)
Let us examine the six elements of this definition. Play first of all expresses 
the freedom of humanity, because as a free act it is disinterested and has no 
practical utility. For Huizinga, play belongs to symbolic culture, which he 
refers to as “holy earnest” (ibid., 23) and which in his view contrasts with 
ordinary life, the realm of what we as fragile beings need to survive: food, 
clothing, housing, etc. We could call the latter instances of “profane earnest” 
in line with Huizinga’s reasoning; play is not meant and refers to an activity 
of make belief or “pretence” (ibid., 47). In play, you know that the game 
you play belongs to a different category from ordinary life; you can be im-
mersed in play, be completely lost in it, experience excitement and joy; play 
is characterised by specific boundaries in space and time and the game you 
play can always be repeated; crucial to play are the rules that constitute the 
world of the game, which are absolutely binding and indisputable; finally, 
play creates order in an imperfect world and a confused life. Play is essential 
for community engagement.
20 Part of the confusion in the reception of Homo Ludens is due to unfortunate translations. 
For example, the subtitle of the English translation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955) - reads 
“A Study of the Play Element in Culture” (own emphasis), which obviously is a substantial 
mistranslation of the Dutch subtitle: “Proeve eener Bepaling van het Spel-Element der 
Cultuur” (own emphasis). In Huizinga’s definition of play, the Dutch “’niet gemeend’ ” is 
also wrongly translated as “not serious”, it should have been: “not meant”.
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Huizinga’s definition of play has met with three major types of critique. 
First, his definition would be universalist and essentialist in the sense that it 
claims to cover the immense variety in games and play. This could be coun-
tered however by understanding the six elements I have distinguished in 
Huizinga’s definition as a set of criteria that together constitute a family re-
semblance in the Wittgensteinian sense. An activity belongs to the family 
of play when it meets at least some of these characteristics, the number of 
which then determines the degree of “playfulness” of that activity.
The second type of critique asserts that Huizinga discusses play merely 
in general terms.  Roger Caillois (2001 / 1958) proposes to further develop 
Huizinga’s play concept by distinguishing four different categories of play: 
(1) mimicry (make believe or pretence), which ranges from the imitation 
games of children or the above-mentioned “playing television” on YouTube 
to the plays staged in the theatre; (2) agôn (competitive games), which covers 
competitive sports like football or the quiz show; (3) alea (games with a luck 
factor) referring to games like the lottery; and (4) ilinx (games in which ver-
tigo is central), which includes entertainments like bungee jumping or the 
rollercoaster. Besides these four categories Caillois distinguishes the poles 
paidia and ludus, with in each of the four categories the specific types of 
games taking up a relative position between these poles: Paidia refers to free 
play, improvisation, spontaneity and impulsiveness, while ludus enriches 
paidia by adding forms of discipline and refers to more explicit forms of 
rule-driven games.
While the first two points of critique can be read in supplement to 
Huizinga, the third is more fundamental. By defining play as he does, 
Huizinga upholds a distinction between play and non-play that is far too 
strict. This entails that playful activities share at least some of the charac-
teristics which I outlined above; while non-play is exclusively situated in 
the opposite domain of reality, utility, coercion, seriousness, etc. As a con-
sequence Huizinga fails to do justice to the ambiguity of play that according 
to play theorists such as Brian Sutton-Smith (1997) is precisely its defining 
characteristic. Huizinga’s strict distinction can be understood in terms of his 
adherence to modernist dichotomies, which is why I explicitly referred to his 
Homo Ludens concept as the most important “modernist” exposition of play. 
For modernist thought, including that of Huizinga, leaves no room for am-
biguities and seeks to dispel them. As a result, however, Huizinga becomes 
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entangled in insoluble conceptual tensions. He 
denotes play as reality at one moment, but as 
appearance at another; it constitutes a core di-
mension of human life (reality), yet stands outside it (appearance) because of 
its make believe element; play is freedom and then again it is another form of 
coercion; play celebrates human freedom, but the player can be completely 
lost in his game; the rules of the game are absolutely binding, but players can 
also bend the rules; games lack utility yet are useful; play is a purposeless 
interlude, yet it also creates order and community, and so on. 
The solution is to do justice to these ambiguities, because they are so 
typical for play. The player for example is both part of the ordinary world 
and immersed in the world of the game: this is where the ludic experience 
matches the aesthetic experience. When we play we plunge enthusiastically 
into the world of the game, while at the same time we maintain a certain 
distance in relation to our own behaviour in play; this is why we can call 
that behaviour playful. This duality allows us to maintain less or more crit-
ical distance with respect to the rules; it allows us to see those rules as just 
the rules of the game, which are always open to adaptation. Taken together, 
Huizinga’s ideas about play along with the three amendments discussed here 
form a good starting point for the analysis of the ludification of contempo-
rary media culture, as we shall see in the next section.
A final remark on Homo Ludens. Although Huizinga argues that all cul-
ture arises and evolves in and as play, he also claims that not every culture 
continue to play. According to Huizinga, the Romantic period was the last 
in our culture to exhibit a playful spirit. In the nineteenth century the play 
factor much recedes into the background. And in the dark final chapter – on 
the play element of the twentieth century – Huizinga proposes that the ele-
ment of play has largely lost its meaning. There is hardly any play in modern 
culture. A major reason for the demise of play, he argues, is the rise of tech-
nology. Here I would defend the thesis – stepping up in time – that, from an 
ontological perspective, digital information and communication technolo-
gies have precisely enabled new forms of play.
The first of the three questions – what is play? – has now been answered. 
The remaining two – which forms do play take up in contemporary media 
culture, and what do I mean to say when I refer to the ludic, playful turn in 
Culture arises and unfolds 
in and as play.
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media theory? – will be addressed presently. Let us begin with tracing play 
in contemporary media culture.
4 Playful media cultuRe
In our contemporary media culture, digital technologies and play are closely 
linked. In order to better understand the impact this has, we need to further 
specify the concept of play. It is important to emphasise the distinction be-
tween play and game. How do the two concepts relate to each other? Play 
is the overarching category. It refers to all activities of play, including both 
games and non-game activities such as playful communication. Games are 
the formalised parts of play (cf. Salen and Zimmerman 2004, 301–311). This 
distinction allows us to focus our attention not only on computer games, but 
also on the impact of play on media culture as such.
Huizinga’s concept of play – to which I confine myself in this article – 
seems like a good starting point for the analysis of our media experience, 
because our experiences in media and play have a great deal of ambiguities 
and characteristics in common. Or, to put it differently, the media – each 
in their own medium-specific way – offer users new possibilities – “affor-
dances” – to play. Let us briefly consider the six elements of the play concept 
distinguished above, taking into account the associated ambiguities.21 This 
discussion makes clear that the process of ludification is not necessarily a 
positive development: freedom goes hand in hand with coercion, fun with 
annoyance.
To start with the first element, media use may initially look like harm-
less, disinterested fun. Think of all the creative adaptations of Star Wars 
(Lucas 1977) on YouTube. It can also, however, become involved in political 
ends. Think of the Turkish court blocking access to YouTube because it al-
legedly hosted videos that attacked Ataturk, the founder of the Republic of 
Turkey; the element of make believe refers to the dual nature of media. Like 
play, our media culture consists of accepting the “as-if-ness of the world” 
(Silverstone 1999, 59). According to the philosopher Gianni Vattimo, it is 
21 For a detailed analysis of the playfulness of digital media, see Cermak-Sassenrath (2010) 
and the book resulting from the Playful Identities project: Frissen et al. (forthcoming). 
Also see note 19.
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becoming increasingly difficult to imagine a single reality, due to the current 
proliferation of digital media. He therefore reasons that if media cause us to 
lose our “sense of reality”, this is a liberation rather than a great loss (Vattimo 
1992, 8). In line with this, he argues that media realities are just versions 
of how the world works, subject to the “game of interpretations” (Vattimo 
1998, 19). The impact of this debate – is it possible that media show us an 
objective reality, or do they merely offer versions of this reality – can be wit-
nessed when considering the current reorganisation of news shows within 
the Dutch public broadcasting system: some shows are assigned the role of 
broadcasting news from a specific angle or perspective, whereas others such 
as Nieuwsuur should maintain strict objectivity.
Considering the other elements, it is worth pointing out that digital 
media offer forms of pleasure and annoyance resulting from the interactive 
aspect: there is frustration when the computer does not perform what you 
want it to do and pleasure involved in surrendering to the rules or conversely 
opposing them; the specific boundaries of space and time appear to be un-
der heavy pressure when considering the culture of constant accessibility 
that arose with mobile phone usage. Yet, the boundaries become clear when 
we focus on the aspect of safety. On social media like Facebook, users can 
playfully construct identities that do not necessarily have any implications 
for real life; the element of order and community engagement returns in the 
formation of web-based social groups: green blogs like sustainablog22 unite 
users who are committed to a better environment and oppose the existing 
social order.
As for the rules of the game, I would like to discuss this sixth element 
of play a bit more in depth. Rules can be either accepted or transformed or 
bent, both at an individual level and at the media system’s macro level. In 
order to achieve a better understanding of the way we can deal with rules, 
we must consider the interaction between, on the one hand, levels of play-
ability enabled by different media (Kücklich 2004) and, on the other hand, 
individual users’ ludoliteracy or play competence (Zagal 2010). With respect 
to television, the aforementioned John Fiske addresses the playfulness that 
arises from the relationship between a medium and its user. Fiske makes a 
22 See sustainablog.org (accessed May 6, 2014).
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distinction between two types of play. First, a text (e.g. a movie) “has ‘play’ 
in it, like a door whose hinges are loose” (Fiske 1987, 230). Play here is “free 
movement within a more rigid structure” (Salen and Zimmerman 2004, 
304). Second, such “play” enables viewers to play with the text, i.e. playfully 
develop an interpretation of their own. Think of the film I mentioned at 
the beginning of this article, Slumdog Millionaire. Is it a form of poverty 
porn (exploitation of poverty) or a critical reflection on Jamal’s social back-
ground? What is distinct about new media is that they enable multiple forms 
of participation and thus playability, and that they therefore are not limited 
to the game of interpretations (Raessens 2005).
Playability can have four different levels. First, there is the player who 
accepts that “the rules of a game are absolutely binding and allow no doubt” 
(Huizinga 1955/1938, 11). Such a player voluntarily submits himself to the 
rules that govern the world of the game. The cheater who “pretends to be 
playing the game” (ibid.) operates on the second level. This player – for ex-
ample the one who uses cheat codes in computer games – is aware of the 
explicit and implicit rules of the game and tries to deploy them (against the 
rules) to his own gain. At the third level we have the spoilsport, “the player 
who trespasses against the rules or ignores them” (ibid.). An example is the 
so-called modder, the player who modifies the computer game if the system 
allows for it. The fourth and final level is that of “the outlaw, the revolution-
ary” (ibid., 12) who in digital culture takes the shape of the programmer. 
Where the player (level 1), the cheater (level 2) and the spoilsport (level 3) 
still operate within the boundaries of the game or oppose these, the pro-
grammer (level 4) creates “a new community with rules of its own” (ibid., 
12), his own game world, in other words, thus driving a system’s playability 
over the edge to discover new forms (Rushkoff 2010 and 2012).23
I will offer three examples to show that such an approach to play can be 
fruitful for the analysis of contemporary media culture. The first example 
concerns the study of serious games, the second example expands on this, 
23 The fact remains that programmers are bound by certain codes and protocols, which by 
definition preclude absolute freedom. This is an important theme in critical software stud-
ies. See Galloway (2004 and 2006). The rules of ludo-capitalism provide additional limita-
tions (Dibbell 2006 and 2008).
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approaching digital media and digital media experience as something play-
ful, and the third addresses the debate surrounding the concept of media 
literacy.
Serious games are computer games, which are not only played for enter-
tainment but also for educational purposes. These games are often designed 
as ideological spaces, as worlds that aim to convince players of certain ideas. 
Think for instance of Food Force (2005) developed by the United Nations’ 
World Food Programme which sets out to convince players that humanitar-
ian aid, possibly involving military intervention – preferably by the UN – is 
of great importance to solve conflicts worldwide. At first sight a purely noble 
cause. But closer inspection yields that such games are built on the metaphor 
of the West as the helping parent, on the premise that emergencies, conflicts, 
or local wars, all originate from within while the conflict can only be defined 
or solved by external forces. From this perspective, these games are not really 
that much different from commercial war games like Call of Duty (2003) or 
Medal of Honor (1999) which are based on a similar analysis of the nature of 
conflicts, suggesting that their solution is possible only through external mili-
tary intervention. In other words, serious games that appeal to our sympathy 
are by no means innocent, because they shape the paradigms of guilt and re-
sponsibility in a very particular way. This raises the ethical-political question 
of what game developers, game researchers, and game players should do. Try-
ing to make games more effective by allowing players to become completely 
immersed in the game world is an option, although allowing for a measure 
of critical distance in the design of the game is quite recommendable, as I 
have argued elsewhere using the term gaming apparatus. If that condition is 
met, serious games incorporate “a moment of disavowal – of distancing . . . 
We [i.e. players] perform actions in the full knowledge that we are doing 
this within the constraints set by someone else” (Raessens 2009b, 26). This 
distinction between immersion and critical distance – which I previously 
described as a game ambiguity – is based on the above-mentioned forms of 
playability. Within such serious games, players will normally subject them-
selves to the prevailing ideological lines of the game world, while from an 
ethical-political perspective the awareness of (and where necessary resist-
ance against) these rules is important. This is where the programmer in-
volved in the creation of activist computer games –  such as independently 
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produced “critical computer games” or “games of multitude”24 – attempts to 
do something different (Flanagan 2009; Dyer-Witheford and De Peuter 2009).
The second example concerns the playability of digital media in general. 
At first glance, it seems that these media increase users’ room for play. That is, 
all software-based products can be modified and adapted to users’ personal 
needs (level 3 of playability). Think of the hacking and further development 
of Sony’s robot dog Aibo. When Sony launched this dog in 1999, users soon 
wanted it to have more functionalities. One of them, hacker Aibopet, de-
signed a program to make the dog dance and made it available on his own 
website. As media scholar Mirko Schäfer shows, Sony initially did not appre-
ciate these forms of “play beyond the manual” (Schäfer 2006) and threatened 
with lawsuits, but soon changed track. Sony realised that these hacks could 
also be integrated into new versions of Aibo. Such playful forms of product 
modification are characteristic of the major changes taking place in contem-
porary cultural industries. This example demonstrates – note: within certain 
limits – the disintegration of the traditional distinction between consumer 
and producer. In today’s “bastard culture” (Schäfer 2011), media users can 
become active participants in the process of the creation and evolution of 
media products. On the other hand, present-day Web 2.0-optimism suggests 
that we – the consumers – are the ones who are in power. This optimism 
“urgently begs for deconstruction” (van Dijck and Nieborg 2009, 855). For 
example, Time Magazine elected as person of the year 2007: “You. Yes you. 
You control the information age. Welcome to your world”. Yet research into 
the online game World of Warcraft (2004) shows for example that although 
negotiations take place between players and Blizzard Entertainment, the 
game company (game scholar René Glas calls these negotiations very ap-
propriately “a battlefield”, 2013), the extent to which players can claim room 
for play to do their own thing is mainly determined by Blizzard. Here too, 
the principle remains unaltered that one should buy the game, pay monthly 
24 Think of more casual games like McDonald’s Video Game (2006) by the collective of media 
activists Mollindustria (www.molleindustria.org, accessed May 6, 2014) and September 
12th: A Toy World (2003) and MADRID (2004) by newsgaming.com (accessed May 6, 
2014). On the basis of Jesper Juul’s notion of casual games (2010) new media scholar Alex 
Gekker labels such forms of playful activism as “casual politicking” (2012).
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subscription fees, and thus remain part of a system that you could designate 
as ludo-capitalism.
The third example concerns media literacy. How to behave in this media 
culture, which appears to be characterised on the one hand by autonomy 
and emancipation and on the other hand by being determined by media 
(technology)? The ability to be immersed in, yet at the same time maintain 
critical distance to media, as well as the ability to address the arbitrary na-
ture and mutability of rules (two of the aforementioned ambiguities), are 
components of what I would call ludoliteracy or play competence, which is 
in fact a specific form of what is called media literacy (Zagal 2010). Where 
media literacy in general terms is defined as “the totality of knowledge, skills, 
and attitudes needed to operate as critically aware and active citizens in a 
complex, changing and fundamentally mediated world” (Raad voor Cultuur 
[the Dutch Arts Council] 2005, 2),25 the distinction between game and play 
and between different forms of playability facilitate a more precise definition 
of civic participation. Game competence or “gaming literacy” (Zimmerman 
2009) relates in particular to playing computer games and involves skills and 
knowledge related to using games, critically interpret them and design and 
produce them. Ludoliteracy, however, is applicable across the full spectrum 
of media. It involves playing by the rules, bending and adjusting the rules in 
order to move easily through the system, or where necessary and possible, 
adjusting the system or playing the system. Or as French philosopher Gilles 
Deleuze once put it: trace and where necessary create lines of flight, allow 
for leaks in the system (Rabinow and Gandal 1986). Considered as such, the 
term play is not only suitable for characterising our contemporary media 
culture (playful) but also for defining the knowledge and skills (ludoliteracy 
or play competence) required to function in media culture.
5 the Playful tuRn in media theoRy
This leaves us with the question whether we could speak of a ludic turn in 
media theory. Let us put things in perspective. In recent years the claims of 
yet another turn followed each other in rapid succession. We already had the 
linguistic turn, and then supposedly a digital turn, a material turn, a visual 
25  Emphasis by Raad voor Cultuur.
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turn, a pictorial turn, an experiential turn, a spatial turn, a cultural turn, a 
mediamatic turn, and so on. Is this a clear case of concept inflation, or are 
these changes really all taking place? Speaking in terms of turns could also 
stem from the all too human tendency to overestimate the significance of 
their own times, perhaps even from the irresistible need of researchers de-
livering articles to accentuate the significance of their own research. 
Considering the above, I do indeed claim we are witnessing a ludic turn 
and that this turn in the field of media studies combines two elements. On 
the one hand, the notion that media are playful opens up new objects of 
study: computer games (including serious games), playful aspects of media 
use (such as product modifications), and the competence to deal playfully 
with the systems you are part of (ludoliteracy). On the other hand, there is 
a ludic turn in media theory itself, a turn to which this article hopes to con-
tribute. This allows for considering these media objects in a particular way. 
A new interpretative framework arises from using new concepts and con-
ceptual dichotomies from game and play studies, a specific focus to deploy 
in the theoretical study of media and their use. Think of concepts such as 
playability, gaming apparatus, play competence or ludoliteracy, battlefields 
of negotiation, and casual games-casual politicking, and of conceptual di-
chotomies or ambiguities such as: rules (constitutive, limiting, closure) and 
variability thereof (openness, freedom); immersion (surrender) and critical 
distance (monitoring); disinterestedness versus social criticism; depicting 
reality or only versions thereof; the pleasure of being either in control or 
not. I believe that these concepts and conceptual dichotomies are useful in 
bringing to light the important characteristics of and issues in the field of 
digital media culture and to prepare the ground for new perspectives and 
action plans. Think for example of the power game fought between produc-
ers, distributors, and consumers, with the industry trying to set the rules of 
the game while certain user groups aim to maintain a degree of openness by 
transforming these rules.
Three perspectives should be united in this: the political analysis of media, 
paying attention to the struggle for power between producers and consumers 
and the impact of ludo-capitalism; the analysis of the “digital material” aspects 
of media such as they are studied in critical code studies and software studies 
(van den Boomen et al. 2009), and the philosophical analysis of play and me-
dia, the lines of flight and leaks in the system. The ludic turn in media theory 
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expounded here seems very fruitful, as I hoped to have shown in this article. 
Now I do not just want to study the ludic turn but actually bring it about, 
as an example of what Henry Jenkins once called “intervention analysis” 
(Tulloch and Jenkins 1995, 238). Intervention analysis is not just interested 
in describing and explaining the existing orders of knowledge, but wishes 
to change these. For this we at Utrecht University are busy with bringing 
together our research and teaching activities in this area to set up a collabo-
rative community of researchers and students (from inside and outside our 
university). We christened this community as the Center for the Study of 
Digital Games and Play, abbreviated GAP. If we do our work well, you will 
soon associate GAP no longer with what Huizinga would call the “profane 
earnest” of GAP clothing, but with the “holy earnest” of games and play.
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PRedigital PRecuRSoRS  
of gamification
by mathias fuchs
intRoduction
If we believe what renowned US-American market analysts tell us unani-
mously, then we have to accept that nothing will influence our lives as much 
as these: mobility, social media, and gamification. The latter is said to have 
the strongest impact: “Gamification is projected to be a $1.6 billion market 
by 2016” (Corry 2011). Other sources predict $2.8 billion for 2016 (Palmer, 
Lunceford, and Patton 2012) and $5.5 billion for 2018 (Markets and Markets 
2013). In 2011 marketing analyst Gartner, Inc. said that “by 2015 more than 
50 per cent of organizations that manage innovation processes will gamify 
those processes” (Gartner, Inc. 2011). Yet one year later Gartner, Inc. said, 
“Gamification is currently being driven by novelty and hype. By 2014 80% 
of gamification applications will fail to deliver” (Fleming 2012). But irre-
spective of whether gamification will change little, something or everything, 
no one can deny that it has become a buzzword that describes what many 
fear or hope to happen right now. The process of a total permeation of our 
society with methods, metaphors, values, and attributes of games (Fuchs 
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2011 and 2013)1 was christened “gamification” in 2002 (Marczewski 2012) 
and has since been popularised by US marketing companies and their re-
spective PR departments. Even though there have been attempts to differen-
tiate between games-related and play-related phenomena, or processes that 
could be seen as either driven by ludus or paidia (Caillois 2001 / 1958), gami- 
fication has remained the buzzword. Greek, Italian, Spanish, Swedish and 
German terminological creations have been introduced and discussed in 
the scholarly world, but neither παιγνιδοποίηση, ludicizzazione, ludificação, 
gamificación, ludización nor the German-Latin ludifizierung could compete 
with the Anglo-American gamification. The reason for this might be that the 
Californian league of gamification evangelists such as Zichermann (2011), 
McGonigal (2011), and company have already been sowing on the semantic 
field at a time when European game scholars were not quite sure whether the 
ludification they observed was more of a curse than a gift. Flavio Escribano’s 
terminological creation of a “ludictatorship” points in that direction. 
The US politician Al Gore did not seem to be worried about what gamifica-
tion might bring to our society when at the eighth annual Games for Change 
Festival in June 2013 he declared, “Games are the new normal”. On the one 
hand this seems to be the Democrat’s or even the democratic assumption 
that everybody should have the right to play. On the other hand, it declares 
total play with the hidden implication that those who cannot play society’s 
games and those who do not want to play them are not to be considered 
normal. Even though 2002 is usually said to be the year when the term gam-
ification was coined, it was only around the beginning of this decade that 
gamification became a buzzword. Deterding, Dixon, Khaled, and Nacke 
(2011), Schell (2010)2, Reilhac (2010),3 and others presented different fla-
vours of gamification, some of them design-oriented, others psychological 
or judgemental. For Sebastian Deterding and his colleagues: 
1 German original: “Gamification ist die Durchdringung unserer Gesellschaft mit 
Metaphern, Methoden, Werten und Attributen aus der Welt der Spiele” (Fuchs 2013). 
2 “Gamification is taking things that aren’t games and trying to make them feel more like 
games” (Schell 2010).
3 “There is no doubt that video games are the emergent form our times and that the process 
of gamification is transforming our world, contaminating it like never before” (Reilhac 
2010).
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[. . .] it is suggested that “gamified” applications provide insight into novel, 
gameful phenomena complementary to playful phenomena. Based on our 
research, we propose a definition of “gamification” as the use of game de-
sign elements in non-game contexts. (Deterding et al. 2011)
All of the definitions of gamification that have been proposed since 2002 are 
based on the idea that the digital computer and digital computer games are 
a reference without which gamification could not be conceived. There were, 
however, predigital predecessors of gamification long before digital comput-
ers became popular. A decade before programmable computers such as the 
Z3, Colossus or the ENIAC were introduced, a playful labour attitude had 
been mentioned and praised by the author Pamela Lyndon Travers. As early 
as in 1934 Travers’ Mary Poppins character was developed to tell the follow-
ing rhyme in the Disney movie: 
In ev’ry job that must be done
There is an element of fun
You find the fun, and snap!
The job’s a game! (Travers 1934) 
This is obviously what we would nowadays call the gamification of labour. 
It is precisely the use of game elements in non-game contexts, as the defini-
tions of Zichermann, Reilhac, Schell, Deterding et al. suggest.4
This article intends to present examples for gamification avant la lettre 
and compares these predigital forms of ludification with recent approaches 
that build heavily on the historic ideas, concepts, and gadgets. In particu-
4 I owe my colleague Paolo Ruffino thanks for the request for a clarification in regard to 
the “game elements” mentioned. In an email from January 21, 2014 Ruffino comments, 
“Deterding et al. talk about the use of game ‘design’ elements. They refer to a specific 
knowledge and practice: game design – a field mostly born with the emergence of video 
games as an industry.” Ruffino has a point there. I acknowledge that I am trying to recon-
textualise gamification here not only in using predigital examples but also in looking at 
games before computer game design existed. Having said so, my understanding of gami-
fication is close to what other authors label “playification” (Mosca 2012) or “ludification” 
(Raessens 2006).
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lar the following fields of predigital gamification will be looked at: religious 
practice, music, magic, education, lifestyle, and styles for killing.
1 gamifying ReligiouS PRactice
Gods from antique Greek myths knew how to play tricks on each other. In-
dian avatars experienced lust and joy and even the warrior gods from Nordic 
mythology had a lot of fun every now and then. The Loki character from 
Edda is a joker and a jester. Little fun however has been reported from the 
Christian God, Son of God, or the corresponding spirits. Protagonists in 
Jewish-Christian mythology never laugh, never make love, and they rarely 
play. Einstein is said to have commented on God’s resistance to play with 
his famous phrase of “God doesn’t throw the dice”. If playing or gambling 
is reported of in the bible, it is usually the bad guys who do so. The max-
imum offence against piety and the example par excellence of how not to 
behave in the vicinity of Christ are the soldiers at the cross who dare to play 
when Christ is dying. Completely in line with the negative sanctioning of 
playfulness is the prohibition of any gambling practice in Christian culture. 
Play, that was felt to be the pastime of the gods in other religions, was asso-
ciated rather with the devil in Christianity. Who could have invented such a 
nuisance as play? Reinmar von Zweter, a poet from the thirteenth century 
had no doubt about that when he wrote in a truly Christian spirit: “The devil 
created the game of dice”:
Der tuivel schouf das würfelspil,
dar umbe daz er selen vil
da mit gewinnen will (Wolferz 1916)
His anger about dice games is actually exemplifying a much wider rejection 
of play in general. Almost every century in Western European history has 
known legal sanctions on gambling, prohibition of certain games, and vi-
olent destruction of games (Ritschl 1884). On 10 August 1452 Capistrano, 
a travelling sermoniser, was said to have collected games that he labelled 
“sinful luxury items” and piled them up to an impressive mountain of 3640 
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board games, some 40,000 dice games and innumerable card games. The 
games were then burnt publicly (Dirx 1981, 82).5
It is frightening to see that game burning preceded book burning and 
that in both cases it was not the medium that was intended for destruction 
but a cultural practice and a practicing group.
In Western Europe gambling that involved monetary benefits was often 
prohibited. Reports about public houses that were accused of being gam-
bling houses were used in many cases to shut down the pubs or to penal-
ise the innkeepers. A class action from 1612 in Ernsdorf united the village 
mayor and members of the parish choir to sue an innkeeper who served 
alcoholic drinks in order to “attract gamblers and scallywags to visit his inn” 
(Schmidt 2005, 255).6 In 1670 a list of all the inhabitants that were suspected 
of playing games was posted in the very same village of Ernsdorf. Nine years 
later the court usher was told to withdraw bowling pins from children on the 
day of their catechism classes (ibid.).
Yet real politics within Christian ethics developed ways and means to 
play and be pious at the same time. Gerhard Tersteegen can be called an 
eighteenth century gamification expert for religious practice. His Pious Lot-
tery7 (1769) was a card game consisting of 365 cards that contained words of 
wisdom and advice for the believers. By randomly selecting a card from the 
deck of cards the pious gambler would perform two activities at the same 
time: playing an aleatoric game of cards and practicing Christian-minded 
devotion. Tersteegen’s gamified prayer book was successful because of the 
popularity of profane lottery practice of the eighteenth century that his game 
appropriated and adapted for Tersteegen’s own purposes. The sermonist an-
nounces his game as a lottery with no danger of losing; however, if you hit 
the jackpot (“drawing the best lot”), your prize will be unsurpassable:
5 Translation by the author, German original: “Er errichtete einen Berg von 3640 Brettspielen, 
an die 40.000 Würfel, Kartenspiele ohne Zahl und 72 Schlitten und verbrannte dieses 
sündhafte Luxuswerk” (Dirx 1981, 82).
6 Translation by the author, German original: “so daß sich allerhand Gesinde bei ihm ein-
finde und spiele” (Schmidt 2005, 255).
7 Translation by the author, German original: Der Frommen Lotterie. The Pious Lottery was 
part of Tersteegen’s Geistliches Blumengärtlein. This book included the Pious Lottery at 
latest in the fourth edition, published in 1769.
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This is a lottery for Believers, 
and nothing can be lost, 
Yet nothing would be better, 
then drawing the best lot (Tersteegen 1769, title)8  
Not everybody was happy with Tersteegen’s ludification of serious content. 
One of his contemporaries and critics, Heinrich Konrad Scheffler, mocked 
the pious lottery in his essay from 1734 on strange religious practice: “Praxis 
pietatis curiosa” (Brückner 2010, 261) as not pleasing to God.
The itinerant preacher Tersteegen was faced with a problem that is not 
unlike today’s problems of selling products with low use-value as desirable – 
or boring work as fun. Common eighteenth century practice of prescribing a 
prayer per day must have been extremely fatiguing for the average believers. 
When the radical pietist Tersteegen introduced alea (Caillois 2001 / 1958) he 
achieved what today’s gamification evangelists try to accomplish: increas-
ing customer loyalty with fun elements. “Gamification is Driving Loyalty” 
(Goldstein 2013), “Motivation + Big Data + Gamification = Loyalty 3.0” 
(Paharia 2013), “Gamification = Recognition, Growth + Fun” (DeMonte 
2013). More than 200 years before the notion of gamification had been in-
troduced, similar practices were already in use: establishing loyalty by hid-
ing the primary company’s goal and offering “peripheral or secondary me-
chanics” (Ciotti  2013) that establish pseudo goals and re-direct the attention 
of the customers, a.k.a. gamers. 
2 gamifying muSic and dance
Contemporaries of Gerhard Tersteegen, Johann Philipp Kirnberger, Carl 
Philipp Emanuel Bach, and Maximilian Stadler worked on something that 
8 Translation by the author, German original: “Diß ist der Frommen Lotterie,/ wobei man 
kann verlieren nie,/ das Nichts darin ist all so groß,/ als wann dir fiel das beste Los”. 
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could be called the gamification of music9 when introducing a ludic gener-
ator for musical composition.10 Kirnberger’s Ever-Ready Minuet and Pol-
onaise Composer11 was first published in 1757 and then again in a revised 
version in 1783. The game preceded the Musikalisches Würfelspiel12 from 
1792 that dubitably has been attributed to Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart. If 
Mozart was the author of the Musikalisches Würfelspiel, his intention was 
most likely to present and sell another virtuosity stunt and not to question 
the nature of composition. It is probably also fair to say that Mozart was 
not particularly hesitant in appropriating material and concepts from fellow 
composers and to polish them in his personal way to make them a successful 
commodity. The idea of Kirnberger’s gamified system of composition as well 
as that of Mozart’s was to propose that music could be conceived as a game 
that follows certain rules and is affected by an element of chance, or “alea” 
as Caillois would name it (Caillois 2001 / 1958). This idea is completely anti- 
classical and anti-romantic, but was epistemically coherent with the eight-
eenth century thought. It is therefore not surprising that systems like the 
9 When eighteenth century musicians used card games and dice to facilitate composition 
processes, they aimed at something that is similar to contemporary gamification attempts 
in the field of marketing: The former wanted to implement a layer of fun and entertain-
ment and they wanted the audience to believe that they were composing. Actually the 
audience did not compose, they were just instrumental in starting algorithmic processes. 
The latter try to implement a layer of fun and entertainment above the functional level of 
marketing and they want the customers to believe that they desire what they are told to 
desire. In both cases rule-based ludic systems serve as persuasive devices for subject mat-
ter that is not play. That is why I speak of gamification in the context of music and in the 
context of recent marketing, even though the object of gamification differs in both cases.
10 The examples for aleatoric composition methods given here do not make claims about 
the earliest attempts to do so. There is a history of aleatoric composition in the eighteenth 
century, in the digital age (Nierhaus 2009) and much earlier than that. Already in the 
seventeenth century, composers had begun thinking of a piece of music as a system of 
units which could be manipulated according to chance processes. Around 1650, the Jesuit 
Athanasius Kircher invented the arca musurgica, a box filled with cards containing short 
phrases of music. By drawing the cards in combination, one could assemble polyphonic 
compositions in four parts.
11 Translation by the author, German original: Der allezeit fertige Menuetten- und 
Polonaisencomponist.
12 English: Musical Dice Game.
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Ever-Ready Minuet and Polonaise Composer or the Musikalisches Würfel-
spiel have been devised by various eighteenth century composers. 
In 1758 Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach’s A Method for Making Six Bars of 
Double Counterpoint at the Octave without Knowing the Rules13 introduced 
a game for short compositions as a demonstration of method and a tool 
for rule-based composition. It would not be appropriate to criticise Johann 
Sebastian Bach’s son for a mediocre quality of the counterpoint composi-
tions produced. The compositional spirit of the eighteenth century was dif-
ferent to classical musical thinking and for the late Baroque composer the 
main achievement was to produce something that fitted the rules of musical 
craftsmanship as effectively as possible. Aesthetic subtlety was not the point. 
Maximilian Stadler was another composer who worked with a set of 
dice. His Table for composing minuets and trios to infinity, by playing with two 
dice14 was published in 1780 and might well have been the inspiration for 
Mozart’s Würfelspiel. Stadler was friend to Mozart, Haydn, and Beethoven 
and it would not be too surprising, if Mozart had picked up a few ideas 
from Stadler when meeting in Vienna. Innovative ideas were not protected 
by copyright at the time of Mozart, and Mozart was reported to have ap-
propriated material, ideas, and concepts from fellow composers. But it is 
also possible that Haydn, another friend of Stadler’s, might have influenced 
Stadler, Mozart, or both of them when presenting his Game of Harmony, or 
an Easy Method for Composing an Infinite Number of Minuet-Trios, with-
out Any Knowledge of Counterpoint,15 which was published in 1790 or in 
1793 in Naples by Luigi Marescalchi. The piece, which is said to have been 
written in the 1780s, is very close in concept and terminology to Stadler’s 
Table. À la infinite is what Stadler had in mind and Haydn, if he really wrote 
the Gioco himself, refers to it as “infinito numero”. Once more, it was the 
13 Translation by the author, German original: Einfall, einen doppelten Contrapunct in der 
Octave von sechs Tacten zu machen ohne die Regeln davon zu wissen.
14 Translation by the author, French original: Table pour composer des minuets et des Trios à 
la infinie; avec deux dez à jouer.
15 Translation by the author, Italian original: Gioco filarmonico, o sia maniera facile per com-
porre un infinito numero di minuetti e trio anche senza sapere il contrapunto : da eseguirsi 
per due violini e basso, o per due flauti e basso.
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easy method – maniera facile – that served as key motivation for composers 
of the eighteenth century to use gamification for the compositional process. 
Leonard Meyer observes that the practice of aleatoric and ludic meth-
ods in musical composition and in musical performance are for good rea-
sons present in the eighteenth century but hard to find in nineteenth century 
musical practice:
Eighteenth-century composers constructed musical dice games while 
nineteenth century composers did not [. . . W]hat constrained the choice 
of figures were the claims of taste, coherent expression and propriety, 
given the genre of work being composed, rather than the inner necessity 
of a gradually unfolding, underlying process [as in nineteenth century 
music]. (Meyer 1989, 193)
I would argue here that gamification provides methods for coherence and 
propriety in the context of music – as has been demonstrated by Meyer –, 
but also in other contexts such as learning (cf. the section below), religious 
practice (cf. the section above) and dance. That is why the eighteenth century 
is a time when examples of predigital gamification can be found in many 
cases. Processes that are driven by gradually unfolding underlying structures 
are much harder to be gamified. The ludic turn of the eighteenth century be-
came apparent not only in the passion for games, in ludified social manners, 
in religious practice or in music. It also shaped the way people used to dance 
then. In her “Sociology of Dance on Stage and in Ballrooms”16 Reingard 
Witzmann notices that dance was conceived as a game in Mozart’s Vienna. 
At the end of the last act of Le Nozze di Figaro Mozart calls the actors of Le 
Nozze to reassemble on stage and proclaim what could be called the motto 
of the century: “Sposi, Amici, al Ballo, al Gioco!” (Witzmann 2006, 403).17
There are two points I want to make here by putting examples from 
the gamification of music and dance in close vicinity to the gamification of 
religious practice of the very same decades:
16 Translation by the author, German original: “[. . .] Zur Soziologie des Gesellschaftstanzes 
auf der Bühne und im Ballsaal.“
17 English: “Beloved ones, Friends, lets Dance, lets Play!”.
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1. I’d like to support the concept of gamification as “permeation of soci-
ety with methods, metaphors, values and attributes of games” (Fuchs 2011, 
2013) as opposed to the idea that gamification can fully be understood as 
the transfer of game design elements to non-game contexts with no regard 
to the historical and social framing. The latter is symptomatic for most of 
the scholarly attempts to define gamification (Deterding et al. 201118, Schell 
201019, Werbach and Hunter 201220). If I understand Deterding, Dixon, 
Khaled and Nacke, Shell, Werbach and Hunter correctly, then a single in-
stance of adapting game design elements for non-game contexts could 
qualify as gamification. My understanding of gamification differs from that 
and I would be extremely hesitant to theorise societally isolated actions like 
convenience store marketing or flight sales optimisation as relevant for the 
phenomenon of gamification, if they are detached from a historical view 
and a social perspective that includes cultural analysis on a global scale. 
The way I want to use the notion of gamification is in line with various 
“fications” and “izations” that have been introduced in the social sciences 
over the past 20 years. Globalization (Robertson 1992, Ritzer 2011), 
McDonaldization (Ritzer 1993), Californication (Red Hot Chilli Peppers 
1999)21, Ludification (Raessens 2006), Americanization (Kooijman 2013) or 
Disneyization (Bryman 1999, Hartley and Pearson 2000) are all based on 
the assumption that we observe large societal changes that are driven by 
apparatuses that influence various sectors of society at a time. Of course, 
McDonaldization cannot be attributed to a society as a result of a few fast-
food restaurants having been spotted in countries other than the USA. It is 
a way of living based on an economic structure, a power structure, a num-
ber of neologisms and changes in spoken language, introduction of a set of 
18 See introduction to this article.
19 “Gamification is taking things that aren’t games and trying to make them feel more like 
games” (Schell, 2010).
20 “Gamification is the application of game elements and digital game design techniques to 
non-game problems, such as business [. . .]” (Werbach and Hunter 2012).
21 The video to the rock song Californication by the Red Hot Chilli Peppers is a perfect exam-
ple for gamification of pop music.
see also 
Raessens
p. 95
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manners and habits, and a perceptual shift that make McDonaldization what 
it is (Kooijman 2013). I would in analogy claim that game design elements 
applied to non-game contexts do not make a society gamified. It is the per-
meation of many societal sectors with methods, metaphors, and values that 
stem from the sphere of play that produce gamification. 
2. I want to show here that certain historical constellations have provided 
fertile ground for the process of predigital gamification. The second half of 
the eighteenth century certainly was one of those. The intention is also to ex-
plain why certain moments in history lent themselves to foster gamification, 
and to propose a few good reasons why our decade seems to be one of those 
as well.
3 gamifying the magic aRtS
In 1762 Wolfgang Schwarzkopf published a book in the German city of 
Nuremberg that presented an enlightened and new take on what formerly 
has been said to be black magic or premodern sorcery. Schwarzkopf subti-
tled the book Playground of Rare Sciences22 and combined a description of 
mathematical and mechanical skills with essays about card and dice games 
followed by an encyclopaedic section of prestidigitator tricks. This book was 
one of many scientific attempts of the eighteenth century to reclaim magic 
and enchantment as playful activities – and to separate it from any connota-
tions to diabolic and irrational activities. In their book Rare Künste Brigitte 
Felderer and Ernst Strouhal lay out how the cultural history of magic took 
a dramatic turn in the eighteenth century and abandoned medieval black 
magic in favour of a ludic activity (Felderer and Strouhal 2006). This new 
form of edutainment was based on an enlightened concept of popular sci-
ence, socially embedded empirical research and a post-religious belief in the 
fact that the new type of magic had much more in common with science 
then with ritualistic or obscure practices from the past. As James George 
Frazer put it in his Golden Bough:
22 Translation by the author, German original: Spielplatz rarer Künste.
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Magic is much closer to Science than it is to Religion. Different to what 
religion tells us, Magic and Science both are based on the presupposition 
that identical causes result in identical effects. (Frazer 1989, 70) 
As a consequence, it made a lot of sense for the eighteenth century publisher 
to talk about “natural magic” – as Schellenberg did in 180223 – or “the magic 
of nature” – as done by Halle in 178324. The reappearing pattern of legitima-
tion for the act of talking about magic as a game and as science is the rhet-
oric figure that magic is useful in societal daily life and that it is entertain-
ing: “Revised to Take Account of Entertainment and Serious Applications” 
(Halle in Huber 2006, 335) or “Useful for Social Life” (Schellenberg in ibid.). 
This line of argumentation can be followed via Goethe’s bonmot of “scientific 
games like mineralogy and the likes”25 (Kaiser 1967, 37)26 up to the present. 
This is probably not the place to develop the idea, but I would speculate that 
the notion of serious games can be followed back to the eighteenth century 
programmatic efforts to declare magic as a game, and in doing so introduc-
ing the idea that science can be entertaining and that entertainment can be 
scientifically relevant. Today we call this project edutainment. 
23 The full title of Schellenberg’s book is A Glance / at / Döbler’s and Bosko’s / Magical 
Cabinet, / Consisting of / New Enchantment from the Field of / Natural Magic / that is Useful 
for Social Life. (Translation by the author, German original: Ein Blick / in / Döbler’s und 
Bosko’s /  Zauberkabinet, / bestehend / in neuen Belustigungen aus dem Gebiete / der natürli-
chen Magie,/ im gesellschaftlichen Leben anwendbar, Huber 2006, 335).
24 Johann Sebastian Halle’s book was published by Joachim Pauli in 1783 in Berlin as Magic,/ 
or/ Magical Power of Nature,/ Revised to Take Account of Entertainment and Serious 
Applications. (Translation by the author, German original: Magie, / oder, die / Zauberkräfte 
der Natur, / so auf den Nutzen und die Belustigung / angewandt worden, / von / Johann 
Samuel Halle, / Professor des Königlich=Preußischen Corps des Cadets / in Berlin, Huber 
2006, 335). 
25 Translation by the author, German original “wissenschaftliche Spiele wie die Mineralogie”.
26 Johan Wolfgang von Goethe’s autobiographical raisonnement called From my Life: Poetry 
and Truth (German original: Aus meinem Leben. Dichtung und Wahrheit) was written be-
tween 1808 and 1831. It is said to be a reflection on Goethe’s life in the 1750s to1770s. The 
phrase about “scientific games” is quoted from Kaiser 1967. 
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4 gamifying lifeStyle in the “centuRy of Play” 
In 1751 Daniel Bernoulli tried to catch the zeitgeist of his century by saying, 
“The century that we live in could be subsumed in the history books as: 
Free Spirits’ Journal and the Century of Play” (Bauer 2006, 377).27 Bernoulli 
expressed an observation about the gamification of lifestyle that was based 
on observations in Vienna, but was valid for the main European capitals 
like Paris, Rome, London, the Haag, and Naples. The gaming culture was 
a pan-European phenomenon based on widely distributed types of games 
and game rules. L’Hombre (14th century), for example, was a game of cards 
originally developed in Spain, then picked up by Maria Theresia, the wife of 
Louis XIV, and was within a few years played in all European countries with 
only a few local variations.28 This made it possible for a new travelling social 
class that extended beyond aristocracy to engage in gaming as a European 
lingua franca. Frequent travellers such as Mozart or Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe could expect to find a gaming community in almost every city in Eu-
rope that they could share experiences and social skills with. Instructions for 
games like the mid-eighteenth century “Pleasant Pastime with enchanting 
and joyful Games to be played in Society” (ibid., 383)29 were translated into 
most of the European languages and became popular among people of dif-
ferent social classes (ibid.). Lotteries could be found everywhere and became 
a source of income for some and a serious economic problem for others. 
Hazardous games or jeux de contrepartie, such as the Pharo (18th century) 
game or Hasard (14th century) were temporarily banned.
The eighteenth century was also the time when “apartements pour le 
jeu”, or play rooms, were introduced in the houses of the aristocracy as well as 
in houses of the bourgeoisie. Special furniture was designed to both display 
27 Translation by the author, German original: “Das gegenwärtige Jahrhundert könnte man 
in den Geschichtsbüchern nicht besser, als unter dem Titel: Das Freygeister=Journal und 
Spielsaeculum nennen”.
28 In Spain the game was called “Juego del tresillo” and there was the Spanish set of cards 
used lacking the eights and nines.
29 Translation by the author, German original: “Angenehmer Zeitvertreib lustiger Scherz-
Spiele in Compagnien” (anonymous 1757, quoted by Bauer 2006, 383).
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well-designed games and to hide such games from view.30 Social lifestyle 
evolved from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century through gami-
fication: via the increased availability of games and gaming circles, trans- 
European distribution channels for gaming, and social acceptance that trans 
cended class and social group. This is why Bernoulli’s proposition to call the 
eighteenth century the “Century of Play” makes a lot of sense. Having said 
so, Bernoulli was unable to see how another wave of gamification would 
change another century; nevertheless, the twenty-first century is about to 
repeat the games craze of the eighteenth century. Today we see ubiquitous 
availability, transplanetary distribution channels, and an acceptance of com-
puter games that transcends class and social group, and games no longer 
belong to any age group, ethnicity, gender, or subculture.
 
5 gamifying leaRning
In 1883 Samuel Langhorne Clemens, also known as Mark Twain, was trying 
to create an easy way for his daughters to remember the English monarchs 
and the dates when they commenced and finished ruling. Twain described 
the problem he was faced with in his notebooks: “It was all dates, they all 
looked alike, and they wouldn’t stick” (Twain 2009). So Twain figured out 
a playful method of remembering dates, names, and numbers by mapping 
them to positions on a piece of land. He measured out 817 feet – each foot 
representing a year – and then put stakes in the ground where kings and 
queens started their reigns. His daughters remembered the dates by remem-
bering spatial positions. “When you think of Henry III, do you see a great 
long stretch of straight road? I do; and just at the end where it joins on to 
Edward I. I always see a small pear-bush with its green fruit hanging down” 
(ibid.), he wrote.
When Twain’s daughters learned the monarchs’ dates in two days (they 
had been trying all summer), he knew he had discovered an efficient method 
for gamified learning. After a couple of years of tinkering, Twain patented 
the Memory Builder (1895): A Game for Acquiring and Retaining All Sorts 
of Facts and Dates. It consisted of a game board similarly divided by years. 
30 See Salomon Kleiner’s “apartements pour les jeu” from the first half of eighteenth century 
as found in Lachmayer 2006.
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The game included straight pins, and players would stick a pin in the appro-
priate compartment to show that they knew the date of the event in ques-
tion. Points were awarded based on the size of the event and how specific 
players could get on the date.
Mark Twain’s invention introduced two elements of play into a teach-
er-learner relationship. On the one hand, he declared learning as an enter-
taining activity by framing it within a board game. On the other, he gamified 
historical data as spatial information. Information and knowledge about 
time and chronological order is reframed as spatial relationship. In terms 
of Derridean philosophy there is some type of play taking place (and taking 
time) on a semiotic level and the level of the very game’s board. According 
to Derrida there is différance, an active movement involving spacing and 
temporalising. The presence of one element cannot compensate for the ab-
sence of the other. A gap or interval remains that escapes complete identity. 
“Constituting itself, dynamically dividing itself, this interval is what could 
be called spacing; time’s becoming-spatial or space’s becoming temporal 
(temporalizing)” (Derrida 1972 / 1968, 143). Mark Twain’s board game there-
fore plays on two levels: The game is obviously a playful approach to teaching 
history as it differs from traditional and rather solemn forms of classroom 
lectures. The second level of play is a metalevel of spacing and temporalis-
ing, as described by Derrida. The instructions for the Memory Builder game 
state that: 
1. The board represents any century.
2. Also, it represents all centuries.
This is what would have to be called dynamic spacing in Derrida’s words or 
an ambiguous and playful potential for spatialisation of historical data. The 
player in this learning application encounters history as gamified and not as 
a solid body of knowledge based on numbers only.
6 gamifying killing
In this section of the article, I want to present a rather small number of exam-
ples how the act of killing and the selection of victims can be gamified. I am 
not going to differentiate between military-action killing as the so-called le-
gal procedure during war and illegal activity by gangs or individual gangsters. 
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It seems to me that it is impossible to differentiate between those two except 
on a cynical level. My intention is rather to show how the selection of victims 
can be influenced by a games system with proper rules and an outcome to 
the game played. The examples I would like to choose are the infrequent 
process of decimation in the Roman army and other military forces and an 
example taken from literature that is based on aleatoric gaming. 
Roman praetor Marcus Crassus, when sent to the south of Italy in 71 
BC during the Spartacan revolt, noticed that Mummius, one of Crassus’ of-
ficers, had engaged the rebels in an early fight and lost. Many of his troops 
deserted the field instead of fighting. Crassus, 
in response to this embarrassment, ordered 
his legions decimated. The process of decima-
tion is an aleatoric process that results in what 
Roman law would consider fair by selecting 
one out of ten accused to be killed. The logic 
in devising such an inhuman procedure, which seems completely unfair to 
us, is ludic. The rationale of random killing refers to a concept of Fortuna 
being both blind and just at the same time. Gamified mechanics of killing 
can therefore not be called unfair, a cheat, corrupt, or meaningless – if one 
believes in the apparatus of play, they must be seen instead as the ultimate 
form of game-inherent logic. I have tried to suggest in another publication 
that this circle of perfect logic makes gamification a perfect case of ideology 
in the sense of Sohn-Rethel’s understanding of ideology, i.e. necessary false 
consciousness (Fuchs 2014).
The idea to use alea is not an exclusively military accomplishment. 
Small crime can sometimes arrive at similar methods to solve problems. So 
did Anton Chigurh in No Country for Old Men (McCarthy 2005). Chigurgh 
forces his victims to have him toss a coin, and to be killed or left alive de-
pending on the outcome of the coin toss. The perfidiousness of delegating a 
vital decision upon chance is in line with the rationale of Roman martial law 
to decimate the legions. Chigurh’s motivation to allow for an escape from 
the fatal consequences of his manhunts has been speculated about at great 
length. Isabel Exner describes the killer as “Homo aleator” who introduces 
a de-individualised form of violence. (Exner 2010, 61) This “new man” is 
obviously a counter-concept to the traditional heroes of Western movies: 
The sheriff, the honest loner who is looking for revenge, and the intelligent 
“The century that we live in 
could be subsumed  
in the history books as . . .  
the Century of Play“ 
 - Daniel Bernoulli, 1751
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gangster are both “Homo faber” type characters. They could solve their re-
spective problems via individualised decision-making and action. Isabel Ex-
ner’s proposition for the emergence of the Homo aleator in No Country for 
Old Men is not exclusively cinematic or related to the history of American 
movies and crime stories. Exner suggests that chance has become “the fun-
damental working principle of the prevailing order [. . .] that has already 
integrated Michel Serre’s finding, that ‘chance, risk, terror and even chaos 
have the potential to consolidate the system’ ” (ibid.).31 
 
7 concluSion
This article cannot provide the reader with a complete history of gamification 
and gamification-related historical documents to prove that something that 
we call gamification now has happened already in former centuries. Neither 
can I sum up all of the possible differences that might exist between games 
of former centuries and computer games of our days. My main hypothesis 
is that we can detect similarities in aspects of the games hype, games craze, 
seriousness of games, and of a process that transforms non-game contexts 
into playgrounds for ludic activities and of ludic experience across centu-
ries. Such playgrounds could once be found in learning, religious practice, 
music, magic, dance, theatre, and lifestyle. Such playgrounds for ludic activ-
ities can be spotted equally well nowadays: When we look at theatre theory 
and find “Game Theatre” (Rakow 2013); when we look at religious blogs 
and find “Gamifying Religion” (Toler 2013); when we look at the informa-
tion from health services and find “Fun Ways to Cure Cancer” (Scott 2013) 
or “Dice Game Against Swine Flu” (Marsh and Boffey 2009); or when we 
investigate collective water management and find “Games to Save Water” 
(Meinzen-Dick 2013). 
It is the range of applications and not the individual examples that 
support the hypothesis that gamification takes place as a global trend, a 
new form of ideology – or as a dispositif, if you will. This is not exclusively 
31 Translation by the author, German original: “das basale Funktionsprinzip einer herr-
schenden Ordnung [. . .] die Serres’ Erkenntnis längst integriert hat, dass ‘Zufall, Risiko, 
Angst und selbst Unordnung ein System zu konsolidieren vermögen’”. Exner quotes 
Michel Serres here from: Der Parasit (1987), page 29.
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dependent on the digitalisation of society or the massive economic success 
of computer games. What I have tried to demonstrate here is a historic per-
spective on an understanding of gamification as a way of living (and dy-
ing), making music, selling and buying, engaging in economic processes and 
power structures, communicating, and introducing new manners and habits 
for a decade or a whole century. This can be the decade of the 2010s, but it 
can also be the eighteenth century, the “Century of Play” – Spielsaeculum – 
as Bernoulli called the century in which he was living in 1751. 
The second half of the eighteenth century shared “pragmatic-relevant 
networking” (Lachmayer 2006, 35) with our days. The contemporaries of 
Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Schikaneder, Tersteegen, Casanova, Bernoulli, 
Schwarzkopf, and Stadler were deeply involved in a European “supra-na-
tionality” (ibid.) that assembled a multiplicity of languages, lifestyles, games, 
and sources of knowledge; all of which somehow resembles our activities on 
the World Wide Web – without being worldwide then. Still powered by the 
naivety of a desire for unfiltered access to a variety of scientific, semi-sci-
entific, popular, or superstitious forms of knowledge, the enlightened and 
the not-so-enlightened of the eighteenth century were striving for visions 
of progress. Playfulness on a personal level that included mimesis, alea and 
ilinx (Caillois 2001 / 1958) was a driver for caprice and virtuality rather than 
flat realism. The ludicity of the times was conducive to multifaceted iden-
tities and strictly contradictory to a monosequential development of char-
acter and career that later centuries required for social inclusion. It might 
be that we have returned to the state of Mozartesque playfulness and that 
the gamification of our society sets up a scenario for an intelligent plurality 
of expression, experience, and knowledge on a global level. Not completely 
serious, but myth-making and myth-breaking at the same time. 
It might, however, also be true that our decade resembles the second half 
of the eighteenth century in a way that Doris Lessing once described with 
these words: “This country becomes every day more like the eighteenth cen-
tury, full of thieves and adventurers, rogues and a robust, unhypocritical sav-
agery side-by-side with people lecturing others on morality” (Fielding 1992, 
762). Rococo culture developed a style that was jocular, florid, and graceful, 
while at the same time being full of sophisticated coarseness. And is this not 
identical to the state that our discourse on gamification is at. We want to be 
SuperBetter (2012) and want to enjoy “self-expansion escapism” (Kollar 2013). 
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We are slightly worried about it and we speculate about a forthcoming 
“revolution” (Zichermann 2013), yet we shout out loudly “Gamification is 
Bullshit!” (Bogost 2011). We finally discover that “gamification is transform-
ing our world, contaminating it like never before” (Reilhac 2010).
That’s so Rococo!
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making PointS the Point: towaRdS a 
hiStoRy of ideaS of gamification
by felix Raczkowski
intRoduction
Digital games are about points. Or so it seems, at least according to a con-
stantly growing body of guidebook-like publications that inform us of the 
most important qualities of games and their potential to be of use in vari-
ous fields. These books advocate gamification in one way or another, even 
though some of them avoid the term (Chatfield 2010; Dignan 2011), while 
others embrace it openly (Zichermann and Cunningham 2011, Werbach 
and Hunter 2012). Gamification, which is a problematic concept at best and 
remains highly contested and criticised (cf. Bogost 2011), is usually defined 
as a technique that seeks to apply game mechanics to non-game contexts 
(Graft 2011; Deterding et al. 2011), thereby aiming to “transplant” some 
of the motivational qualities of games into contexts that are not inherently 
leisure-focused or motivating in themselves. Thus, they are employed in 
marketing and PR (Zichermann and Linder 2010), consulting (Edery and 
Mollick 2009; Beck and Wade 2004), or self-optimisation (Dignan 2011). 
The theories informing these applications express certain assumptions about 
the nature and the potential of digital games. The following chapter will give 
a brief overview of some of the results of an extensive review of publications 
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on gamification, especially focusing on the alleged qualities of digital games 
as they are mentioned by said publications. I will then attempt to develop 
a preliminary history of ideas for one of the core concepts of digital games 
according to gamification. By historically contextualising gamification and 
the assumptions it makes, it then becomes possible to develop a notion of 
what digital games are becoming and how this development is influenced by 
the way games are used by and positioned in modern society. 
Points and scores appear to be the ultimate device for keeping track of 
the game state in digital games. As Juul (2005) asserts, one of the most obvi-
ous yet far-reaching results of the digitalisation of games is the fact that the 
management of the game state is accomplished by a computer and thus be-
comes automated. In these ludic environments, points feature prominently, 
be it as high-scores (indicating dominance over contenders) or as markers of 
progression (indicating player actions that are assigned some kind of value 
in the game). Even meta-gaming services like the Xbox or Playstation player 
profiles are largely built around points in the form of gamer-scores or trophy 
values. Small wonder, then, that points and scores are among the most fre-
quently mentioned characteristics in gamification guidebooks. The popular 
literature1 on gamification is very varied regarding the fields of application 
that are suggested, but shows great similarities in its views on digital games. 
Several assumptions concerning digital games can be singled out, three of 
which will be presented in the form of preliminary categorisations:
gameS aS exPeRimental techniqueS
Games have negotiable consequences. This feature of games is a prominent 
part of many definitions of digital games, as evidenced by Juul’s literature 
review (2005, 29–36) and, while being controversial2, it is part of an impor-
tant argument in many guidebooks: digital games are presented as experi-
mental environments in which certain tests, but also training, can be con-
1 The study focuses almost exclusively on popular publications instead of scientific research 
because they make up the bulk of publications on gamification and supposedly influence 
how gamification is actually implemented and, through this implementation, how digital 
games are perceived by those that gamify and those that participate in gamified systems.
2 Especially in debates on gambling, multiplayer games, or media harm, which often revolve 
around the question of the real-life consequence of gaming.
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ducted in a less expensive way, without the fear of consequences beyond the 
game-world. Chatfield (2010) states that game-like systems are ideal training 
grounds for future soldiers (ibid., 193). Dignan (2011) similarly points out 
that games do not punish risky behaviour like non-game contexts would and 
that they are ideal for facing fears in the repetitive safety of simulated envi-
ronments (ibid., 44, 45). Beck and Wade (2004) underline that “[g]ames are 
great practice for real life” (ibid., 75). Edery and Mollick (2009) directly refer 
to the capabilities of training games to induce experimentation that would 
otherwise be impossible (ibid., 126). 
Interestingly, these perspectives tie into a strong and convincing argu-
ment that has become popular in game studies in recent years. The assump-
tion that games can develop especially persuasive capacities because they 
can model systems (and their processes) through other systems (and pro-
cesses) is commonly known as proceduralism and has been widely popular-
ised through two consecutive books by Ian Bogost (2006; 2007). Although 
Bogost does not think of digital games in terms of experiments, but instead 
focuses on their similarities to simulations, some of his conclusions regard-
ing the potential of digital games as a medium of persuasion (e.g. for adver-
tising purposes) are very similar to the arguments proposed by gamification 
guidebooks.
gameS aS SouRceS of flow 
A second aspect touched upon by many guidebooks concerns the psycho-
logical notion of flow, first described in 1975 by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, 
since which it has enjoyed an impressive career in game research. 
Csikszentmihalyi originally focused on the question of optimal experience 
and the actions and circumstances that afford it, demanding for work to 
be structured more like a game (Csikszentmihalyi 2008, 152). Specifically, 
he identified goal-orientation and rules as well as (among others) feedback 
and an altered sense of time (ibid., 49). Because of these characteristics, 
144
Csikszentmihalyi proposes that even daily routines3 could be transformed 
into optimal experiences by turning them into “personally meaningful 
games” (ibid., 51): “Mowing the lawn or waiting in a dentist’s office can be-
come enjoyable provided one restructures the activity by providing goals, 
rules and the other elements of enjoyment . . .” (ibid., 51). This leads to the 
reception of his theory in the context of gamification: the careful balance 
between challenge (through the task or environment) and ability (to meet 
said challenge) creates a particular state during which players feel challenged 
in just the right way, play extensively, and tend to forget their surroundings. 
As such, flow is a ubiquitous concept in gamification discourse. Especially 
its alleged effect of focusing attention is highlighted (Reeves and Read 
2009, 182–184), among the advice to become one’s own flow-designer 
through making a game of everyday chores (Dignan 2011, 6–8) and the 
ability of well-made games to absorb their players and circumvent boredom 
(Chatfield 2010, 43, 51). Of course, ultimately most guidebooks seek to 
“transplant” the flow caused by digital games into non-game activities, e.g. 
to structure business operations or work in general more like a game (Edery 
and Mollick 2009, 159).
gameS aS goveRned By PointS and high-ScoReS
The previously discussed aspects of digital games according to gamification 
are of a theoretical nature; they concern characteristics that are argued to 
be somehow connected to or adaptable by games without necessarily being 
game-intrinsic. The matter of high-scores is somewhat different in that (feed-
back) systems based on collecting and earning points are evidently featured 
in many games. The impact these systems have on actual gameplay varies, 
but they can be singled out as important arguments for the merits of games 
3 Interestingly, it should be noted that Csikszentmihalyi at first concentrated his re-
search efforts on very particular activities, such as performing surgery or climbing 
(Csikszentmihalyi 2008, 4). This would make flow in its original conception a supremely 
rare occurrence. Only later did he broaden the scope of his research to include, among 
others, assembly line workers. Thus flow became more common among different activities, 
though it still remained difficult to attain. The factory worker Csikszentmihalyi cites as 
one of his case studies has decades of experience and “mastered every phase of the plant’s 
operation” (ibid., 148). This difficulty of actually meeting the requirements to attain flow is 
frequently disregarded by popular literature on gamification.
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in gamification literature, according to which points and scores fulfil two 
main goals: they measure and they reward players. The former is evidenced 
by Chatfield, who enthusiastically points out: “[G]ame technologies excel 
at nothing so much as scoring, comparing and rewarding progress [. . .]” 
(Chatfield 2010, 199). Besides underlining the allure that points have as a 
scoring measure, Dignan describes their effect as “magical”: “We see them 
as a reward, even when they’re worthless, because they are a form of valida-
tion. Points represent an abstraction of value and so we often act irration-
ally when points are in the mix” (Dignan 2011, 155). This irrationality also 
forms the basis for Zichermann and Linder’s advice for “making points the 
point” (2010, 68). Their gamified marketing strategies put high-scores and 
points in a central position because they can simulate value without actually 
granting benefits (ibid., 122–126), while at the same time sparking compe-
tition among customers through leaderboards (ibid., 55–64). This approach 
of assigning points to everything has not been criticised very often in the 
reviewed popular literature. Edery and Mollick point out that using points 
to make work feel like play could encourage cheating or power-gaming, de-
cidedly undesirable behaviours in work environments (Edery and Mollick 
2009, 168, 169).
Gamification guidebooks display ideological notions of what digital 
games are and how they work. The attributes mentioned above, compiled 
from groups of propositions, are not exhaustive and the list could be ex-
panded in various levels of detail. This chapter is limited only to the most 
common of the features that were mentioned in relation to games in the 
reviewed literature. The next section of the chapter is concerned with con-
textualising these findings in what is to be the first sketch in a larger project 
on the history of ideas that pervades the discourse of gamification.
token economieS and the alluRe of ScoRing
It has been shown that points and scores are paramount in today’s popular 
theories on gamification. It seems opportune to discuss these systems in the 
light of their role in the media history of digital games, especially in the 
context of arcade gaming in the late 70s and 80s (cf. Kent 2001) and the 
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first fan-driven attempts to develop nationwide leaderboards4, thus adding 
additional social value to singular score. Instead, my approach is more in 
line with what gamification aspires to do. Point-based, closed systems are 
not to be seen as inherently ludic phenomena, but as arrangements of hu-
man motivation, measurement, and experimentation that can be traced to 
psychiatric experiments. The point systems of today, presented as formulas 
for the success of digital games that can be detached from said games and 
applied to marketing or consulting, are revisiting experimental approaches 
to behaviour modification that came to be known as token economies in 
the 1960s. Through reading the psychiatric method of the token economy 
against the backdrop of gamification discourse, the hierarchical and de-hu-
manising structures both have in common will become apparent. 
Token economies essentially were first conceived as a point- or to-
ken-based experimental rehabilitation treatment for long-term psychiatric 
patients. The first experiment began in 1961 at Anna State Hospital, Illinois, 
and was conducted by Teodoro Ayllon and Nathan Azrin. This pioneering 
effort still remains the best documented one. The token economy as devel-
oped by Ayllon and Azrin can be seen as an effort among a larger tendency 
to influence human behaviour through behavioural methods (Kazdin 1978). 
Generally, whenever a behaviour occurs that is to be strengthened (made 
to occur more often), reinforcement is made accessible to the patients, usu-
ally through an attendant. These reinforcements may range from handing 
out candy to offering intangible benefits such as praise. Tokens were a reg-
ular feature in many of the experiments, mostly because they guarantee a 
standardised and easily quantifiable way to control the reinforcement pro-
cedure (Ayllon and Azrin 1968, 77). The tokens are handed out and can be 
exchanged for tangible rewards later on. Token reward systems were used al-
ready at the end of the 1950s, for example in experiments with children with 
learning disabilities (Kazdin 1978, 253). The novelty of Ayllon and Azrin’s 
approach is a matter of scope. Their goal was to create an effective “motivat-
ing environment” (Ayllon and Azrin 1968, 5) that would reinforce desirable 
behaviour and cause undesirable behaviour to become extinct. Thus, the 
4 cf. Twin Galaxies: https://web.archive.org/web/20050613073727/http://www.twingalaxies.
com/index.aspx?c=17&id=332 (accessed May 7, 2014).
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experiment encompassed the whole closed psychiatric ward of Anna State 
Hospital and lasted for six years (ibid., 16), during which different series of 
experiments with varying parameters were conducted. The motivating en-
vironment of the token economy focuses on behaviour modification for 
long-term inmates, who are to be motivated and behaviouristically prepared 
for release from the ward. To achieve this, basically every desired activity 
(usually work assignments on the hospital grounds) earns the patients per-
forming it a specific amount of tokens, while all items or activities that are 
coveted among the patients are assigned a specific cost of tokens. Only if the 
patients are able to pay the cost are they are given the item or allowed to per-
form the activity. Patients have to pay tokens if they want private audiences 
with psychologists as well as for extra clothing, consumable articles, or even 
an additional religious service (Bandura 1969, 263).
Structurally, there are several similarities between how token econ-
omies handle their tokens and how points are treated in the gamification 
discourse. The general goal of a motivating environment seems almost iden-
tical, whether employees, customers, or psychiatric patients are to be mo-
tivated. The specific method of influencing or changing behaviour is what 
ties gamification approaches directly to behaviourism, as has already been 
shown (Deterding et al. 2011). The irrational actions that are ascribed to 
point-based games in gamification literature (cf. Zichermann and Linder 
2010; Dignan 2011) in behaviouristic terms are nothing else than specific 
changes of behaviour that are the result of directed reinforcements. Token 
economies largely offer tangible rewards where gamification specifically la-
bours to validate points through themselves. However, even the first major 
book on token economies already mentions the possibility of detaching the 
reinforcement from actual physical rewards: reading a mail-order catalogue 
without ordering anything is identified as a reinforcer to the patients (Ayllon 
and Azrin 1968, 69, 70). The same publication discusses the replacement of 
(tangible) tokens with (intangible) points or credits: 
In addition, the points are standardized, have a simple quantitative di-
mension, and are not easily altered or destroyed since the record of the 
points or credits can be safeguarded. The disadvantages of points and 
credits are that they are intangible and hence are not in the individual’s 
possession during the delay interval. Their intangibility also limits them 
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as a medium of exchange and prevents their use for operation of auto-
matic reinforcing devices. (Ibid., 78, 79) 
The project of gamification has been already prefigured in considerations 
like these. The intangibility of points, perceived as a flaw by the behaviour-
ists regarding their potential as an exchange medium, is precisely what pre-
destines them for use in a ubiquitous digital motivation environment. In a 
gamified world, there is no delay interval between behaviour and reinforce-
ment, because the devices and mechanics that are measuring players and 
awarding points are ubiquitous.5 The same is true for points as a “medium 
of exchange”, since the medial environments that gamification relies upon 
guarantee the value of points because of their interconnectedness – high-
scores and leaderboards only work if scores can be compiled and compared 
across different devices.  
It is becoming clear now that the ideas driving gamification and through 
them the discursive knowledge amalgamating in the instrumentalisation 
of games are reaching beyond game-design theory or marketing strategy. 
The association of digital games and experimental techniques that has been 
identified as one of the central themes of gamification guidebooks is not a 
product of chance. Even more so than its strongest advocates may think, 
gamification is (re)creating experimental arrangements – gamified systems 
resemble laboratories that run experiments on normalisation and economic 
optimisation. The literature on token economies reveals the prevalence of 
considerations on automatisation and standardisation. The greatest risk for 
the motivational environment in the psychiatric ward seems to stem from 
the attendants: 
One can easily excuse any laxity in administering rewards due to these 
factors by stating that the attendants are, after all, “only human”. But that is 
just the point: One cannot rely upon the attendant’s intentions as a meas-
ure of what she is doing. The attendant is too much influenced by predis-
positions, external events, and behaviours of the patient to be expected to 
5 E.g. as envisioned in Jesse Schell’s (2010) popular talks at the DICE conference.
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administer rewards in and impartial, objective, and standardized manner. 
(Ibid. 12) 
Bluntly put, attendants are simply too unreliable; they are inconsistent in 
giving out rewards and their individual measure of what constitutes a de-
sired behaviour varies. The solution in token economies is automatisation. 
The tokens function as chips and the actual rewards are handed out through 
vending machines. This system is implemented thoroughly and to the point 
where access to certain areas in the ward (e.g. the leisure room) is restricted 
by token-operated turnstiles (ibid., 141). Where vending machines cannot be 
employed, especially in the case of intangible rewards like social interaction 
or religious services, the procedure is strictly regulated through the meas-
urement of duration. The experiments in general are designed for a min-
imum of human involvement: “The best way 
to eliminate the influence of a human in the 
recording and presentation of the reinforcer is 
to minimize his participation or to substitute 
some automated method” (ibid., 140). Token 
economies can be considered an attempt to implement a motivational en-
vironment that is largely automated, which is a procedure that inevitably 
is evoked as well in proposals concerning games in gamification discourse: 
“[G]ame technologies excel at nothing so much as scoring, comparing and 
rewarding progress . . .” (Chatfield 2010, 199). The environments envisioned 
by gamification could be called scoring economies; the problems posed 
by attendants in the experimental design of the token economy are solved 
through the automatisation provided by the structures of digital games. It is 
no longer necessary to develop a surrounding that is physically closed off or 
restricted, as long as the game design itself is not exposed.
This development towards scoring economies that are alluding to digi-
tal games is, for example, especially evident in Zichermann and Linder’s ac-
count on frequent flyer miles. They laude the programmes as key inventions 
that single-handedly revolutionised the US airline business (Zichermann 
and Linder 2010, 115). The advantages of point-based FFPs (frequent flyer 
programmes) are described in a way that evokes the behaviouristic discourse 
around tokens: 
Gamified systems are  
like laboratories  
running experiments on  
behavioural control.
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Moreover, the technical cost of creating, implementing, and managing a 
point system, as pointed out in earlier chapters, may ultimately be much 
less than the alternative over the medium term. Once the infrastructure is 
in place, it’s relatively easy to keep track of every actionable item, and this 
gives the FFP one of its core cost advantages over standalone promotions.
(Ibid., 122)
The abilities to reduce costs and to keep track (of transactions and the people 
conducting them) seemed to be just as relevant in 1960s psychiatry as they 
are in today’s marketing concepts, although the ideal goal of the latter is 
keeping the participants from actually spending their points and, by doing 
so, further reducing costs through unredeemed rewards. Gamification, as 
Zichermann and Linder bluntly put it (ibid., 68, 69), aims to make points the 
point. Beyond these intangible point-systems, FFPs also establish a hierar-
chical architecture in closed spaces that externalises an individual’s “wealth 
of points” (or, simply, her score) in the form of status displays. Just as token 
economies enabled tiered access to different parts of the ward, so do the 
scoring economies of FFPs in airports: “From First Class lines to premium 
waiting areas, airports offer dozens of literal examples of the dividing lines 
between individuals of differing statuses” (ibid., 126). However, architectural 
arrangements in physical space like these gradually give way to purely dig-
ital structures in today’s media environments. The tiered progression and 
status displays are even more emphasised; the scores become universal (cf. 
Xbox Live Gamerscore) – psychiatric architecture is translated to software 
and hardware architecture. 
coStS and RewaRdS
The token economy experiment, besides its already discussed therapeutic 
goals, revolves around efficiency. Long-term psychiatric patients are to be 
prepared for release, thus prepared to become functioning and efficient 
members of society. The experimental design for token economies show-
cases concern for efficiency as well: a core element of the therapeutic ap-
proach is having the patients work regularly in one of the jobs that usually 
have to be fulfilled on the ward. This leads to a substantial reduction in the 
costs for maintenance of the ward (Ayllon and Azrin 1968, 210). The ethical 
ramifications of having patients work regularly to maintain the ward they 
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are confined in have been discussed extensively (for an overview, cf. Wexler 
1973), while the idea of “generating” work as a by-product of other occupa-
tions prevails and flourishes in gamification literature. The vision of a gami-
fied working environment turns the token economy on its head by focusing 
not on therapy, but instead directly on work and offering ludic involvement 
as the by-product. Whereas the token economy is about the gradual con-
cealment of the psychiatric routine (in preparation for release), gamification 
aims to hide work (as another form of routine) behind mechanisms of play. 
The connection between work and (digital game) play is pointed out in sev-
eral guidebooks, the scope of associations ranging from typical grinding in 
MMOs as work (Edery and Mollick 2009, 18) and gaming experiences as 
mediators for team-oriented thinking (ibid., 115–121; Beck and Wade 2004, 
75; Reeves and Read 2009, 84) to speculations about how games can be used 
to “harvest” the knowledge of their players (Edery and Mollick 2009, 189). 
One could even go so far as to postulate that the core capabilities that can 
be called forward or taught by digital games according to gamification are 
very similar to those that the 1960s psychiatric wards tried to instil in their 
patients.6 This connection cannot be explored in the scope of this chapter. I 
will instead focus on the outcome of working in the experimental design of 
token economies as compared to the game design of gamification. 
The most distinct difference in ideology between the arrangements this 
paper seeks to compare seems to be regarding the rewards or incentives of-
fered to the participants. Gamification specifically relies on “making points 
the point” (Zichermann and Linder 2010, 68); thus, positioning points at the 
core of its mechanics, but also doing so the ultimate intrinsic goal of every 
interaction with said mechanics. Additionally, the competition between 
participants (in the form of high-scores, leaderboards, or status displays) 
is regularly mentioned as a strong motivator (ibid., 34–37). Token econo-
mies, on the other hand, offer tangible rewards like cigarettes, sweets, or 
access to television, the tokens themselves merely figuring as a medium of 
6 This assumption requires more research, but it is noticeable that some of the qualities that 
are praised as gamers’ virtues like decision-making or sociability are those that at least 
some of the behavior-modifying treatment approaches relied upon as core competences 
that had to be conveyed to patients to prepare them for release (Fairweather as cited by 
Wexler 1973).
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exchange without any official way for the inmates themselves to compare 
their wealth.7 This comparison, however, neglects a fundamental structural 
similarity between token economies and gamification programs: both are 
multi-purpose applications. Gamification is presented as a ludic cure-all for 
the motivational and organisational problems of modern informational so-
cieties. It is applied to marketing (cf. ibid.), consulting (cf. Edery and Mollick 
2009; Reeves and Read 2009), and self-optimisation (cf. Dignan 2011). To-
ken economies are similar, since while they originated in 1960s behavioural 
psychiatry, there soon emerged various areas of application that ranged from 
educating citizens in ecological behaviour (Kazdin 1977, 229–236) and mat-
ters of military training (ibid., 243, 244) to the optimisation of job perfor-
mance (ibid., 236–240).8
These later applications of the token economy system exhibit modifica-
tions and further developments that bring them closer to today’s visions of 
gamified environments. A fairly common expansion of Ayllon and Azrin’s 
original concept introduces official, public lists that display the participant’s 
individual or general score. For example, a behaviouristic experiment to 
teach pollution control made use of a central scoreboard that was placed 
outside the venue where the experiment was conducted (Geller, Farris and 
Post 1973). The board prominently displayed two counters: one for cus-
tomers who bought returnable bottles, the other for customers who bought 
throwaway bottles. The rules of the game, or, in the behaviourist’s terms, the 
prompt, were given out as handbills to each customer and informed them 
about the advantages of returnable bottles. The customers were urged to 
“show concern” (ibid., 371) and were able to see how their individual pur-
chase influenced the (manually adjusted) general score on the scoreboard. 
Other examples of individual, public scoring include an experimental com-
munity modelled after B.F. Skinner’s utopian novel Walden Two (1948). The 
community members earned credits through work and community service 
7 This, of course, excludes unofficial comparisons or even secondary economies between 
inmates, which largely remain undocumented.
8 Interestingly, token economies in their original form of behavioural modification pro-
grams for closed environments persist even today, often as motivational programs for 
children (e.g. http://tokenrewards.com/#Home, accessed May 7 2014).
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and the amount of credits earned by each individual. Both examples illus-
trate a development towards public score-keeping and competition that is 
also reflected in the use of badges or patches in the fashion of boy-scout 
merit badges – which can be interpreted as the predecessors of achievements 
and trophies in digital games and gamification today. Token economies as 
a scientific motivational practice gradually evolve while at the same time 
staying true to their behaviouristic roots.  
The range of applications for token economies already resembles a 
catalogue of desires that later on are to be satisfied through serious games 
and gamification. The token economy as a system stays the same at its core, 
wherever it is externally applied. It is this external application that puts to-
ken economies in line with later developments like large-scale bonus pro-
grams (e.g. frequent flyer miles), which in turn constitute the prime exam-
ple for some marketing-oriented arguments (Zichermann and Linder 2010, 
113–120) regarding the power of points and thus, of gamification, as has 
been shown above. The tangible incentives that token economies offer in-
stead of “mere” points cannot be considered external benefits or “pay” for 
the participant’s work. Token economies restructure the systems they are 
applied to and turn commodities everyone usually has access to into rewards 
that can be earned. In the case of the psychiatric wards, this means that ac-
cess to luxury articles or recreational activities is usually possible, until the 
token economy purposefully restricts it. In an effort to discover which activ-
ities would work as reinforcers, patients on the ward were observed and the 
behaviour that was thought to occur frequently was restricted through the 
token economy. The restrictions cover a wide range, from trivial limitations 
like not being able to select one’s chair to sit in (Ayllon and Azrin 1968, 61) 
to severe constraints of basic human rights, like being deprived of food or 
not being allowed to sleep in a bed (Wexler 1973, 87–89). Token economies 
in the 1960s do not (yet) use points as their ultimate motivational goal, but 
like gamification they aim to transform the systems they are applied to and 
to submit them to the rule of tokens or scores. They are both focused on 
measurement to the point of fetishising it. Anything can be distilled into 
points and scores – whether it is part of an effort to make human behaviour 
measurable in a scientific context or central to motivate players in a gamified 
system. If anything, the scores that replace tokens in today’s digital moti-
vating environments are becoming even more influential. Token economies 
154
were not built towards self-measurement; the tokens essentially served two 
different purposes for patients and psychiatrists: to the former, they provided 
the means to uphold a certain quality of life. To the latter, they measured 
the success of certain parts of the experiment or the experiment as a whole. 
When I talk about scoring economies today, this relationship blurs as well. 
Participants in gamified environments are not only measured and rewarded, 
they are expected to measure themselves and improve their performance. 
As such, scoring economies are as much about individual efficiency as token 
economies were about institutional efficiency.9 A good example for this is 
the Attent program (2013) of US-based start-up Seriosity. Through what is 
described as an artificial economy derived from online games (Reeves and 
Read 2009, 113–127), the Attent program seeks to optimise electronic in-
ternal communication in businesses. Every participant (which in this case 
means everyone working at the company in question, since scoring econ-
omies are no less totalitarian than token economies) in the program gets a 
specific starting amount of an artificial currency named serios. These vir-
tual points can then be attached to emails to highlight them as especially 
important. The higher the amount of serios attached to an email, the more 
important its contents are in the view of the sender. The email’s recipient can 
then add the attached serios to her own account. While very similar to token 
economies in passing, the Attent program limits the amount of currency in 
circulation, thus creating artificial scarcity that is meant to reduce unnec-
essary emails. Attent can be interpreted in relation to classical tokens and 
rewards (they are a reward for reading some emails earlier or more precisely 
than others) as well as in relation to scores and evaluation (they make com-
munication via email visible as a cascade-perceived relevance; they foster 
awareness of communication habits on an individual level). The employees 
9 To this end, it seems productive to expand the concept of scoring economies to in-
clude not only gamification, but also related developments like the “quantified self 
movement” that aims to employ digital technologies to measure every measureable as-
pect of one’s life, thus hoping to infer methods of personal improvement from the data. 
The quantified self movement (http://quantifiedself.com/, accessed May 7, 2014) marks 
a culmination of this tendency and exhibits several parallels to gamification, since it also 
employs gamified applications like Nike+ (2006) to measure life itself. For a more detailed 
account of Nike+ and the relationship between gamification and life, see Paolo Ruffino’s 
text in this book. 
see also 
Ruffino
p. 49
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are supposed to regularly consider their own score and work to improve it, 
which in the case of Attent means optimising their communication habits to 
reduce their serios spending. Compared to the token economy that is mainly 
concerned with measurement, institutional optimisation, and rewards, the 
scoring economy measures, rewards, encourages competition, demands 
self-optimisation, and functions self-sufficiently, without any incentives that 
stem from outside the system. This does lead to various developments, some 
of which demonstrate the alleged mutual relation with typical game-design 
elements, but also highlight one of the problems that today jeopardise gam-
ified environments. Both aspects will be briefly touched upon before the 
chapter is concluded.
Token economies in their experimental roots are designed environ-
ments. As such, they employ techniques that directly invoke typical digital 
game elements that in turn get re-contextualised (in the spirit of classical be-
haviourism) by gamification applications. Tiered progression, often through 
levels, is a part of the structure of many digital games and is also present in 
gamification literature (ibid., 75–78; Zichermann and Linder 2010, 34–37; 
Dignan 2011, 132–134, 151–156). It also appears in token economies, ful-
filling a similar function: progression through the rehabilitation program 
as well as “physical” progression through the ward as such is tiered; access 
to a privileged status or to additional areas of the ward (e.g. the garden) 
has to be purchased through tokens (Ayllon and Azrin 1968, 202; Wexler 
1973, 104, 105). The psychiatric ward as an already limiting and controlling 
environment becomes even more restricting to its inhabitants, while at the 
same time opening up possibilities for new / added agency through partic-
ipation in the program. Unfortunately, the way the experiments have been 
documented does not provide the evidence for an in-depth discussion of 
the way the level-structure actually worked during the experiment and for a 
comparison to the mechanics of gamification. Besides (or because of) fall-
ing back on similar structures, token economies and gamification share a 
similar problem as well. They either are experiments (in the case of token 
economies) or put a strong emphasis on the experimental qualities of dig-
ital games. As such, they are existentially endangered through all creative 
approaches in interacting with the rules they present, including (but not 
limited to) cheating, “power-gaming”, and, even, playing. While cheating is 
usually considered a typical player behaviour that entails a subversion of 
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rules (Consalvo 2007) and as such is inherently threatening to rule-based 
systems, the extreme optimisation of performance (power-gaming) and 
playing around with the rules (instead of playing by the rules) are highly 
problematic as well. Many gamification guides explicitly warn against these 
unpredictable player behaviours (Zichermann and Linder 2010, 105) and 
position themselves in a way that suggests that gamification applications are 
not aimed at players at all, since they obviously try to prohibit core player 
behaviour.10 There are similar concerns to be found in the protocols on token 
economies, albeit not many cases of cheating or playing were actually docu-
mented. Ayllon and Azrin underline the importance of attendants for occa-
sional observation through a case of cheating in which the token automatic 
of a TV set was subverted by inserting a nail file into the token slot (Ayllon 
and Azrin 1968, 150). The ideas shared by token economies and gamifica-
tion, automatisation, standardisation and optimisation, are susceptible to 
play and play-like behaviour. While the question of cheating in gamification 
applications has already been addressed (Glas 2013), there is still further 
investigation needed into the relation of gamification and the experimental 
arrangements it evokes to their players or subjects.
concluSion
It is maintained throughout this paper that, to understand digital games, 
it is helpful to examine the way they are contextualised in popular media. 
Specifically, I focus on utopian discourse surrounding digital games in the 
form of gamification. Gamification guidebooks argue and propose to make 
use of games in a way that frequently associates digital games with several 
central qualities. These qualities, among them an emphasis on points and 
scoring as well as the parallels between games and experimental arrange-
ments, serve to picture games as systems focused on optimisation, autom-
atisation, and standardisation. Through these issues, the measures of gam-
ification can (and have to be) put in a larger context that places them next 
10 There appear to be some exceptions to this rule, as the case of Foursquare’s lenient 
anti-cheating policy shows. Though some functions of the service are highly restricted 
and monitored (the mayor-system), it is generally possible (and tolerated by the staff) to 
perform “false” check-ins and even collect badges and points that way (Glas 2013, 10).
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to specific experimental arrangements like token economies. It is necessary 
to regard digital games not only as contemporary popular cultural artefacts 
whose techno-cultural evolution is interwoven with digitalisation, but also 
to question which motives, ideas, and aspirations infuse them. In this case, 
the analysis reveals the close relationship between gamification and behav-
iouristic experimental arrangements, as well as the tendency of both to in-
scribe themselves into the various levels of the structures they are applied to. 
Thus, it makes sense to describe the way gamification actually takes effect as 
part of a scoring economy that expands the classical behaviouristic model 
of token economies through a new focus on competition and self-measure-
ment, while at the same time integrating its core elements into contempo-
rary digital technologies. While this approach entails not focusing on digital 
games as games per se, it also opens up insights into the fascination with 
digital games that seems to form the basis of many gamification guidebooks. 
Digital games appear as phenomena that can be used, their appeal can be 
made productive, and they can develop a motivational attraction that may 
be adapted for fields of operation as varied as consulting or marketing. Mere 
elements of games appear to be capable of transforming mundane struc-
tures, systems, and spaces into ludic ones. This view on games opens up a 
variety of questions that go beyond a critique of gamification, some of which 
have been touched upon in the article, all of which need to be elaborated 
further. 
One question concerns the circumstances under which digital games 
are charged with the ideas that have been described and analysed in this 
article. The conditions under which the assumptions of gamification are 
made have to be detailed, if we want to understand the mutual interference 
between digital games and the theories of instrumentalised gaming. To ac-
complish this, it is necessary to review the games that are cited as examples 
in the guidebooks, while also considering current developments in main-
stream digital gaming such as achievements in an effort to carve out the 
backdrop of gaming culture against which gamification emerges.
The second, and perhaps more important question, is the problem of 
players and their position in gamified systems (and in the discourse of in-
strumentalised gaming in general). Every game and, perhaps even more so, 
every gamified application carries with it specific assumptions about the 
player the game is designed for. These assumptions are manifested in design 
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decisions, in code or in hardware architecture, and the physical quality of 
game elements. They have to be carefully examined and related to actual 
player practices. In the case of gamification, the implied player is actually not 
a player at all but instead she or he would be more aptly described as a test 
subject in the closed and determined experimental arrangement.11 The chap-
ter already shows that players and their practices can be very problematic for 
the experimental conditions of gamified environments. It is here that I see 
the greatest conflict between “classical” (digital) games and gamification: the 
former can be played with, while the latter cannot. Playing with games, as 
has been detailed on various occasions (Consalvo 2007; Sicart 2011), always 
involves a creative, unpredictable moment. This creativity is at odds with the 
approach gamification exhibits towards games and it is necessary to formu-
late a critique of gamification that has the player’s role in mind.
It is safe to assume that the controversy surrounding gamification and 
other attempts to instrumentalise games will stay with us for some time to 
come. Whether we participate in the attempts to make game-transcending 
use of digital games or not, they will shape the way digital games are per-
ceived, what is thought about, and what is done with them. And regardless of 
the question whether these developments should be embraced or criticised, 
in my opinion they offer an excellent opportunity to broaden the scope of 
game studies as a transdisciplinary approach not only to digital games, but 
also to the way they are perceived and received as well as to the hopes, ideas, 
and expectations that take form in the popular utopian discourse surround-
ing them.
11 While there are rare cases of excellent games like Portal (2007) in which, ironically, player 
and test subject are one and the same, this cannot be said about gamification and the ex-
amples discussed in this chapter.
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communicology, aPPaRatuS, and 
PoSt-hiStoRy: vilém fluSSeR’S  
concePtS aPPlied to video gameS 
and gamification
by fabrizio Poltronieri
Among the philosophers who undertook the task of thinking about the 
status of culture and the key advents of the twentieth century, the Czech- 
Brazilian Vilém Flusser deserves prominent recognition.
A multifaceted thinker, Flusser produced sophisticated theories about 
a reality in which man advances towards the game, endorsed by the emer-
gence of a kind of technical device that is dedicated, mainly, to the calcula-
tion of possibilities and to the projection of these possibilities on reality, gen-
erating a veil that conceals the natural reality and creates layers of cultural 
and artificial realities.
This technical device, designated by Flusser as “apparatus”, being the 
index of a civilisatory stage where societies are characterised by the fact 
that they are programmed from discourses that point to a highly abstract 
shared language exposed through “technical images” which, just like Indian 
screens, are calculated and projected on the natural reality of the world, hid-
ing and recreating it.
During this brief introduction, we can note the convergence between 
the main principles exposed by Flusser and that of the field which studies the 
theories concerned with video games, including the concept of gamification. 
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Although such connections have yet to be formally established and, in some 
points, the philosopher himself reaches different and opposing conclusions, 
the categories created by Flusser, such as apparatuses, technical images, and 
“projection systems”, can be found, analogously, within the field of video 
game studies.
To conduct part of this process, of reflecting on Flusserian theories ap-
plied to video games, is one of the objectives of this text. My current research 
intends to verify whether the hybrid codes of video games and their syntac-
tical strategies, in which the concept of gamification can be positioned, are 
suitable for the production of scientific knowledge in a reality that I concep-
tualise, via Flusser (2011b), as post-historical.
This unease begins mostly from the study of Does writing have a 
Future? (Flusser 2011a), where the author questions if the western alphabet-
ical method of linear writing is still an efficient code for the production of 
scientific, poetic, and philosophical knowledge, positing that nowadays we 
are endowed with more efficient codes than the written one.
The change from one code to another brings transformative conse-
quences to previous models used for the production of knowledge and, more 
importantly, to the way we experience reality around us.
The vital object of this study is, therefore, the understanding of how 
these codes, particularly the video game one, change what the philosopher 
Martin Heidegger (1978) called “Dasein”, altering the way civilisation pro-
duces and accumulates knowledge. Heidegger uses the term Dasein to label 
human beings’ distinctive way of being. We might conceive of it as Heideg-
ger’s term for the distinctive kind of entity that human beings as such are. By 
using the expression Dasein, the philosopher drew attention to the fact that 
a human being cannot be taken into account except as being existent in the 
middle of a world among other things (Warnock 1970), that Dasein, despite 
the impossibility to translate the concept, is “to be there” and “there is the 
world”. To be human is to be fixed, embedded, and immersed in the physi-
cal, literal, tangible day-to-day world (Steiner 1978). Hence, the present text 
is an incursion into philosophical concepts such as simulation, representa-
tion, and projection, which relate to the philosophy of science, ontology, and 
communication.
To comprehend how a video game is virtually a suitable apparatus for 
the likely occurrence of this large-scale change in codes of communication 
167
requires, firstly, familiarity with the structure of Flusserian thought, so that 
his theories concerning connections between apparatuses, technical images, 
projection, and post-history can be later related to video games and gamifi-
cation strategies.
It is necessary to immediately stress the principles that guide the pro-
posals of this text, extracted from previous reflections upon Flusser’s writ-
ings that will be expanded theoretically throughout this paper. It is also im-
portant to summarise them, because Flusserian theories leading to a broad 
understanding of some categories of thought are not always taken into con-
sideration in video game studies.
A video game is an artificial communicational system, which emerges 
from a cultural scenario where computational apparatuses have become 
ubiquitous. The video game, as an apparatus, is a system programmed to 
serve the mediation between the will of larger systems – such as a university, 
a state, or an industry – and a player or, under Flusserian terms, a “func-
tionary”. These systems are dedicated to program and to project a reality 
on the natural world. As a computational system, the video game archives, 
processes, and transmits information with the objective of changing human 
existence in the world and making sure that a person plays symbolically, 
aiming to distance the player from their awareness of death, as we shall see.
In this respect, gamification is treated as a set of codes that are created 
from this reality, with the intention of serving as a program implemented 
through apparatuses seeking to change the way player-functionaries act.
This is a syntactic set that wishes to change the semantic value of human 
perception of reality, also ontologically changing its existence, thus achiev-
ing the status of a set of rules or laws. Flusser, who died in 1991, would 
probably not be interested in clarifying the concept of gamification. Yet, the 
author left a considerable legacy regarding the understanding of the gaming 
theory and the relationship between games and apparatuses.
Based on these elements, we will seek to expand the understanding of 
the terms beyond their status quo in the available literature, taking advan-
tage of the fact that this is a new and fertile ground. We will seek to under-
stand gamification as programming models that seek to change the world 
around us. Hence, definitions such as the ones provided by Karl Kapp may 
appear somewhat reductive.
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For Kapp, “gamification is using game-based mechanics, aesthetics and 
game thinking to engage people, motivate action, promote learning, and 
solve problems” (2012, 10). This definition, along with others (Zichermann 
and Linder, 2013; Kumar and Herger, 2013), neglects some aspects that, for 
Flusser, are crucial in any communication process: modification of being in 
the world by encoding and decoding codes and the placement of an artifi-
cial, programmed, veil on the natural reality.
Lastly, apparatuses and their narrative strategies do not simulate an 
external reality as some authors tend to describe (Aarseth 2004, Manovich 
2001). The processed operation is rather more complex, and Flusser (2011b) 
calls it “projection”. A projection is markedly more abstract than simulation. 
Simulation, for historical reasons, is nevertheless ever more present in liter-
ature than projection.
The act of simulation had an influential effect on the history of West-
ern civilisation, mainly through the artistic activities of the Renaissance 
(Gombrich 2006), the cradle of modernity, and also being touted as essen-
tial in some writings of Aristotle (Reale 2005), where the Greek philoso-
pher conceives it as having an important role for establishing public belief in 
artistic manifestations such as theatrical narratives, primarily through imi-
tational techniques (Aristotle 2005).
Manovich (2001 and 2008) defines simulation as something that causes 
a sensation of immersion to one involved within a virtual or real environ-
ment. The main question, however, is regarding the fact that Manovich 
makes assumptions based on the Renaissance’s model. When he speaks 
about computer simulations, he assumes that an apparatus is, still, a window 
to the external, real, world. Even his concept of image as an interface is based 
on schemes to control a simulacrum of the objective world, not to create new 
realities.
What happens in contemporaneity, in Flusser’s understanding, is a pro-
jection of extremely abstract points calculated within the apparatuses, creat-
ing a reality that encompasses the objective and natural world. These points 
project the Cartesian “thinking thing” on monitors, and “such projections 
are indistinguishable, as suspected, from the ‘things of the world’”, as Flusser 
explains in a letter to Milton Vargas (Flusser 1987, 1). Projections and the 
world become enmeshed as one thing only.
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Flusser, in this way, adopted a position opposite to Baudrillard’s, who 
claims that we live in the culture of simulacrum. For the French thinker, 
simulation is a “psychosomatic disease, where the patient’s pains are quite 
real and the question whether his illness is also real does not make much 
sense” (Baudrillard in Bauman 1997, 102). Flusser, unlike Baudrillard, does 
not adopt an apocalyptical view in relation to the emergence of apparatuses 
and technical images in contemporary society.
These artificial projections do not simulate reality at all and would never 
be able to do so, since they are already five degrees of distance from reality, 
on a scale that Flusser calls a “ladder of abstraction” (figure 1). Any attempt 
to simulate reality is a frustrated one, semiotically, because the current in-
dexes do not hold any relation to concrete signs. Current indexes are pure 
projected abstractions that point to the apparatus’ interior.
That is the reason why apparatuses such as video games project to the 
exterior realities that were calculated within it, creating, or at least trying 
to create, new artificial realities that hide and become symbiotic with the 
natural world without simulating it. Any attempt at simulation results in the 
projection of a new reality.
Using different terms, Michael Foucault (2002, 18) had already ob-
served this phenomenon under his archaeology of the human sciences, 
where he states that a free representation does not answer to facts outside 
itself, not simulating anything external to it but projecting itself on the world 
as a reality that envelops it.
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1  an intRoduction to the thought of fluSSeR  
and the concePtS of communicology, aPPaRatuS,  
technical image, and PoSt-hiStoRy
Despite Flusser’s vast intellectual output, we shall focus on the most im-
portant part to our analysis, namely the field designated by him as “com-
municology”, where the author discusses questions concerned with human 
communication and language. It is in this field that we find his theories of 
apparatuses, technical images, and the projection system on reality, all of 
which are used as arguments that question the validity and role of the writ-
ten word as the producer of knowledge.
It is important to note that Flusser’s communicology changed over the 
course of his intellectual development. First, communicology was seen as 
a general theory of humanities (geisteswissenschaften), which subsequently 
was reformulated as a rather broad discipline, positioned in an intermediary 
Figure 1: The Flusserian Ladder of Abstraction. 
Starting from the concrete world, there follows a negative sequence of abstraction where one 
reaches a peak, represented by dimensionless calculations and unrelated to the importance of 
the actual experience. At this step, there are apparatuses dedicated to the calculation of pro-
grammed possibilities, such as video games, which project new realities on the natural world.
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field and established on the foundations of humanities and natural sciences 
(naturwissenschaften). Consequentially, this transformation causes a change 
in his methods, resulting in the incorporation of newer analytical categories, 
such as the introduction of numbers and concepts of calculus and compu-
tation.
For that reason, communicology is a suitable set of theories to be ap-
plied to contemporary phenomena such as the discourse presented by video 
games that, in Flusserian theory, project on reality the results of complex 
programmed numerical calculations computed by apparatuses.
Unlike other theorists, Flusser’s method takes into account not only the 
punctual changes brought about by these new discourses but also rethinks 
the way we see apparatuses such as video games, since a change in the com-
municational method and codes results, necessarily, in a change in the way 
humans place themselves in the world.
We can define apparatuses as “products of applied scientific texts” 
(Flusser 2000, 14). Its products, technical images, can be defined as “images 
produced by apparatuses” (ibid.). These definitions, however simple, hide 
important consequences. We are dealing with a new type of image here:
[. . .] in the case of technical images one is dealing with the indirect prod-
ucts of scientific texts. This gives them, historically and ontologically, a 
position that is different from that of traditional images. Historically, tra-
ditional images precede texts by millennia and technical ones follow on af-
ter very advanced texts. Ontologically, traditional images are abstractions 
of the first order insofar as they abstract from the concrete world while 
technical images are abstractions of the third order: They abstract from 
texts which abstract from traditional images which themselves abstract 
from the concrete world. Historically, traditional images are prehistoric 
and technical ones “post-historic” [. . .] Ontologically, traditional images 
signify phenomena whereas technical images signify concepts. (Ibid.)
Regarding post-history, we could say that:
It is concerned with a cultural revolution whose scope and implications 
we are just beginning to suspect [. . .] When images supplant texts, we 
experience, perceive, and value the world and ourselves differently [. . .] 
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And our behaviour changes: it is no longer dramatic but embedded in 
fields of relationships [. . .] Linear texts have only occupied their domi-
nant position as bearers of critically important information for about four 
thousand years. Only that time, then, can be called ‘history’ in the exact 
sense of the word [. . .] Technical images rely on texts from which they 
have come and, in fact, are not surfaces but mosaics assembled from par-
ticles. (Flusser 2011b, 5)
Thus, a human that plays with apparatuses occupies, ontologically, a differ-
ent position from the human that does not play. Playing video games is ana- 
logous to occupying a post-historical position, as the player now deals with 
applied scientific concepts, and no longer with the concrete, natural, world. 
The human panorama is changing, shifting from a procedural behaviour, 
based on a cause and effect model, to a contextual model of existence, where 
what we call reality is constantly recalculated by modifications in the context 
surrounding the player, the one who deals with apparatuses and is embed-
ded in a game composed by mosaics made from scattered particles linked by 
non-causal relations.
The cultural rearrangement described leads to remarkable modifica-
tions in human existence. Flusser points to the fact that communication 
is always an artificial phenomenon, which aims to be a tool in humanity’s 
struggle against death (ibid.). Adopting a phenomenological method, the 
artificiality of existence, of Dasein, is presented by him as two different per-
spectives: an internal, subjective one; and an external, objective one.
We should note that existence is linked to communication. In order to 
exist, humans need to communicate. Video games and its codes function as 
sophisticated communicational mechanisms that project realities calculated 
from its interior into the world and, consequentially, alter human existence 
in its deepest philosophical meaning. Video games are contemporary strat-
egies against death since mankind, according to Flusser, is conscious of its 
own mortality and that banishes us to a solitary existence (ibid.).
It is in this way that codes, as artificial systems, envelop natural objects, 
by imposing artificial forms on natural matter, in order to archive acquired 
information. For Flusser, it is when man becomes aware of the finitude of his 
173
experience in the world that he begins projecting an alternative reality, since 
in his inner self the dream of immortality always remains (ibid.).
From an existential point of view, communicology assumes that every 
human communication process is an immune and artificial system, built in 
order to distract us from the acknowledgement of our own mortality. Seen 
as such, technical images are one of the main antibodies against death, built 
in order to distract humans from their mortality and working more sophis-
ticatedly and abstractedly than previous codes.
1.1  functionaries and freedom
The investigation of human communication methods requires an under-
standing of cultural historicity, taking into account the various communi-
cational codes currently stacked in layers. Flusser’s analysis (2000, 2011a) 
begins with oral codes, with traditional images – such as petroglyphs – and 
with texts until it reaches, finally, images produced by apparatuses, produced 
by a new communicational code, which succeeds texts and inaugurates, as 
described above, post-history: an age where the process of codification is 
transferred to outside the body, into the interior of the technical or social 
apparatus.
The transfer of the codifying capacity to a foreign agent creates a bond 
of connection between technology and human beings that,  according to 
Flusser (2000), is shown in the figure of the apparatus-functionary complex, 
which forms a union that cannot be considered separately.
The concept of apparatus-functionary is essential to understand the 
current cultural situation, since it has reconfigured the relationship between 
mankind and technology. Flusser defines the functionary as being someone 
who plays with the apparatus but does not understand how its programming 
is done and thus cannot have any kind of critical insight into its processes. 
What remains to the functionary is only to act according to the apparatus.
Historically, the relationship between man and technology occurs in 
two distinct ways: sometimes technology works for man, sometimes man 
works for technology (ibid.).
Before the Industrial Revolution, the transformation of nature into 
culture was executed mainly via technical instruments called tools. In the 
Renaissance period, at any shoemaker’s workshop the production’s value 
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resided in the hands of the artisan. The shoemaker’s tools were simply var-
iables in his work, working for him. With the industrial revolution and its 
mechanisation of production, this relation is inverted and man becomes the 
variable, that is to say, an external agent in a system regulated by machines.
In our first example, the tool is an instrument for freedom while in the 
second the machine is a mechanism for imprisonment. The novelty of our 
current situation is the apparent equilibrium between man and technology, 
when both are merged in unison.
The apparatus is not an instrument, let alone a machine, but rather 
its synthesis. The machines’ trapping annuls the freedom characteristic of 
the instrument, which in the apparatus is manifested as a phenomenon of 
thirdness through which both apparatus and functionary are mutually con-
ditioned.
In the case of video games, this mutual conditioning stems from the 
actualisation of potentialities contained within the programming codes and 
through the process of interaction between the player and the technical dis-
course contained in the apparatus.
Murray’s definition (1997, 126) regarding agency as “the satisfying po- 
wer to take meaningful action and see the results of our decisions and 
choices” is intimately related to the freedom described above. Freedom, in 
the case of video games, is contained in the symbiosis between apparatus 
and player-functionary. The player is free to take action to reach desired 
results as long as these actions are codified in the interior of the apparatus.
The matter of the fact is, in order not to frustrate the player, the appara-
tuses are programmed in such a way that they are presented as systems ca-
pable of projecting infinite possibilities, giving the player the impression that 
his actions are essentially free. Apparatuses are instruments programmed to 
codify certain abstract technical concepts into images. The relation between 
player and system occurs in the agency described above, in Murray’s terms, 
but it can be described better under Flusserian terms in the diagram shown 
in figure 2.
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1.2  matter, form, and Probability
It should be borne in mind that technical texts, best represented by com-
puter programming languages and abstract scientific discourse, are articu-
lated through calculations performed in the interior of apparatuses, being 
the technical images composed of a series of points that, when grouped, ap-
pear superficially as an image. They are, therefore, mosaic-like structures. 
The points composing the mosaic are so small that, in order to be perceived 
as meaningful forms (gestalten), they need apparatuses that compute and 
calculate them into a group of images.
With this, the concept of information gains importance, perceived in 
its probabilistic meaning as an unlikely situation. Communication processes 
begin to be thought of as a game of probabilities and alternative universes 
projected via the new images produced by apparatuses. These processes are 
paths to freedom opened through the arising of unexpected situations.
It is this process that the ladder of abstraction (figure 1) describes, ac-
cording to Flusser (2011b, 6):
First rung: Animals and “primitive” people are immersed in an animate 
world, a four-dimensional space-time continuum of animals and primitive 
people. It is the level of concrete experience.
Second rung: The kinds of human beings that preceded us (approxi-
mately two million to forty thousand years ago) stood as subjects facing an 
objective situation, a three-dimensional situation comprising graspable ob-
jects. This is the level of grasping and shaping, characterised by objects such 
as stone blades and carved figures.
Third rung: Homo sapiens sapiens slipped into an imaginary, two-di-
mensional mediation zone between itself and its environment. This is the 
Figure 2: The Relation Between Apparatus and Functionary
A technical text, programmed in the apparatus’ interior, virtually contains all the possibilities 
– alternatives for the player’s action – that the system allows. These alternatives, when incited 
by the player’s interaction with the apparatus, are calculated and projected in the form of tech-
nical images. The conclusion that Flusser reaches concerning this relationship is that “freedom 
is playing against the apparatus” (2000, 80).
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level of observations and imagining characterised by traditional pictures 
such as cave paintings.
Fourth rung: About four thousand years ago, another mediation zone, 
that of linear texts, was introduced between human beings and their images, 
a zone to which human beings henceforth owe most of their insights. This is 
the level of understanding and explanation, the historical level. Linear texts, 
such as the Odyssey (Homer, around 800 BC) and the Bible, are at this level.
Fifth rung: Texts have recently shown themselves to be inaccessible. 
They don’t permit any further pictorial mediation. They have become un-
clear. They collapse into particles that must be gathered up. This is the level 
of calculation and computation, the level of technical images.
This is a negative ladder that can also be interpreted as the increasing 
alienation of existence through artificialisation or as the passage of mate-
rial culture into the immaterial one, where calculations simulate nothing 
because they are simply methods to design the zero-dimensional space con-
sisting of scattered points that are united when calculated and projected.
Flusser considers the basis of matter as being an aggregate of aggregates 
and stuff (stoff), a textile. The material world resembles the logic of a Russian 
doll, in which the starting point of matter is the concrete that can be appre-
hended by sense, to the extent that thought deepens, matter tends to become 
increasingly more abstract, less tangible, until effectively disappearing into 
nothingness, into immateriality.
In this perspective, form appears as an intermediate state of matter 
(Flusser 2007). At the level of maximum reduction of scale, we reach the ze-
ro-dimensionality and there we find only points. In this fluid and ephemeral 
universe, comprised of relations contaminated with uncertainties, probabil-
ity calculation appears as the only suitable analytical method.
The fundamental issue regarding this scenario is the dynamics of the 
shaping of matter, because points are not merely denial, but also locations in 
potential, that is, potentialities. In the case of theory – science – the issue is 
the deepening in the direction of more abstract and negative levels creates 
holes ever more dilated in the fabric of reality; whereas, practice – technique 
and technology – targets the emergence towards superficiality, that occurs 
through the projection of probabilities calculation, towards levels ever more 
concrete and positive, by the filling of holes opened by theory.
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Flusser suggests that the post-historical poetic should not begin at the 
horizons of the real and the fictional but from concepts of abstract and con-
crete, since the closer and more improbable are the connectedness of points, 
the denser and more “real” becomes the “sensation” of matter and of image. 
From this, we could say that the “old real world”, objective and represented 
by the first degree of Flusser’s ladder, is devoured by the emergent alternative 
and projective world, that shapes the universe of technical images.
Flusser expands this idea in the following terms:
The production of technical images occurs in a field of possibilities: in 
and of themselves, the particles are nothing but possibilities, from which 
something accidentally emerges. “Possibility” is, in other words, the stuff 
of the universe and the consciousness that is emerging. “We are such stuff 
as dreams are made on.” The two horizons of the possible are “inevitable” 
and “impossible”; in the direction of the inevitable, the possible becomes 
probable; in the impossible direction, it becomes improbable. So the basis 
for the emerging universe and emerging consciousness is the calculation 
of probability. From now on, concepts such as “true” and “false” refer only 
to unattainable horizons, bringing a revolution not only in the field of 
epistemology but also in those of ontology, ethics and aesthetics. (Flusser 
2011b, 16)
2 video gameS, PlayeR, and PoSSiBilitieS
Considering the questions previously discussed, we can observe that video 
games represent, par excellence, the post-historical era, since they allow a 
broad hybridisation of cultural codes through the uses of synthetic images 
and sounds as mediating mechanisms, as well as the inclusion of the player’s 
body as part of the discourse construction process.
Video games are complex representatives of both the game of calcula-
tion and the projections processed within the apparatuses and envisaged by 
Flusser (2011a) as being a real post-historical code. Besides, the methods of 
production and access to video games’ language happen in a non-sequential 
fashion, as an open hierarchy, in such a way that they present the potential to 
fulfil, if properly programmed, Flusser’s forecast of “future correspondence, 
science, politics, poetry, and philosophy will be pursued more effectively 
178
through the use of these codes than through the alphabet or Arabic numerals” 
(Flusser 2011b, 3).
In order to produce codes employing the characteristics of post-history, 
it is necessary to think about post-historical methods that comprehend the 
phenomena calculated by apparatuses, bearing in mind that the player, on-
tologically, is modified by the possibilities given by the interior of the appa-
ratuses. His or her being is altered by the projection of a programmed reality.
We should rethink some categories, if we want to examine our cul-
ture and more specifically the ideas presented here: the dialogues between 
post-historical codes and players.
The relationship between player and game begins with the fact that 
video games do not wish to change the world. As post-historical discourses, 
they intend to modify human life, since apparatuses do not work, do not 
take objects from nature, and do not inform them, as instruments and ma-
chines do. Apparatuses do not act in the natural world but in the artificial 
veil that conceals nature, called culture (Flusser 2000).
Although players do not work, they act in the production, handling, 
and storage of symbols that result in messages whose destiny is to inform 
culture and other players through their contemplation and analysis. Cur-
rently the activity of producing, storing, and manipulating symbols, which 
is not work but play, is performed through the mediation of apparatuses.
As observed, one of the key characteristics of the apparatuses is the fact 
that they are programmed. The projections are previously typed within their 
own boxes. The player who explores a digital game realises some of the pos-
sibilities inscribed inside it and obtains the outcome of possible calculations. 
For a game to be interesting, the number of potentialities should be great 
but, nonetheless, it is always limited, as it is the sum of all possible interac-
tions made by the player.
Each performed interaction decreases the number of potentialities, of 
original calculations, and increases the number of projections. The game is 
ending and at the same time making itself a reality.
For Flusser, the player acts on behalf of the exhaustion of the game and 
to support the achievement of the universe of the game (ibid.). Or, in other 
words, the player seeks to modify himself through the playful activity of 
projecting a reality on the natural world. However, as games become richer, 
the player strives to discover ignored potentialities. The player manipulates 
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the game, attempting to look into and through 
it, trying to discover ever-new possibilities.
In touch with the game, the player’s inter-
est is focused on the apparatus and the outside 
world matters only in terms of the programme, 
since the complex game-apparatus is more 
concrete than reality. There is no effort to change the world, as the player 
just obliges the game to reveal its potential.
For that, apparatuses are playthings, and not instruments in the tradi-
tional sense. The player does not play with his or her playthings but rather 
against them. The player attempts to exhaust the programme. Unlike man-
ual workers surrounded by their tools and industrial workers standing next 
to their machines, players are inside their apparatuses and bound up with 
them. Yet, “this is a new kind of function in which human beings and appa-
ratus merge into a unity” (ibid., 27).
In their attempt to exhaust the programme, the player fulfils the holes 
made by the scientific program in the fabric of matter and brings forth, via 
the act of playing, realities created by the improbable grouping of possibil-
ities contained within the apparatus. While playing, the player reverses the 
ladder of abstraction and goes from abstraction to projected concreteness.
The activity of projecting games is defined as codifying the theoreti-
cal abstract possibilities within the apparatus, taking into consideration the 
practical act of the player, who calculates such opportunities, returning to 
the world certain concreteness. The imaginary world merges with the pro-
jected one during the act of playing, moved by the imagination of the player, 
since imagination is a “specific ability to abstract surfaces out of space and 
time and to project them back into space and time [. . .] It is the precondition 
for the production and decoding of images” (ibid., 8).
From the players’ point of view, to imagine is to fill the gaps left by the 
designer, as she or he equipped the apparatus with post-historical possibil-
ities, with her or his personal expectations and experiences. We are talking 
about a game perpetually refilled and exhausted. This continuous game re-
quires a rich program in order to keep the player connected to it. Other-
wise it would soon become exhausted, signalling the end of the game. The 
potentialities contained in the program must exceed the player’s capacity to 
exhaust it. In other words: the act of the player should be only part of the act 
“Man plays only when he is 
in the full sense of the word 
a man, and he is only wholly 
Man when he is playing.“ 
 – Friedrich Schiller
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of the apparatus, in such a way that the program should be impermissible to 
the player in its totality.
A rich and deep game does not need to be structurally complex but 
should, instead, be functionally complex. Structurally complex systems can 
be functionally simple, such as a TV box, in which internal functionality is 
extremely complex and impermissible but works in a stupid, almost idiotic, 
manner. The games that challenge creative thought have complex functions 
despite being structurally simple. Chess (3rd – 6th century AD) is a good 
example. Tetris (1984) is another one. Both games have simple structures 
but are, nevertheless, functionally complex, since they hold immense pos-
sibilities and are virtually impossible to be exhausted by the player, who is 
lost in the hidden possibilities allowed by the functionality of the program.
The player cannot ever comprehend functionally complex systems, with 
virtually infinite possibilities of calculus. That is to say, players cannot ex-
haust all their possibilities. These programs operate through interchangeable 
symbols, sets of rules that govern their calculations and that are activated by 
the players. To work, within the framework of apparatuses, is nothing more 
than swapping programmed symbols.
It is in this movement of exchange of programmed symbols that lays the 
aspect of the game in apparatuses. What video games do is to uninterrupt-
edly exchange their rules on the agency of players. Prior to agency, however, 
it is necessary to codify the rules of permutation subject to calculation.
Flusser affirms that there are apparatuses, such as video games, which 
can inform and create objects via dynamic projections, calculated in real 
time. The symbols permutated by these apparatuses are in constant move-
ment, altering the form of the world in an uninterrupted fashion. The game 
of symbolic permutation envelops the player in such a way that the symbi-
osis between player and game is fulfilled. The player is emancipated from 
any kind of work and is free to play. “The tool side of the apparatus is ‘done 
with’ and the human being is now only engaged with the play side of the 
apparatus” (ibid., 29).
There is a broad modification of historical values that become meaning-
less in this process, since what becomes valid is not the apparatus itself, the 
hardware, but the set of rules, e.g. the software:
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One can see from the softest of the apparatus, e.g. political apparatus, 
what is characteristic of the whole of post-historical society: It is not those 
who own the hard object who have something of value at their disposal 
but those who control its soft program. The soft symbol, not the hard ob-
ject, is valuable: a revaluation of all values. (Ibid., 30)
Hence, it is the soft, immaterial, abstract, syntactic aspect of game that de-
fines the game of power in post-history that, on the other hand, is held by 
whoever programs the apparatuses. The game of using symbols is now a 
hierarchical power game, marking the transition from the industrial era to 
the current information society and post-industrial imperialism. This shift 
is linked to the definition of the term apparatus, a complex plaything that 
doesn’t completely reveal itself to those who play against it. Its game is made 
of uncountable combinations of symbols contained in the interior of its pro-
gram. Like Ouroboros, the Greek tail-devouring snake, the programs inside 
the apparatuses were installed by metaprograms and the game results in fur-
ther programs.
As a symbolic game, the apparatuses surpass machines and are closer 
to man and, especially, to our intellect. Machines substituted manual labour. 
Apparatuses projected new mental realities. For that reason, designers and 
programmers occupy a rather high position in the hierarchy of post-histor-
ical societies, since it is up to them to program the possible actions of the 
apparatuses’ games.
With apparatuses, we are dealing with thinking expressed in numbers, 
as all apparatuses are calculating machines and, in this sense, artificial in-
telligences. Thinking in numbers overrides linear, historical thinking and 
allows the overcoming of the Cartesian way of thinking, as since René Des-
cartes we have been subordinating thinking in letters to thinking in num-
bers. For Flusser, this changes our perception of reality, as only numbers 
are suited to a process of “bringing thinking matter into line with extended 
matter” (ibid, 30).
3 gamification and PoSt-hiStoRy
As functionaries of an apparatus, it is clear that the players of video games 
change, via the agency that they exert over the game, the written possi-
bilities contained and programmed within apparatuses, and their actions 
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consequently project technical images on the world. The act of playing alters 
the being of the players in their exchange of the symbols with the apparatus. 
Since any communicational system is artificial and, as such, exists only and 
solely with the function of distracting mankind from death’s certainty, all 
communication processes are, above all, existential (ibid.).
From this point of view, to think about gamification is to consider it 
to be a group of language strategies that define the primordial points that 
should be calculated, with the intention of programming the freedom of 
players and, consequentially, their position in the world.
As we have seen at the beginning of our discussion, according to this 
view the concept of gamification is inseparably implicated in the soft, pro-
grammatic character of video games and post-historical society. At its most 
abstract level, the post-historical narrative models are all contaminated with 
the elements of gamification since the ludic aspect of gaming is found in all 
images projected over the world. Gamification, therefore, does not wish only 
to instruct or educate people, let alone make them collect points in fun ac-
tivities. Its role should be a deeper one, as a communicational and syntactic 
model, altering the players in an ontological way.
Notwithstanding, the most common discourse regarding the term does 
not take into account this ontological change. Used extensively as a practi-
cal marketing strategy, the deeper implications of the current post-historical 
society are not taken into account and discourses on the concept are usually 
heterogeneous, pointing to a society that seems to have realised the cultural 
importance of playing only after the advent of the video games. Obviously 
this is not true.
Some definitions regarding gamification in the available literature de-
fine the term as a set of strategies to engage customers as never before, align 
employees, and drive innovation that seemed impossible without the advent 
of games as a way of reinventing commercial organisations (Zichermann 
and Linder 2013, xi). Others believe that the concept deals with a previously 
unspecified group of phenomena. This new phenomenological group would 
be represented by the use of game elements in non-game contexts (Deterd-
ing et al. 2011, 2).
Two arguments in line with the theories presented need to be made:
On one hand, if gamification, as a strategy, distributes throughout so-
ciety elements and phenomena originated in video games or game design 
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elements, the concept is nothing more than evidence of the Flusserian the-
ory regarding projections. Under this argument, gamification projects on 
society the calculated reality made within the video game apparatus.
There is no simulation. On the contrary, nothing is simulated but rather 
projected as new reality, and launched into the world as Flusser foresaw. 
New signs are projected on the world, originating from programs that com-
pute new realities. There are not, as with simulation procedures, attempts to 
make one sign impersonate another, aiming to teach strategies, marketing 
or lifestyle changes. For example, the projection cannot simulate, as it is five 
steps below, the concrete world. I stress the necessity of new categories for 
the analysis of contemporaneity.
On the other hand, the current discourse regarding gamification is, 
somehow, fragile. Paying attention only to more academic conceptualis-
ations of the term (Deterding 2011 et al.; Barden et al. 2013), one can see 
that there is a great effort on the part of academics in making this field of 
knowledge be dealt with by newer approaches, when there are already disci-
plines, such as philosophy, which have observed the issue of games for many 
centuries.
Video games and their products are elements immersed in culture and 
language, and to treat them in isolation, as if they were not part of the con-
tinuous role of games in the civilisatory process, discards important philo-
sophical accomplishments.
Even if we place games as elements separated from play, it goes against 
the current scientific and multidisciplinary methods of knowledge produc-
tion (cf. Kuhn 2012; Feyerabend 2010). Further discussion on this subject 
is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this article (see, for example, the in-
depth discussion carried out by Gadamer 2011), but it is worth mentioning, 
especially, a sentence from Schiller (2004 / 1795, 80): “For, to declare it once 
and for all, Man plays only when he is in the full sense of the word a man, 
and he is only wholly Man when he is playing.”
As a brief conclusion, in the light of the arguments put forth, the term 
gamification is undoubtedly a coherent index of the applicability of Flusse-
rian theories, especially in regard to his radical idea of apparatuses’ projec-
tion on the reality of the world and is also consistent with a philosophical 
historicity linking the act of playing with every cultural manifestation.
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However, I believe that the studies on gamification should take into 
consideration the existential field of communication processes in order to 
make the term further integrated within the post-historical structures such 
as the ones seen throughout this text. 
4 concluSion
I have presented a Flusserian theory concerned with the universe of video 
games as post-historical apparatuses. This theorisation was objectively fo-
cused at the presentation of new theoretical underpinnings to the field of 
game studies that, although recently created, has already some consolidated 
theories.
This study sought to systematise Flusserian thoughts towards video 
games, since the points of intersection between these apparatuses and the 
theories of Flusserian communicology are enormously evident. This is a 
huge theoretical effort, since this approach had not yet been systematically 
performed.
The fact that some of the concepts described above may seem over-
whelming or controversial is an observation that had been made by the phi-
losopher himself, who claimed that we are witnesses to a complete change in 
the cultural and civilisational landscape of proportions that are comparable 
with the invention of writing itself. We are witnessing the rise of a post-his-
torical era and, hence, new categories need to be created and constantly 
questioned. To open these categories to discussion by a larger audience that 
research into video games and gamification was a key objective of this text.
Finally, this paper opens some doors that will be explored further in 
my current research, presenting a theoretical framework that will work to 
produce a game exploring post-historical codes in knowledge production, 
especially in the scientific one. 
This article is part of a postdoctoral research project conducted between the Pontifical Catholic 
University of São Paulo (PUC-SP), Brazil, and the Gamification Lab at Leuphana University 
Lüneburg, Germany. The project has the support of FAPESP, São Paulo Research Foundation. 
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gamification:  
Rethinking ‘Playing the game’ with 
JacqueS henRiot
by thibault Philippette
intRoduction
Gamification principles are based on the following idea: There is the game, 
and there is the non-game. We find it is time for the non-game to take into 
consideration what works in the game (McGonigal 2011a). The aim of the 
present article is to question this seemingly clear distinction and to show 
the limits and the contingence of this premise. Jacques Henriot is the author 
who inspired this article. He is a well-known philosopher in France where he 
founded the Sciences du jeu1 research laboratory 30 years ago. Unfortunately, 
his work is almost unknown to the Anglo-Saxon academic world, which 
partially stems from the fact that his texts have not been translated. For Hen-
riot, the qualification of an object as a game is arbitrary, since “the thing that 
I call game right now in the world where I live, was different yesterday, may 
be different tomorrow. It is probably different elsewhere” (Henriot 1989, 
1 The term “jeu” in French refers to both English words “game” and “play”. This linguistic 
feature probably has some cognitive consequences, as we shall see.
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15).2 Nevertheless, as he highlights, we must resist a double temptation: on 
the one hand, considering the game to have no intrinsic reality, something 
he pointed out with some developmental psychologists; on the other hand, 
considering the game to be overtaking all parts of our culture (Henriot 1969, 
6–15). This means if games have an intrinsic reality, it is perhaps not where 
it is believed to be.
a cRiticiSm aBout the game of gamification
“I love playing games.” If you identify with this, you probably do too, or at 
least the subject interests you. But when I say “I love playing games” and you 
think, “Yes (or no), I (do not) love playing games”, are we sure we are talking 
about the same thing? Maybe I am thinking of strategy games I have played 
and you are thinking of puzzles or action games. Our idea of games is prob-
ably different. Thus the question is: What makes a game a game?
The concept of game in gamification is influenced by video games and 
the success of this industry. The proponents of gamification are mainly in-
terested in a macro-gameplay design principle: the objective-challenge-re-
ward loop (Albinet and Mousson 2010). According to this principle, the 
game’s progression is based on causal relations: a task to accomplish, reward, 
or failure. The design thus consists of developing a system for reward or 
punishment in the game (e.g. with badges). Behind terms like “onboard-
ing”, “scaffolding”, “pathways to mastery” (Coursera 2013), the proponents 
of gamification infer that a behaviourist stimulus-response-reinforcement 
process will naturally motivate the player to play. According to one propo-
nent, Gabe Zichermann, this classic game design principle, which can be 
found in casual games (“average-challenges” games as he calls them), uses 
what he calls the “dopamine release loop”, which is what occurs in our brains 
when an achievable challenge ends in success (rewarded success, of course) 
(Zichermann and Linder 2013, 132). 
The principle in a reward system, which is only one among others in 
game design, does not make up the basis of every game. For example, the 
first video game in history Spacewar! (1962) had three game objects: two 
missile-armed spaceships and a main star with a gravity well. There was no 
2 Henriot’s emphasis. All qotations from Jaques Henriot are my translations. 
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scoring system; two players simply tried to destroy each other’s spaceship 
and avoid crashing into the star. How can we consider this a game since it 
only has a few rewarding elements? Why is it regarded to be the first video 
game in history, when examples like Tennis for Two (1958) or Mouse in the 
Maze (1959) could also claim this status? Game designer Sébastien Genvo 
gives us an explanation, stating that it was the first video game in history 
because it was the first game developed as such; the others being software 
developed with the intention of creating a game (Genvo 2009, 28). 
Jane McGonigal, who is credited with being the instigator of gamifi-
cation with her book Reality is Broken (2011a), has recently reacted to the 
gamification buzz during the Game Developers Conference in a presenta-
tion titled “How to Re-Invent Reality without Gamification” (2011b). She 
admits, like Sebastian Deterding (2010), that points, leaderboards, and chal-
lenges do not make a game. She talks about what does make a game – what 
she calls “gameful design” –, which means “creating the spirit of the gamer”. 
In her keynote talk, while criticising gamification, Jane McGonigal main-
tains an important idea from her book: There are games and there are non-
games, and those who design games can help to improve the non-games. As 
emphasised by the psychologist Yann Leroux, this is a pleasant discourse in 
front of a game designers’ audience (2011). 
Some researchers challenge the separation between game and non-
game, considering the game to be an experience rather than a clear system of 
objects. The game designer Sébastien Genvo uses the term “ludicisation” in-
stead of “ludification” (Genvo 2013) to translate “gamification” into French, 
just as Ian Bogost criticised the rhetorical “-ify” in the term “gamification” 
(Bogost 2011), Genvo explains that:
It is necessary not to maintain inherently playful characteristics and the 
dimensions of an object, but rather to question how some objects, which 
were not even considered to be games, gradually started to be designated 
as such, and how, in doing so, the idea we had of what a game is will 
change. (Genvo 2013)3  
3  Translation by the author.
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 Haydée Silva Ochoa points out that gamification is a hybrid word with 
an English-prefix and a French-suffix, -fication, coming from the Latin fac-
ere, which means “to do / to make”. The problem is that it “reinforces the idea 
of an automatic rather than a problematic transformation of an activity usu-
ally excluded from the ludic sphere” (Silva Ochoa 2013).4 These criticisms 
draw on the fact that somehow our “language filter” guides our conceptions 
of things. In English, the distinction between game and play seems to imply 
that the question should be addressed separately – from the perspective of 
objects and systems of rules (game) or from the other of the activities of play-
ers (play). In French, this distinction does not exist: The free-activity of play 
or the rule-based game are both found in the same word jeu. Unlike other 
languages, it seems that the distinction is amplified, so the Nordic can “play a 
play” or “game a game”5 (Juul 2011, 28–29). This linguistic fact is not neutral. 
Language, as explained by the semio-pragmatic, is both a way of represent-
ing the world, like other symbolic forms, and a 
way of understanding and interacting with it. 
By insisting on one aim rather than on another, 
we reveal how we understand a phenomenon. 
In this sense, the neologism “gamification” is 
very clear, and could be translated literally as 
“make it look like a game”. But behind that, 
there is the idea of making an object (website, 
app, software, or even “reality”) look like another (video game). This obvi-
ously infers that: 1. games and non-games are clearly identifiable, 2. it is pos-
sible to transpose a game to a non-game, and 3. the associated conduct, play, 
will occur, and with it all its positive effects such as engagement, motivation, 
fun, etc. Play is then reduced to “responding to a game”. But playing is more 
than that, as Jacques Henriot explains. 
4 Translation by the author.
5 In gamification, speaking of “gaming a game” means that players may start cheating the 
rules of the game that they are supposed to follow. It is considered a gamification risk, or 
more precisely a risk for the player (in the examples taken) because not following the rules 
may create a dangerous situation. (Werbach and Hunter 2012, 117–119). For Henriot (see 
below), it is actually the climax of play, when you play at the extreme limit of the game 
(Henriot 1989, 92).
The essence of the game  
does not lie in 
the system of objects, but 
in the relationship that 
develops between 
the player and the game.
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the theoRy of Playing By JacqueS henRiot
In 1969, Jacques Henriot established the foundation for his way of thinking 
based upon the interwoven themes of obligation, responsibility, and what he 
calls, the “voluntary condition” in a book simply entitled Le jeu. In this book, 
Henriot explains that: “Le jeu is not in the thing, but in the use made of it” 
(Henriot 1969, 24).6 The syntactic definitions of play proposed by authors 
like Johan Huizinga (2008 / 1938) and Roger Caillois (1992 / 1958) are some-
what unsatisfactory, because they do not allow us to enter the “pensée du jeu” 
or play thinking. For the philosopher, each element proposed in these defi-
nitions can be questioned: a “free” activity? Work is equally free, at least in 
terms of a certain freedom of means – thus, a separate activity? But if sepa-
ration means “boundary”, there are ad minima two territories around it, and 
the other is then also separated – so an “unproductive” activity? When the 
game produces nothing outside itself; however, to some extent, the player is 
the result of her or his game – an activity with a “set of rules” then? What be-
haviour does not follow rules? In that case, a “fictitious” activity? The game 
can be fake, but it is operational not fictional, it really exists (Henriot 1969, 
56–64). Jacques Henriot therefore advocates a pragmatic approach to games:
A game can probably be defined objectively by the set of rules that give it 
its structure. That allows it to be compared to other games. But in doing 
so, we fail to specify how one game and another are both games. It is im-
plicitly assumed that any definition of a game begins with the proclama-
tion of its playful nature [. . .]. We describe the structure, we list the rules, 
but we do not say what makes it a game. (Ibid., 41)
He goes on to argue that the things called games refer to the analysis of play-
ing, which is their principle: 
Any game [. . .] exists if someone invents and reinvents it as such – for 
playing, for being played – and if it offers itself to the praxis of someone 
defined as a potential player. (Ibid., 48)7
6 Henriot’s emphasis.
7 Henriot’s emphasis.
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For him, the essence of the game does not lie for him in the system of ob-
jects but in the relationship that develops between the player and the game, 
explained above with the example of Spacewar! (1962). In this text, Jacques 
Henriot identifies four criteria characterising the relationship between the 
player and the game she or he plays (ibid., 73–80):
•	 Distance: Playing the game remains subjective, no one is ever sure of its 
reality, not even the player who knows he or she is playing.
•	 Uncertainty: There is still unpredictability – real or perceived – between 
the actions and the consequences.
•	 Duplicity: The player sees her- or himself in a state of “playing” with the 
assurance that it is just a game.
•	 Illusion: Entering the game assumes a prior understanding of what the 
game is. “A playful attitude, like any attitude, is taken” (ibid., 77).
In 1989, according to several published articles (Henriot 2013), Henriot 
draws a form of synthesis of his reflection: Sous Couleur de Jouer (Henriot 
1989). As part of an interview with Haymée Silva Ochoa for her PhD (2011), 
Henriot explains the title of his book:
It is [in The Savage Mind by Levi-Strauss] that I found the phrase Sous 
couleur de jouer. Sous couleur de jouer8 means in reality that we do not 
play. Basically, we could say that “play” is “the belief that we play”. And 
to believe, it would mean that we bring, in the interpretation we place on 
behaviour, contents of ideas, ideas that I willingly call metaphysical, be-
cause they exceed experience [. . .]. For example, we believe it is possible to 
introduce into things unpredictability, unexpectability, contingency. And 
above all, and there is the big word, “freedom”! The player feels free, but is 
he really? (Brougère 2013)9
 
According to Henriot, there could be a kind of “double illusion” in the act 
of playing. The first, symbolic or semantic, is due to the status given to the 
game. It can be called: “the game illusion”. 
8 Wearing the colours of a player, i.e. having a player mentality.
9 Translation by the author.
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To play, you must enter the game. To enter the game, you must know that 
it is a game. There is therefore, from the one who gets to play, a first un-
derstanding of the meaning of game. (Henriot 1969, 77)
A game in this sense is primarily an idea (Henriot 1989, 15–16). This idea is 
globally and culturally shared between the people who design the game and 
the people who accept to play it. Issues of computer-mediated interactions 
often obscure the role of the cultural conception of the game. Playing video 
games is seen as a kind of interaction between an object and a user. But the 
video game is foremost something designed as a game, and then it could be 
seen as a shared idea of playing. In other words, video game designers try, 
via computer-interactivity, to transmit an idea of how to play this game and 
players try to understand and in a way accept this idea as a game to be en-
gaged in. It is a kind of co-design, as J.P. Gee pointed out (2005). Once this 
idea is accepted, as described by Caillois, then comes the conduct associated 
therewith, to conform to the game’s forms and the associated illusion (“the 
play illusion”). If the first step, for Henriot, is necessary for the second, both 
are ontologically related:
[. . .] I do not think that the two English words game and play refer to 
two different types, one with rules, and the other without. Rather, they 
characterise two different aspects, but complementary ones, of any act of 
playing. There is no playing without a requirement of rationality, without 
an obligation that we ourselves impose, without respecting some kind of 
rule; there is no game if the structure remains empty and purely formal, if 
it is not referred to as an instrument of possible play.
(Henriot 1989, 107–10)
Jacques Henriot explains that a game is actually the representation of a kind 
of conduct in relation to a situation’s shape (ibid., 216). To be played, the 
situation should allow for it, and the subject in the situation should have the 
capacity to perceive and imagine the situation as a game. “Taken separately, 
neither the situation nor the mental attitude is enough to make it a game” 
(ibid.). Jacques Henriot uses the concept of “jouabilité” to describe a situa-
tion conducive to play. “I propose to theorise as ‘jouabilité’ that which, on a 
purely structural level, makes a potential game out of a situation.” (ibid., 217). 
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The French term jouabilité could be translated as “playability” in English. 
Playability, as user experience, generally refers to methods used to assess 
the quality of a game’s design (Bernhaupt, Eckschlager and Tscheligi 2007, 
Nacke et al. 2009). As Regina Bernhaupt noted: “Terms like fun, flow and 
playability are most often used to explain user experience in game design” 
(Bernhaupt, Eckschlager and Tscheligi 2007, 309). In practice, the concept 
is difficult to pin down:
[. . .] more research is needed to create a coherent set of playability heu-
ristics that can be used to evaluate all kinds of digital games in all kinds of 
different settings and environments [. . .]. (Nacke et al. 2009, 2) 
In this sense, the purpose of the playability approach is to determine a ma-
trix of indicators that can be applied to video game products to help assess 
the quality of the play experience each one offers. This approach is interest-
ing for comparing products between each other. But these approaches fail, at 
one level, to say in which way it is a “playable experience” and in which way 
it is not. They do not allow us to determine why situations are suitable or not 
to be played, and furthermore why situations, which were not considered 
playable, are now considered, at least semantically, to fall within the game 
family.
Gonzalez Sanchez and colleagues consider playability to be “the degree 
to which specified users can achieve specified goals with effectiveness, 
efficiency and especially satisfaction and fun [. . .]” (2012, 1038). They do 
conceptual work around identified relational forms (and not purely consti-
tutive) in the study of a corpus of video games. It shows that there are differ-
ent facets of playability (ibid., 1042):
•	 Intrinsic: playability of the game’s design (mechanisms, rules, etc.)
•	 Mechanical: playability of the software (communication system, flu-
ency, etc.)
•	 Interactive: playability of the user interface (controls, dialogues, etc.)
•	 Artistic: the aesthetic playability (visual graphics, music, storylines, etc.)
•	 Intrapersonal: the subjective outlook produced by the video game in 
each player
•	 Interpersonal: the group awareness that arises when playing the game
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Even with this differentiation, we maintain an approach that seeks to iden-
tify indicators to assess the quality of objects; although, Sanchez and col-
leagues do point out that video games are games, of course, and software 
(“good games can be bad software or vice versa”), and communication tools, 
and artistic works, but their results especially demonstrate that variability 
comes from the subjective and facets related to shared experience (ibid., 
1049). However, based on the framework outlined here following Henriot, 
the jouabilité of a game, what Jesper Juul describes as the “pull” or desire to 
play the game (Juul 2010, 2–5), must be considered on a different level, and 
the game objects and mechanisms highlighted by the proponents of gami-
fication are just one of those levels. A situation becomes playable when the 
situation inspires the game to “come to mind”. The idea of the game seems 
to come from both intrinsic object characteristics (rules, interface, graph-
ics, etc.) and the player’s previous personal experience. As Juul noted in his 
study on casual gamers (ibid., 127), there are several “frames” to consider 
regarding the playability of a game: the first is related to the game as an 
object (“the goal orientation and the desire to win”), the following is related 
to previous experience (“the game as an experience and the desire to partic-
ipate in an interesting game”), and finally there are the relationships allowed 
by the game (“the game as a social event and the desire to manage social 
situations”). As Alain and Frédéric Le Diberder say: “Video games are not a 
solitary practice that is occasionally shared. It is rather a common practice 
often played alone” (1998, 171).10
Following Jacques Henriot, when a game is identified as playable, a spe-
cific conduct must be adopted.11 He calls this conduct le jouer. What char-
acterises this conduct is that it is based on both obligation and uncertainty 
(Henriot 1989, 114–115). The obligation does not come from the structure 
of the game, but from the obligation that is imposed on the player as she or 
he agrees to play the game. The obligation is not only placed upon the goal, 
but also upon the means to achieve it (ibid., 235). He calls the obligation 
an “arbitrary theme” in the sense that it is an individual decision and not a 
10 Translation by the author.
11 Henriot prefers the term “conduct” to “behaviour”, as it refers to a voluntary act and not a 
conditioned one.
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transcendent order, even when rules are given by a system, since these rules 
are only mandatory for the person who wants to play during the time period 
she or he plays (ibid., 229). 
If the essence of any game lies its completion, the path to accomplish-
ment is paved with uncertainty. For Henriot, this uncertainty may be due 
to different things: the lack of information available to the player, her or 
his intellectual faculties or position within the situation (ibid., 237). This 
uncertainty is then subjective and irreducible. In this context of uncertainty, 
playing is decision-making unaided by rigorous logical deduction. “Playing 
is always deciding under uncertainty” (ibid., 239).12 He calls this arrangement 
of means under uncertainty “random patterns” in the sense that players 
do not often have the resources needed to achieve their project and must 
“tinker” to do so (ibid., 236).
At least, playing a game for Jacques Henriot is the relationship estab-
lished between the appropriate object and the playful conduct. The founda-
tion of this relationship can be expressed as a metaphor: 
The player lives on two levels. He does what he does and at the same time 
he plays. He plays in doing what he does. His playing is due to the distance 
he puts and tries to maintain between what he does and what he does 
when he is doing. (Ibid., 256)
The metaphor is related to both the game and the play illusion, in the sense 
that the situation is first interpreted as a game, which is itself the result of 
a metaphorical process. It is a shift in meaning or a second-degree activity: 
“what characterizes the game is a diversion, a transformation of denotation” 
(Brougère 2005, 44).
In summary, Jacques Henriot considers that to be taken as a game, a situ-
ation must exhibit some characteristics that make it identifiable. But at the 
same time, none of those characteristics, taken separately or together, are 
sufficient to make it a game without any mediation. The “idea of game” must 
come to someone, and this can only happen, in fact, if the person is able to 
transcend the situation but also to identify the conduct he adopts (playing) 
12  Henriot’s emphasis.
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as relative to the game. In other words, it is necessary for the person to ar-
rive at the idea that she or he is actually “playing a game” (Henriot 1989, 
292–295). 
the fallacieS of gamification 
The serious games designer Olivier Mauco sees a triple fallacy in gamification: 
1. The digitisation fallacy: There are no new objects or practices, but rather 
the adoption of other marketing practices like loyalty coupons: “It is 
only a change of medium.”
2. The behaviourist fallacy: Studies in media sociology show that the im-
portance of local cultural practices and devices do not condition indi-
viduals because they belong to a social space.
3. The aesthetic fallacy: Gamification adopts the arcade persona but only 
at a visual level. From the ludic side, game is mostly a competition be-
tween a player and a system (Mauco 2012, 9–12).
For Mauco, the use of gamification as a marketing technique must be inter-
preted in the context of the “attention economy”. In a society over-saturated 
with information, the problem is not the information, but the attention of 
the public. As he says: “Gamification is the rationalization of the attention’s 
problem by the use of behavioral techniques.” (ibid.).13 
Nevertheless, the first fallacy of gamification is simply the game fallacy. 
A game structure, as good as it may be, is not enough to make a game. As 
Jacques Henriot says, if a “playable” structure is necessary, the game only 
exists if the idea of game comes to someone’s mind. A game is a game first 
because someone has been able to communicate it through a system of ob-
jects and rules; but second because this structure becomes a game for some-
one else through the evolution of its understanding, appropriation, maybe 
diversions, and surely the sharing of this idea. In brief, when it is played. 
“Think like a game designer” (Coursera 2013) is the slogan of gamifi-
cation’s proponents. Jacques Henriot might say, “No! Think like a player”. 
When we think like a player, we think of game situations that were exciting 
and others that we did not like even though people said they were great 
games. We think about games that occupied us for hours and then we passed 
13 Translation by the author.
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on to others. We think of tips and tricks that allowed us to circumvent a step 
that we regarded as boring or for which we did not want to spend the extra 
hours. And mostly, we think of times when we did not want to play at all. So 
long as it merely represents a set of proven techniques, gamification will still 
not guarantee that people will play the game (or the game you think they 
must play) or that the success will immediately come from the situation. You 
can dream of Foursquare (2009), World of Warcraft (2004) or Candy Crush 
(2012) successes, but they are probably more cultural than technical. You 
can mimic their structures without having the same success. We certainly 
cannot determine when it’s game on… and when it’s game over.
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to Play againSt: deScRiBing  
comPetition in gamification
by gabriele ferri
1 towaRdS a Semiotic PeRSPective on gamification
This paper presents a set of categories to interpret the field of gamification by 
examining different features that emerge in the competition between players 
and adversaries. To do so, notions from the disciplines of semiotics, nar-
ratology, and philosophy will be adapted to describe gamified experiences.
Within the relatively new sector of game studies, gamification is an 
even more recent development. Many current perspectives have their roots 
in marketing, business communications, and advertising, as gamification 
attracts significant attention and economic investments from corporate en-
tities. However, more theoretical approaches can also bring concrete benefits 
to this market-oriented area. 
At the same time, the reception of gamified apps within videogame cul-
ture has often been controversial. Opposed to enthusiastic proponents such 
as Priebatsch (2010), other game scholars and designers have stressed how 
limited the current concept of gamification is (Robertson 2010). The overall 
consumer response to gamified apps seems to mirror this division as, on one 
hand, products like Foursquare (2009) or Nike+ Running (2006) attracted a 
202
significant user base but, on the other hand, influential magazines and opin-
ion leaders have criticised this phenomenon (Poole 2011). 
Moving on from these premises, it is interesting to discuss from a the-
oretical perspective how gamification relates to other types of games by 
analysing their competitive features. To do so, semiotic and narratological 
categories will be adapted to describe the logical opposition of subjects and 
adversaries, and this will allow us to distinguish between different modes of 
competition in various types of gamified apps. 
2 a comPlementaRy model to quantitative  
aPPRoacheS
Today, most studies on gamification are entrenched in market-specific con-
texts and aim towards immediate objectives – with a majority of quantita-
tive approaches to marketing, customer loyalty, or employee motivation. 
Instead, the approach discussed here is rooted in semiotics and narratology, 
and complements existing models that draw from game design, human- 
computer interaction, informatics, marketing, and business communication. 
As the study of gamification is making its first steps, it will benefit from more 
detailed methodology to describe gamified activities in relation to games, 
narratives, and other significant everyday events. Without being in contrast 
with other methodologies, a semiotic view contributes to this field by intro-
ducing more abstract categories and by allowing more general comparisons 
between different gamified and non-gamified activities. 
Let us begin this discussion by introducing some of the lenses through 
which gamification will be examined in these pages. The relation between 
gamified activities and other associated experiences has not been satisfy-
ingly described yet: the one between advergames and gamification will be 
considered here as a first step to exemplify the benefits brought by semi-
otic categories. In general, advergames are simple video games used for ad-
vertisement purposes: they usually elaborate on popular game genres such 
as puzzles, racing, or platform games; they make use of simple and widely 
available technologies such as Adobe Flash and they are closely coordinated 
with the public image of the brand they promote. Similarly to the field of 
gamification, advergaming is rapidly gaining relevance, as testified by the 
wide distribution of titles like Magnum Pleasure Hunt (2011). Consumers 
often distinguish in an instinctive way between advergames, conventional 
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advertisements, video games, linear narratives, and other everyday practices 
(Bogost 2007; Cauberghe and De Pelsmacker 2010; Smith and Just 2009; IAB 
Game Committee 2010) without elaborating on their specific differences. 
Here, the main reason for comparing advergames with gamified apps is that 
they share the persuasive and pragmatic objective of attracting and retaining 
customers. 
The forms and the degrees of competition between players, and against 
the computer system, are the second lens through which gamification will 
be studied in these pages. As argued above, the relation between gamified 
apps and other games is complex and not yet fully studied. Video games and 
gamified apps appear to share the same medium, but also to diverge in their 
ways of competing against players. Structured video games are often char-
acterised by some degree of competitive attitude, but gamified apps seem to 
promote different agonistic forms – such as a generally softer competition, 
often lacking defeat conditions, and strong computer-generated antagonists. 
All this makes competition a promising parameter for producing more de-
tailed analyses and comparisons.
2.1  a field in need of a more formal methodology
Several meaningful differences between ordinary games, advergames, gam-
ified activities, and other everyday activities have been intuited by many us-
ers – often with the more passionate players arguing against gamified apps 
being proper games – but have not yet been featured prominently in scholarly 
discussion. In some respects, such blurring among different fields might be 
beneficial, with marketing campaigns intuitively playing with the ambiguity 
between what is ludic and what is not, or what is competitive and what is 
not. However, the lack of formal categories makes it difficult for research-
ers and content producers to reflect on gamification past a certain intuitive 
level, and weakens both theory and practical design.
To progress after the current stage, research in this field will benefit 
from a better typology of gamified practices. Moving towards it, this contri-
bution investigates how a semiotic approach might be used to describe the 
presence, the absence, and the relative weight of competition in gamified 
applications. The proposed model is based on abstract logic relations and, 
thus, easier to generalise and adopt for comparing artefacts and experiences 
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across different domains (e.g. gamified products versus everyday practices, 
or versus unilinear advertising). This aims at two beneficial effects: 
1. A more detailed understanding of the internal boundaries in the field, 
distinguishing different types of gamification
2. More effective comparisons with non-gamified artefacts or experiences, 
made possible by adopting shared, general descriptive categories
          
2.2  using Semiotic categories
In this context, a categorisation based on the semiotic notion of an actant 
contributes to the resolution of the above-mentioned current shortcomings. 
Programmatically, the semiotic categories that will be proposed in this work 
aim at being:
1. Abstract and logical, favouring the deep semantic structures underlying 
the analysed artefact rather than its specific figurative qualities: In other 
words, they look beyond the single example and its particular charac-
teristics and they concentrate on finding more general similarities and 
differences across a wide corpus.
2. Technologically agnostic: semiotic categories – especially the most 
abstract ones such as actants and their disposition on a semiotic square – 
remain the same, independent from the specific medium considered. 
Complementing other media-specific approaches, this particular 
method allows evaluations across different media and accounts for the 
pervasiveness of certain gamified activities.
3. Scalable, allowing the description of simple or complex activities re-
gardless of their size or of the number of players taking part in them.
4. Generative, capable of giving useful insights to practitioners: While they 
are not directly intended as design tools, semiotic categories can inspire 
practitioners, highlighting relevant differences and points of view.
As the majority of the semiotic approaches, this contribution is mainly de-
scriptive and aims at complementing prescriptive design methodologies. 
Well-articulated analyses can facilitate the understanding of gamified ac-
tivities, their assessment beyond quantitative / economical parameters, their 
evaluation, and their comparison. The overall objective is to open an inter-
disciplinary dialogue with a common metalanguage that could facilitate, in 
a longer perspective, a selection of best practices and shared examples in the 
field of gamification.
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3 towaRdS a model foR gamification: a Semiotic 
fRamewoRk
This contribution on gamified activities draws from the logical categories 
of narration to describe the abstract schemas at work in the competitive as-
pects of gamification, and situates itself in the tradition of general semiotics. 
In the most general terms, semiotics refers to a systematic study of signs, 
their possible uses, their classification, and their role in social contexts. Um-
berto Eco (1976) distinguishes between specific semiotics, describing the 
organisation of particular systems such as linguistics, proxemics or iconog-
raphy, and general semiotics, a more philosophical approach concerned 
with the emergence of meaning. Semiotics is largely a descriptive discipline 
but specific semiotics is also, in some respects, prescriptive and predictive 
– as it aims to analyse and foresee how a typical interpreter would react to 
certain stimuli given some contextual rules. General semiotics, on the other 
hand, constructs schemas and shared categories to describe heterogeneous 
phenomena. This paper will adopt the broader point of view of general semi-
otics, constructing a framework that links gamification with deeper logical 
categories and that is not limited to the specific textual types of games.
To have a clearer view, a model based on the notions of actant, actor, 
and automata will be adopted – rooted in the tradition of the Paris school of 
narrative semiotics (Greimas and Courtés 1979). The semiotic model con-
stituted a mainstream contribution to the past decades of European narra-
tology, from Tesnière (1959) and Barthes (1966) to recent developments in 
cognitive sciences (Herman 2009; Herman 2013). Since its first steps in the 
1960s, narrative semiotics has deemed it necessary to take distance from 
the empirical author and related psychological issues and to favour, instead, 
qualitative analyses through interdefined notions. While early semiotics was 
mostly concerned with signs and texts, current theoreticians have extended 
its scope to include also computer games and interactive practices. In this 
context, the generative trajectory (Greimas 1970; Greimas 1983; Greimas 
and Courtés 1979; Bertrand 2000) provides a skeleton for understanding 
how different, concrete texts emerge from deep, abstract structures. In brief, 
the generative trajectory traverses different layers: abstract semantic values 
(e.g. good vs. evil) are converted in narrative structures (e.g. a protagonist 
desires to obtain a precious object, but an antagonist fights back) and, finally, 
into discursive structures with concrete, figurative, and thematic elements 
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(e.g. a virtuous knight, with a white and blue armour and a white horse, 
is searching for a magical gem, but an evil wizard with a dark cape tries to 
prevent it). In this minimal case, meaning emerges from a trajectory across 
many levels: for example, the abstract notion of being evil flows into the role 
of the antagonist and then is made more concrete with the dark cape. This is 
not an interpretive schema – as it does not describe the hypotheses formu-
lated by specific subjects or how interpretation is guided by the text – but it is 
a general guideline for understanding how abstract concepts are articulated 
in concrete texts: for example, it would be possible to trace the distribution 
of a semantic oppositions such as young vs. old, or local vs. foreign, in its 
many narrative or ludic expressions across a whole novel, or in a set of ad-
vertisements, or in a computer game.
3.1   keeping an open dialogue with ludology
In a preliminary review of the impact of semiotics in this field, the ludology 
versus narratology debate cannot be ignored. In the past decade, the dis-
cussion centred on whether games constituted a class of their own, requir-
ing a specific methodology for analysis and criticism, or if they should be 
understood in relation to non-ludic and non-digital media. The discipline 
of ludology strongly argued against narrative-based approaches to games 
(Aarseth 2001; Eskelinen 2001; Juul 2001; Frasca 1999, 2003) and for the au-
tonomy of that field from disciplines such as media studies, film studies, or 
literary criticism. The proponents of this new approach advocated a strong 
specificity of rules, playfulness, interactivity, and agency to video game ex-
periences, as opposed to narrative interpretation. They aimed at describing 
game systems with formal categorisations like Järvinen’s (2007) – with cat-
egories such as elements, mechanics, goals, ability sets, and emotions. Over 
the course of the years, the distance between ludology and other analytical 
approaches to games has diminished and interdisciplinary methods have 
been introduced, as exemplified by Aarseth proposing a “Narrative Theory 
of Games” (Aarseth 2012) as a possible synthesis. 
While this is not the place to discuss such debate, it is necessary to spec-
ify that the approach proposed here is not specifically narrative but, more 
broadly, semiotic. A semiotic perspective on games obtained international 
visibility in 2009 with Computer Games Between Text and Practice (Coppock 
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and Compagno 2009). Its editors sum up a possible definition for a semiotics 
of games as: 
[. . .] a strictly formal analytical (or descriptive) methodology, inde-
pendently of any of the more specific characteristics of the actual objects 
and other phenomena it was supposed to be applied to [. . .] A semiotic 
plane or level of analysis does in fact exist; it is intuitively easy to isolate, 
since it is precisely this analytical sphere in which both Narratology and 
Ludology operate. (Ibid., 2) 
In other words, following the direction taken by Compagno and Coppock, 
this contribution will not attempt to make games and other gamified ac-
tivities fit in the mould of verbal narratives. Instead, it will aim at adopting 
general, abstract categories encompassing different fields. 
3.2  competition
If we adopt a point of view rooted in narrative categories, the competition 
between user and system might be, at first, difficult to position in such theo-
retical approach. While the presence of persuasive or manipulatory compo-
nents in many texts, such as advertising, is well known and well described, a 
first humanistic reading might find it anomalous that videoludic experiences 
also deploy competitive strategies against the player. When considering that 
video games play against their users, it is important to stress that it is quite 
literally a pragmatic activity and not simply a textual strategy. Written texts 
remain static and do not actively interfere with their reader, even in the case 
of texts specifically designed to be ambiguous or misleading (e.g. murder 
mystery novels often contain decoys and other strategies to keep readers 
guessing) or art pieces whose open interpretation is part of the intended 
experience. The focus, instead, is on systems that actively contrast the play-
er’s actions: in other words, while a verbal text might be difficult to interpret 
while still being static, a video game may be difficult as its components react 
pragmatically to the player’s actions. Of course, ludology has dealt with these 
specific characteristics of games, described as simulated challenges and their 
canonical form involves at least two subjects in mutual competition, each 
one enacting strategies and actions against an adversary (Järvinen 2007). 
In this context, electronic games are never completely solitary activities, as 
208
even single-player games require computer-generated antagonists or some 
kind of system or environment or set of rules to keep a certain level of com-
petition. 
Differently from what it might appear to be at a first glance, a general 
semiotic approach is well suited to explore the components constituting the 
competitive instances of electronic games. A first step in this direction is to 
recognise that players have indeed some authorial properties in video game 
experiences – at minimum whether a session actually takes place and, in 
general, the overall outcome of a session – and gameplay practices show 
both competitive and cooperative traits at the same time. It would be a mis-
take to consider such competitive and cooperative parts in mutual conflict as 
both participate in creating a fully videoludic experience. They are coopera-
tive as users are required at least not to produce aberrant behaviours – such 
as refusing to play, or deliberately killing their own avatar – and competitive 
thanks to the agonistic nature of games. While this may be taken as granted 
in a certain sense, a satisfactory study of gamification should be based on 
a more complete understanding of the interaction between a game and its 
player. In this sense, games demand to be played, they challenge players and 
they teach them how to play through different codified strategies. 
3.3  narrativity, actors, actants, automata
This premise allows us to introduce a semiotic view on competition as an 
effective contribution, as structuralist semiotics has already developed the-
oretical models to describe the conflict between characters in fictional and 
narrative settings and the same models have more recently been adapted for 
the description of social activities and situated contexts (Landowski 1989). 
In the next parts of this article, a semiotic polemico-contractual model 
(Greimas 1970; Greimas and Courtés 1979) analysing competition between 
a subject and one or more antagonists will be applied to gamified contexts. 
Structuralist and poststructuralist semiotics adopt the notion of narrativity 
as the deepest, most general and abstract identifiable level of any text and 
as a common layer for any meaningful artefact regardless of the medium 
adopted. In this sense, narrativity is intended as the logic baseline of every 
form of expression, and can be described in highly abstract terms – as de-
tailed in the works of Greimas (1966) and subsequent evolutions. In this 
case, narrativity does not refer to having a narrative or being a narrative in 
209
the ordinary or literary sense of the term, but is defined as the quality of 
every text to be formalised as a network of semantic opposition and of act-
antial roles that change over time following a canonical schema. As Coppock 
and Compagno remark: 
[. . .] every meaningful artifact or activity is then narrative in this abstract 
theoretical sense, and all cultural productions specify the way in which 
they determine how a interpreter is able to understand and respond to 
them (thus integrating these interpretations into his/her prior cultural 
knowledge base). If we agree on this notion of narrativity, then computer 
games cannot but be narrative. (Coppock and Compagno 2009, 2)
In the following paragraphs, the basic elements of these definitions will be 
explored and, then, this model will be applied to the categorisation of gam-
ified activities.
Actants are part of a general narrative grammar (Greimas and Courtés 
1979) and – in the most accepted version of the model – are described as 
mutually defined positions to be filled during the course of a narrative. The 
labels used to identify them (subject, object, sender) are rooted in narratol-
ogy, but today their use has been generalised and is not limited to traditional 
narrations. An actor occupies a subject actantial position when it is charac-
terised by agency, competences, desires; it occupies an object position when 
it is acted upon; and a sender actantial position is defined by the transfer 
of knowledge, aims, and tasks to a subject. While actants are positions in 
an abstract network, actors are concrete entities occupying them: this way, 
actors are defined figuratively and thematically, as well as situated in spe-
cific narrative programs. The notion of automata, already present in classical 
Greimasian semiotics as a tool to analyse scientific discourses, gains further 
relevance when adapted for studying interactive objects such as digital me-
dia. In this specific context, I argue that the original definition of automata 
as neutral subjects should be extended and brought up to date with interac-
tive technologies as autonomous actors with an algorithmic programming 
capable of reacting to outer stimuli, such as a user’s behaviour. 
Competition enters the semiotic model through polemico-contractual 
relations (Greimas 1970; Greimas and Courtés 1979): instead of distinguish-
ing between a protagonist and an antagonist, mature narrative semiotics 
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adopts a general schema where many actants (a subject and one or more an-
ti-subjects) compete for an object. From a logical point of view, subject and 
anti-subject are equivalent and try to achieve the same goal from different 
starting points: a dual actant similar to the classical ludic situation in which 
two players struggle for a ball. The subject vs. anti-subject opposition may 
be unpacked further by positioning each piece in a semiotic square. Derived 
from Aristotelian logic, the square articulates the constituent relationships 
of a category in terms of contrariety, contradiction and complementarity or 
implication. Its underlying principle requires the development of a semantic 
category (s1 vs. s2) through the negation of each component (non-s1 vs. 
non-s2) – in this case, constructing a square between subject, anti-subject, 
non-subject (non-s), and non-antisubject (non-as). 
By expanding the dichotomy between subject and anti-subject, it is pos-
sible to obtain a more fine-grained distinction. To understand the mech-
anisms at work in the subject vs. anti-subject semiotic square in a linear 
narration, let us consider, for example, the final part of the movie Star Wars 
Episode VI: Return of the Jedi (Lucas 1983). Luke Skywalker, the protagonist, 
surrenders and is brought to Vader and the Emperor, the two main villains. 
Luke and Vader engage in a duel, Vader’s hand is severed, and the Emperor 
tempts Luke, asking him to kill Vader and take his place. As Luke refuses, the 
Emperor attacks him, but Vader takes pity and slays the Emperor. Mortally 
wounded, Vader removes his mask and lets Luke finally see that there was 
Figure 1: A Semiotic Square Articulating Two Generic Semantic Categories (s1 vs. s2)
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still good left in him. These narrative developments are structurally complex 
and benefit from a schematisation based on a semiotic square. In the begin-
ning, Luke occupied the subject position while Vader and the Emperor were 
anti-subjects. As Luke surrendered, he moved from subject (the active pro-
tagonist of the story) to non-subject (suddenly passive in front of the antag-
onist); then he is tempted to move towards anti-subject when the Emperor 
invited him to join his cause. However, it was Vader who chose the opposite 
movement – from anti-subject (actively opposing Luke), to non-antisubject 
(the active opposition stops), and to subject together with Luke (killing the 
Emperor).
Drawing from this narrative logic will allow us to produce a mapping 
of actantial competitive stances in games continuing research initiated – and 
then interrupted – by David Myers (1991) to discuss more in-depth the dif-
ferent competitive situations in gamified activities.
4 diffeRentiating comPetition in gamified  
aPPlicationS
Several points of view on gamification have been recently formulated – from 
scholars (Deterding et al. 2011), practitioners and enthusiastic proponents 
(Zicherman 2011; Bunchball 2013), or critics (Robertson 2010; Mosca 
2012). However, competition has not yet been proposed as an analytical lens 
to understand gamified activities. Instead, a preliminary exploration shows 
Figure 2: A Semiotic Square Articulating the Opposition Between a Subject Actant and an 
Anti-Subject Actant
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that they feature different types and intensities of agonistic activity among 
players or between players and computer-controlled automata. To map such 
possibilities, it will be particularly useful to track which kinds of actors enter 
the role of anti-subjects and, thus, compete against players. To do so, they 
will now be subdivided in three sets, whose characteristics will be modelled 
and described using actantial analysis and narrative semiotic categories. The 
nature of actors opposed to players is, indeed, instrumental in determining 
which type and intensity the competition will exhibit.
As a first distinction, it is possible to isolate three general categories of 
actors contrasting the players’ actions:
1. Other human participants
2. Contextual elements
3. Computer-controlled automata
More specifically, the first category may be further complicated by consider-
ing the social and logical distance between a player and other competitors. 
Human competitors might be friends using the same gamified app, or they 
may be part of a wider social network to which the gamified app is linked, or 
even complete strangers taking part in the same activity. As an extreme case, 
players might be even competing against their own previous performances 
– as it happens, for example, if an athlete attempts to beat his or her own best 
performance.
Foursquare is a canonical example for the first category, where a bland 
agonistic activity takes place among human actors. Foursquare users com-
pete principally by accumulating and comparing points on a leaderboard 
accessible from within the app and its scoreboard is not exported to wider 
social networks such as Facebook. Other systems, for example Nike+ Run-
ning, favour the second option and allow their users to compete both on in-
app leaderboards against their friends and also to share their performances 
on general social networking sites. Further fitness-oriented apps explore 
approaches that are even more competitive: for instance, Runno combines 
a GPS activity tracker with other mechanics similar to the traditional, open-
air game “capture the flag”.
Different gamified practices might also select contextual elements to 
occupy anti-subject positions; this is the case, in other words, for apps and 
initiatives that ask players to avoid or to prefer certain actions, or objects, 
during their activities. Motivational and feedback systems that increase or 
213
reduce the users’ score whenever they carry out a task – or refrain from do-
ing so – are suitable examples for this category. The EpicWin app (2010) is a 
well-known example, but it is possible to include also car insurance policies 
rewarding customers for driving safely, or credit card companies giving bo-
nuses to clients paying their balance on time.
Finally, computer-controlled automata explicitly competing against 
players are not common in gamified activities; whereas, they appear much 
more frequently in related genres that are closer to everyday computer 
games. Advergames are a fitting example of this category, where non-inter-
active ads, e.g. a visual advertising in newspapers, are translated into very 
simple games. Advergames often deploy the exact same mechanics of reg-
ular video games in smaller, simpler pieces where competition is generally 
between a single human player against computer-controlled adversaries and 
dangerous environments.
To synthesise the different types of actors occupying the position of anti- 
subject actant:
1. Human competitors, player’s acquaintances inside the gamified app
2. Human competitors, from the player’s social network (e.g. Facebook), 
even if they do not explicitly use the gamified app
3. Human competitors, even complete strangers
4. The player’s own actions and other contextual circumstances in the case 
of motivational and self-help apps
5. Software automata, even though such category rarely appears in gam-
ified apps while it is more common in ordinary computer games and 
advergames
This shortlist shows a variety of different elements entering the competition 
against players. For a more detailed view of their characteristics, it could be 
productive to come back to the subject versus anti-subject dichotomy artic-
ulated on a semiotic square, producing a more fine-grained logical view. The 
logical opposition between subject (s) and anti-subject (as) is expanded by 
finding two intermediate positions (non-s and non-as) acting as mediators 
and identifying competitive tendencies.
The Runno app is a fitting example of a system where adversaries oc-
cupy the proper anti-subject position. It is a fitness tracker where users claim 
territories by running around a specific area and then use in-game currency 
to fortify it. Other runners might attack the player’s lands using mechanics 
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similar to the famous Risk board game (1957). The combat is resolved auto-
matically by the system and ends with a clear victory or defeat. Each player 
is an anti-subject for the others, the competi-
tion is clearly represented, and intermediate 
positions are not possible. As a secondary ex-
ample, we might recall that the majority of ad-
vergames feature automata in the anti-subject 
positions – either anthropomorphic characters 
or, more generically, a hostile environment op-
posing the player’s progression.
Other actantial positions, non-s and non-as, appear in different pro-
portions in other gamified applications in which the competitive stance is 
problematised. The next three examples – EpicWin, Foursquare, and Nike+ 
Running – will be used for mapping how such positions are used in practice. 
In general, non-s and non-as are seldom separated and, together, articulate 
non-burdening, playfully competitive situations. It is possible to identify 
non-s competition with the cases in which a player challenges himself or 
herself to do (or not to do) certain actions: it is not a concrete adversary to 
play against but a component of the player’s own activity. Non-as adversar-
ies represent a complementary approach and appear in the situations where 
competition is blurred, amicable, and the other participants are not fully 
opposing the player’s actions. To understand better what has been briefly 
presented here, let us now consider three examples showing how non-s and 
non-as positions are concretely articulated.
User experience in EpicWin and similar apps is fundamentally different 
from the Runno app (2013), as there seem to be no actors or automata ac-
tively contrasting the player’s actions. EpicWin is a gamified to-do list that 
allows the user to create their avatars as if they were characters of a fanta-
sy-themed massively multiplayer online game; the system encourages users 
to rephrase mundane tasks on the to-do list (e.g. washing the dishes) into 
more heroic quests (e.g. banishing the grease monster). EpicWin, finally, re-
wards its users by assigned experience points and virtual treasures for com-
pleting tasks, fostering some kind of competition among players. Within the 
logical framework outlined before, no concrete actors appear to occupy the 
anti-subject position as nothing inside the system actively opposes the sub-
ject. In concrete terms, users of this type of gamified motivational apps are 
A semiotic approach  
helps us to describe the 
presence, the absence, 
and the relative weight  
of competition  
in gamified applications.
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more in conflict with their own actions (or lack thereof) rather than with 
other actors. For this reason, the adversarial role is more focused on the 
non-s position on the semiotic square rather than on anti-subject.
In addition, the Foursquare system does not feature any anti-s actant 
opposing the users’ actions but, differently from the previous example, relies 
on the non-as position. The user experience of these gamified apps involves 
collecting a score on a shared leaderboard “against” other participants – who 
might be more or less connected to the player’s social network depending on 
the implementation. For example, it is certainly possible to “win” a weekly 
competition in Foursquare by accumulating the largest amount of points, 
but it constitutes a weak agonistic activity that has little impact on the overall 
experience. In the Foursquare example, the role of opponents is situated in 
the non-as actantial position and not in the anti-subject because the game-
play experience lacks any strong sense of victory: typical Foursquare users 
are more engaged in an urban experience than in a fight against any com-
petitor.
Finally, Nike+ Running and the Nike+ ecosystem in general emerge as 
a synthesis of the above-mentioned positions, as the actors taking part to its 
experience might transit through all the actantial roles detailed so far. An 
actual competitive challenge between two runners would see one of them in 
the subject position and the other as anti-subject. Its use by a single person 
trying to beat his or her own best performance would position that sim-
ulacrum in the non-s role and, finally, using it as a sort of social network 
for tracking the other’s activities in a low-key competition would refer to a 
non-as position.
5 diffeRent categoRieS foR gamification
By definition, gamification blends ludic mechanics with non-ludic activities 
or objects and it is often experienced in contexts that are not usually con-
sidered playful. For this reason, gamified activities and applications seem to 
be inextricably intertwined with everyday practices and several descriptions 
have been proposed for this overlapping. Famously, Seth Priebatsch, founder 
and CEO of SCVNGR – a creative studio operating in the field of gamifica-
tion – opened his TED-Boston speech in July 2010 claiming that through his 
company’s products he was “fairly determined to try and build a game layer 
on top of the world” (Priebatsch 2010). Priebatsch’s intuitive idea of game 
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layer seems to adhere to the gamification practice of using ludic mechanics 
to make non-game products more ludic, but it is possible to trace its roots 
to the tension between being in a magic circle and, on the opposite end, to 
being pervasive. While these concepts have been widely discussed in game 
studies and media studies, we might benefit from developing a more formal 
and logical framework for mapping different experiences. In the conclusion 
of this article, I will argue that using the anti-subject actantial position as a 
marker for different types of gamification may lead to a better understand-
ing of their ludic qualities and social situation.
In 1938, cultural theorist Johann Huizinga gave a definition of the ludic 
context that has become influential in contemporary game studies: 
All play moves and has its being within a play-ground marked off before-
hand either materially or ideally, deliberately or as a matter of course. Just 
as there is no formal difference between play and ritual, so the “conse-
crated spot” cannot be formally distinguished from the play-ground. The 
arena, the card-table, the magic circle, the temple, the stage, the screen, 
the tennis court, the court of justice, etc, are all in form and function play-
grounds, i.e. forbidden spots, isolated, hedged round, hallowed, within 
which special rules obtain. All are temporary worlds within the ordinary 
world, dedicated to the performance of an act apart. (Huizinga 1955, 10)
In Huizinga’s view, the magic circle delimits the real world from ad hoc, 
non-permanent fictional worlds created for playing. Current game studies 
have imported such a notion through the work of Katie Salen and Eric Zim-
merman who, at first, operationalised this concept, describing gameplay as 
surrounded by physical or metaphorical boundaries remarking the subdi-
vision of ludic space from everyday life. However, Salen and Zimmerman’s 
simplification had mostly didactic purposes and the authors themselves later 
note how, while games are in the most cases formal, defined, rule-based en-
tities, the act of playing remains inevitably fuzzy: 
[T]he boundary between the act of playing with the doll and not playing 
with the doll is fuzzy and permeable. Within this scenario, we can identify 
concrete play behaviours, such as making the doll move like a puppet. But 
there are just as many ambiguous behaviours, which might or not be play, 
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such as idly kneading its head while watching TV. There may be a frame 
between playing and not playing, but its boundaries are indistinct. (Salen 
and Zimmerman 2004, 94)
On the other end of the spectrum, pervasive games seem to defy the idea of 
magic circle. In research published in 2009, Markus Montola, Jaakko Stenros, 
and Annika Waern described playful pervasive practices as having in com-
mon one or more salient features that expand the contractual magic circle of 
play spatially, temporally, or socially. The three scholars note: 
The contracts of pervasive games are different from the contracts of tradi-
tional, non-expanded games. The magic circle is not an isolating barrier 
distinguishing the ludic from the ordinary, but a secret agreement mark-
ing some actions as separate from the ordinary world. While all human 
actions are real, those that happen within the contract of a game are given 
a special social meaning. In conclusion, we can see that there is a twofold 
dynamic between the playful and the ordinary that provides pervasive 
games a reason to exist: Both play and ordinary life can benefit from the 
blurring of the boundary. (Montola, Stenros and Waern 2009, 21)
This dichotomy intersects productively the theme of gamification, under-
stood either as the addition of “a game layer” on top of other activities or 
other texts (Priebatsch 2010) or “the use of design elements characteristic 
for games in non-game contexts” (Deterding et al. 2011). In other words, a 
gamified situation seems to be composed by a first-order activity or object 
(e.g. entering a train station) and a second-order one, having some compo-
nent derived from game-design (e.g. checking-in using Foursquare at the 
train station, to improve one’s own score on the leaderboard but also – in 
the case of advergames – experiencing an advertisement as a platform game 
rather than as a non-interactive billboard). Some gamified activities emerge 
as interstitial and can easily take place at the same time as other actions, 
sharing their time, space and cognitive resources – they are, in brief, fit to be 
experienced while undertaking other tasks. The second type of gamified ac-
tivities, instead, is exclusive – as they demand the player’s attention and they 
cannot share the same space and time with other everyday practices. In this 
analytical dimension, interstitial gamification will refer to gamified activities 
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that take place in parallel with other activities that do not require the user’s 
full attention and that complement existing social practices. Foursquare and 
other similar apps are good examples of this category, as they coexist with 
other activities. Exclusive gamification is at the opposite end of the contin-
uum and refers to games that require the user’s concentration and that are 
difficult to play while doing other tasks. The proposal of an interstitial / ex-
clusive continuum for gamified practices has its roots in – on one side – the 
classic notion of magic circle, widely adopted in game studies to theorise a 
separation between ludic and non-ludic activities, and – on the other – in 
the genre of pervasive games. 
Insights from the analysis of actantial positions related to competition 
can be used together with other descriptive categories to construct a con-
tinuum from interstitial to exclusive practices and to map the blending (or 
lack thereof) between gamified experiences and their users’ ordinary every-
day activities. Using categories that are more abstract allows us to formalise 
the difference between the gamification of practices (weak anti-s, often in 
shifted positions on the square) and the gamification of texts and discourses 
(strong anti-s, usually in advergames). By examining the anti-subjects, their 
positions on the semiotic square, the kind of strategic actions the undertake, 
and the general victory conditions of the system, we can understand bet-
ter the degree of flexibility and porousness of several types of gamification: 
weak anti-subject positions allow less-competitive gamified activities to be 
interstitial practices that can be easily paired with other everyday actions 
without much interference. Vice versa, a strong anti-subject with effective 
tactics generates an openly agonistic situation that may be quite engaging for 
the user, but might be more difficult to seamlessly blend the game into differ-
ent other behaviours: to compete against a tough opponent requires concen-
tration and strategic planning that risk subtracting cognitive resources from 
other parallel activities.
Among the abstract variables that can be considered while positioning 
examples on the interstitial/exclusive continuum, we can include:
Which actantial position is occupied by the adversaries in a semiotic 
square (anti-subject, non-s, non-as) during gameplay, as described in the 
previous section.
The type of actions the competitors undertake and the strategies they 
follow in relation to the user. Do the adversaries actively try to contrast the 
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player’s actions, or do they simply act independently? This point is deter-
mined, in the case of software automata, by their algorithmic programming 
and, if the opponents are human actors, by the instructions or priming they 
have received from the system.
The presence, or absence, of victory and defeat conditions. In other 
words, whether the experience might potentially proceed indefinitely, or if 
it will end at one point with a win or a loss. If win/lose conditions are pres-
ent, it is also important to assess their rigidity or flexibility describing, for 
example, if players are able to set their own victory conditions, or if they win 
or lose relatively to other players’ performances, or if there is an absolute 
criteria for determining the outcome of a session.
These descriptive parameters help us to formalise the difference be-
tween interstitial and exclusive gamification at an abstract, logical level that 
does not depend on technological and contextual-specific characteristics. 
In other words, this type of approach aims at being technologically agnos-
tic, generalisable, and potentially future-looking, not depending on specific 
characteristics of any implementation. On one side of the continuum, inter-
stitial gamified practices like Foursquare feature a weak competitive situa-
tion where opponents do not occupy the anti-subject actantial position but 
rather the non-s or non-as ones. Adversaries in interstitial gamified activi-
ties do not generally enact specific strategies to hinder the player’s activity. 
In addition, the victory conditions for this type of apps are usually quite 
flexible, without specific objectives that – once obtained – cause the end of 
the experience. Vice versa, exclusive gamification – such as, for example, an 
advergame like the well-known Magnum Pleasure Hunt – feature opponents 
in a strong anti-subject position which actively oppose the players and that 
are characterised by clear victory and defeat conditions. 
6 diScuSSion and concluSionS. ReSeaRch tRendS 
and futuRe woRk
In these pages, a semiotic model for competition has been introduced us-
ing the notions of actants, automata, and semiotic square. In synthesis, 
why should a new methodology complement existing quantitative views? 
This approach provides the means for comparing different design strategies 
within the field of gamification, and also between gamified apps and other 
objects. The two results may be summarised as follows:
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Adopting a semiotic square to articulate the opposition between subject 
and anti-subject allows us to examine more clearly different modes of com-
petition. These preliminary results need further validation, but less com-
petition seems so far to be correlated to a better flexibility inside a social 
context and to a higher compatibility with other activities at the same time: 
this mode could be named interstitial gamification. Vice versa, more intense 
competition seems to require a separation between the act of playing and 
other events – a mode that could be called “exclusive gamification”.
Subdividing the antagonists between those occupying the anti-sub-
ject position and those in intermediate collocations such as non-subject or 
non-antisubject allows us to contrast gamified apps with other ludic activi-
ties. Advergames, among other genres, were chosen here for comparison be-
cause their persuasive ends are close to those of gamification. In brief, initial 
observation suggests that gamified apps usually do not pit players against 
strong computer-controlled anti-subjects; whereas, advergames – and many 
other ludic activities – often do so.
Formulating design principles is not the main objective of semiotic 
analyses but, in conclusion, some tendencies can be sketched. Future gam-
ified apps could explore other modes of competition and different actantial 
positions: this research suggests that new ways to automatically adjust the 
relation between the intensity of competition in relation to the social context 
(proposing harder challenges only at the right moments) could be beneficial 
for new products. Finally, by examining how the subject position is articu-
lated, it emerges that only few titles collocate several players in subject posi-
tions as collaborators; thus, more cooperative and team-based gamified apps 
might be welcome additions to the field. These possible tendencies, along 
with further theoretical and comparative exploration, suggest a considerable 
expressive potential and will need more attention in the future from scholars 
and practitioners alike.
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counteR-gamification:
emeRging tacticS and PRacticeS 
againSt the Rule of numBeRS
by daphne dragona
1 intRoduction
Social media are ruled by numbers. Counts of friends and followers, scores 
of “likes”, views, and shares play a central role in defining what is on view and 
what is not, in a constantly evolving info stream. As every move is measured 
and every post awaits feedback, a particular ground for action is being set 
up. Images, links, videos, and thoughts constantly compete with each other 
for attention. The number of friends a user has, the time he chooses to up-
load a post, and the number of responses she or he gets are all decisive for 
her or his online presence. The social media world is a competitive world 
with scores dependent on networks’ algorithms on one hand and on users’ 
promptness and virtuosity on the other; it is part of a new gameful reality, 
which – based on machinic modes of counting – continuously tracks and 
processes networked human moves and interactions. 
But is this then a new form of a gamespace? As users constantly con-
sider what their next “move” should be while checking the scores of others, 
they very much seem to be acting like players. But what looks like a game 
is actually not such. It is rather the ultimate convergence of the real world 
with the online realm where real data is being used in a new peculiar game 
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system (Dragona 2014, 98). What happens in the web is one of the many 
facets of the phenomenon of gamification which opens the way not only to 
opportunities for gameful interaction, but also to new modes of exploitation, 
capitalisation, and control. As McKenzie Wark puts it, there seems to be “a 
sort of enclosure of the world” within what he famously called “gamespace”, 
“where the logics of the game become the general patterns of organization”. 
And this happens thanks to the contemporary game like media, “the allego-
ries of our times” (Wark 2013a). 
2 the emeRgence of gamification
Gamification can be described as a trend (Gartner, Inc. 2013), a buzzword 
(Kumar 2013, 528), a method (de Neef 2013, 4), a process (Huotari and 
Hamari 2012, 19; Zicherman and Linder 2013, xii), or a strategy (Pradeep 
Kumar and Addagada 2013, 47). It relates to a vast array of activities to 
which game features are added, assigning a gameful character to people’s 
daily rhythm. Nowadays, for instance, someone could compete with his 
friends while jogging using Nike+ Running App (2006), gain or lose points 
while following a diet on Lose It! (2011), create a more engaging website with 
Bunchball, form a more productive work environment with Gameffective, 
and learn some new foreign language with Duolingo (2011). These are 
only some of the known gamification platforms that allow the inclusion of 
badges, points, progress bars, and leaderboards in non-game environments 
with the aim to challenge people to continuously improve their performance 
and to compete for better outcomes.
Described as “the application of a game layer on top of the world” 
(Priebatsch 2010), “the use of game design elements in non-game contexts” 
(Deterding et al 2011) or “the penetration of our society with methods, met-
aphors, values and attributes of games” (Fuchs 2012), gamification seems 
to have made an appearance which cannot be ignored, highlighting a new 
era for the role of games in culture and society. Although the idea behind 
gamification is not new – in certain areas, like the military or education, the 
use of game elements was always present – what happens today is something 
ultimately different as it also becomes clear from the controversies and dis-
cussions about it. 
Gamification’s origins are not to be found necessarily in games. Even 
though the word itself appeared back in 1980 when Richard Bartle named 
see also 
Fuchs
p. 119–140
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gamification the process of “turning something that is not a game into a 
game” (Werbach and Hunter 2012, 25), the term only started being used in 
2010 after it was reintroduced by the technology company Bunchball as a 
new form of game-based marketing strategy (Ionifides 2012, 8). According 
to the company, game mechanics and dynamics started then being intro-
duced into a “site, service, community, content or campaign”, in order to 
“drive participation”, to “teach, motivate and persuade people” (Bunchball 
2010), or else as Zichermann and Linder put it, “to serve business purposes” 
(2010, 20). For this reason, gamification was confronted with hesitation by 
scholars mainly from the game studies field doubting its aims and values. 
Ian Bogost has referred to gamification as “exploitationware”, purposefully 
recalling practices of software fraud such as malware or adware (Bogost 
2011). Chaplin described it as a “tactic employed by repressive authoritarian 
regimes” (2011) while Chorney argues that gamification “pacifies” players 
in order to generate revenue (2012, 9), and Man similarly claims that “value 
is created for the corporations while its citizens are playing games and kept 
happy” (2011). At the same time, its very connection to the world of games 
has been negated. Several scholars have claimed that gamification actually 
uses the least important element of games (Robertson 2010, Bogost 2011) in 
order exactly to invite the user to behave like being in a game (de Neef 2013, 
4), and become more active, engaged, and motivated. For this reason, gami-
fication was ironically characterised as “pointsification” by Robertson while 
it has also been argued that the fiction, ambiguity, and uncertainty found 
in games are also purposefully absent (Roberson 2010; Bogost 2011; Mosca 
2012). But this is how it is perhaps meant to be as, according to Huotari and 
Hamari, the goal of the process is no other but to support the overall value 
creation by the users themselves. And this is done simply by offering to them 
affordances for gameful experiences (Huotari and Hamari 2012).
On the other hand and taking into consideration this line of thought, 
several game developers and games enthusiasts have asserted that, if used 
properly, game elements can still become an integral and positive part of life. 
In particular, it has been argued that gamification can be “smart”, creating 
compelling experiences (Kin 2011), or “meaningful” by offering inner mo-
tivations, developing engaging habits, and taking into consideration users’ 
needs and goals (Nicholson 2013, Rapp 2013). It might not need to follow 
the marketing strategy necessarily, but rather one of gameful design, which 
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pays attention to positive emotions, and purposes, which can ultimately 
bring changes to daily life (McGonigal 2011). 
As it becomes clear, the spectrum of the gamification discourse is wide 
and so are its applications and uses, which might or might not be directly 
connected to the market. What all sides agree on, however, is the fact that the 
whole process did not appear unexpectedly. It rather followed what Raessens 
has framed as the “ludification” of culture, which emerged with the rapid 
development in the fields of computer games, mobile telecommunications, 
and the Internet (2006, 52). The serious and persuasive games, the pervasive 
and alternate games, as well as the use of games as services have all been 
aspects of this continuum, which set the stage for gamification to appear 
along with new possibilities offered by constant connectivity and availability 
of mobile devices. However, what was still unclear when ludification just be-
came apparent was the direction that would be followed given the ambiguity 
of the term itself. Would it mean “an increase of playful activities” or rather 
a “transformation of perspective” using “play as a metaphor” for entities and 
domains that might not be necessarily playful (Frissen, de Mul and Raessens 
2013, 82)? Ludification was an outcome not only of the adoption of a game 
logic penetrating different sectors of life, but also of the playfulness that these 
technologies encouraged. And what one could confidently now argue is that 
society was gamified at times when the lusory attitude, that is the game-like 
attitude according to Bernard Suits’ term, was on a high level (Fuchs 2012). 
This gameful shift in the behaviour and the perception of the many seems to 
have been a precondition for today’s gamified world.
3 gamification in Social media
Social media entered gamification after a quite discrete period of ludifica-
tion. It is actually possible, as it will be explained in this section, to even refer 
to a gamified and a ludified web, which respectively followed the early – now 
almost forgotten – playful web of the 90s. 
Since the appearance of the social web in the middle of the previous 
decade, social networking platforms were based on technological structures 
which embraced different game and play elements, encouraging users to have 
a lusory attitude when interacting within them. One can recall, for example, 
the period when YouTube had a star voting system for videos, MySpace had 
a top friends rank, and Facebook offered its users the possibility to send vir-
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tual gifts to each other. The two spaces of social networks and games seemed 
back then to actually have quite a lot in common. Based on voluntary partic-
ipation, encouraging sociability, allowing users to play with their identities, 
and providing a particular context of action, social networking platforms 
just like games were inviting users to bring in their disposal and skills in 
order to freely interact with others.
The passage from ludification to gamification happened when certain 
elements started becoming apparent. These included the introduction of 
progress bars in users’ profiles, the addition of social buttons (e.g. the like, 
share, or check-in button) enabling measurement on users’ posts and interac-
tions, the connection of various external gamification applications to social 
networking platforms to (e.g. Nike+; Starbucks reward card, 2014), and the 
emergence of social games especially designed to be played within social 
networks. The ludified space of the web was now being formed into a new, 
gamified one, not only because of the already game-like attitude of the us-
ers within it, but mostly because the web’s development greatly enabled this 
change and this can possibly be associated to the following two aspects:
First, when the above elements appeared, at the end of the previous dec-
ade, the numbers of users and respectively of friends’ networks on social 
networking sites had significantly augmented. As networks are systems, just 
like games, this meant that a great territory was opening up that could pos-
sibly accelerate and intensify interaction. And what could have been more 
convenient for social media companies than to use growing active and vivid 
systems to apply a strategy like gamification? If, as Salen and Zimmerman 
have argued, games can be defined as “systems in which players engage in 
an artificial conflict, defined by rules, that results in quantifiable outcome” 
(2004, 80), then one easily realises that all gamification needed was the con-
struction of this artificial conflict in order to bring about quantifiable out-
comes that would prove to be especially useful for the networks. 
Second, gamification reached users in the era of a data-driven economy 
and culture, when new forms of measurement, capitalisation, and valorisa-
tion started to emerge. The social media are, of course, a great resource of 
data. As users constantly exchange information within them, an amazing 
wealth of data is collected, analysed and re-organised. This “datafication”, 
as Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier name the process (2013, 73), not coinci-
dentally, emerged at the same time as gamification, and the two of them, as 
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will be explained further below, serve and support one another. And it is not 
only companies and governments that are interested in the power of data. 
It is the very users themselves that are becoming more and more dependent 
on emerging forms of measurements and data structures. Phenomena such 
as the “quantified self / self knowledge by numbers” movement need to be 
taken into consideration in order to realise that a new trend and a new way 
of thinking now exist which see self improvement in the continuous self 
tracking of everything. 
To conclude this point, it could therefore be argued that the earlier game-
like or else ludified social networks were developed into gamified systems 
thanks to the very structure of the networks, the wealth of data circulating 
within them, and the lusory attitude of users, which was strengthened with 
the growing importance of online scores and numbers. While the emergence 
and application of gamification in the case of social networking sites might 
seem “light” compared to other gamified contexts, it is of a special interest 
as it can greatly capture the reasons that made this overall process feasible, 
while also revealing its goals and outcomes. 
4 fRom ludification to gamification: locating the 
changeS of the tRanSition 
In the section that follows, the transition from ludification to gamification is 
discussed, locating the game elements being introduced on one hand and the 
way users are being affected on the other. The changes are presented through 
different examples in relation to a) the online profile, b) the network of 
friends, and c) users’ networked interactions within the urban environment.
4.1  the gamified Profile
When web 2.0 emerged, a user’s online profile very much resembled an 
online avatar. The way users choose images and attributed features to their 
profiles was not far from the process of identity-building for the characters 
of the online gaming worlds. Identities were often re-invented and the net-
worked spaces seemed open to diversity and multiplicity. Many profiles on 
Friendster or MySpace were fictional and playful, and the social network 
seemed to be a new stage for social interaction and identity performance. 
As has been explained by different scholars, new, disembodied, mediated, 
and controllable spaces were offered where users could actually create their 
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own staging and setting for performances based on their social and affective 
needs and skills (Cover 2012; boyd 2006; Pearson 2009).
With the empowerment of subsequent social networking platforms like 
Facebook, Linkedin, or Google+, however, and especially with the appear-
ance of status updates, progress bars, and social buttons, a different form of 
gameful interaction appeared. The online self started more and more to be 
fed by data and numbers; it became measurable and started resembling a 
Sims character or a Tamagotchi toy that needed to be taken care of in order 
to remain “alive” (Dragona 2014, 101). If no new data was given, the online 
identity might be forgotten and be off the stage. And this is how, unavoida-
bly, a shift occurred. A user-generated gamified data body replaced the play-
ful performative online identity and gave way to a stronger connection to 
reality and to the logging of more data on the networks’ databases.
4.2  the gamified network of friends
For many users, the network of friends on a social networking site is their in-
formal daily audience. As boyd puts it, it was the actual collection of friends 
that provided space for people to engage in identity performance (2006). It 
needs, however, to be taken into consideration that the number of friends 
for an average user in the early days of social media was much smaller com-
pared to today, reflecting only a sample of a person’s real-life friends and 
acquaintances. Some of the networks were presenting a high ranking of 
friends, chosen by the user as the “top ones”, and in general a high number 
of connections was not necessarily seen positively. The ones with superficial 
friends were often called names, and in the case of Friendster they have even 
been called “whores”, as Donath and boyd write (2004, 80). 
As the number of users in social media significantly increased, the im-
portance of friends for an online profile changed. Not only did it become 
indicative for a user’s real or fictitious sociability, it also started playing a 
decisive role for her or his overall score of influence. Within this context, 
aggregating platforms such as Klout or ProsKore appeared, developed es-
pecially with the aim to measure users’ influence and to assist them in im-
proving their score. This brought about a new form of exponential growth of 
social capital for the networks and a new kind of alienation for the users, an 
alienation from their own data. At the same time, a new class of friends ap-
peared, the “high quality” ones as Andrejevic calls them (2011), describing 
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as such the people of special interest, the influential nodes of the networks, 
that users connect to in order to raise their social or professional status. As 
for the “top friends”, they were replaced – for instance on Facebook – by the 
friends the user interacts with the most, depicted automatically by the net-
work’s algorithm. The new scores therefore brought along not only different 
metrics of power and status, but also different metrics of friendship. 
4.3  gamified urban interactions
Location-based social networking services were designed with the aim to 
facilitate users’ communication and especially coordination in the urban 
space. Just like on standard social networking sites, early location-based ones 
like DodgeBall offered opportunities not only for sociability in the physical 
space, but also for identity performance and “cataloguing” according to their 
preferences and tastes (Humphreys 2007, 355). Users were associating them-
selves with venues and were meeting up with friends, but as they were using 
an SMS-based system – in the case of DodgeBall – check-ins and shouts 
were “manual” and regulated by them. Game elements were therefore hardly 
present while at the same time a different field, location-based games, was 
emerging, highlighting the potentiality of gaming on the streets of a city. 
In the era of datafication, things changed. When urban interactions be-
came traceable and quantified, new game-like experiences became apparent. 
The map became a territory for exploration, socialisation, and gameful in-
teraction, as users’ moves and preferences became connected to check-ins, 
badges, rewards, and leaderboards. In platforms like Foursquare (2009), city 
inhabitants were now offered moments of sharing, meeting up, and playing, 
but interactions were no longer regulated by the users; even if the venues 
were created by the users “manually”, they would in any case be datafied. 
Either used to locate friends, to express themselves, or to play with others 
(Cramer, Rost and Holmquist 2011), in all cases a wealth of geo-locative 
data and metadata was generated within these networks, without users really 
being aware of it. It seems like people were being challenged and rewarded 
to explore the city and be social – if we follow McGonigal’s (2011) line of 
thought – but in reality, more data was becoming vulnerable to exploitation 
and control. 
235
5 Situating the outcomeS and oveRall imPact
When discussing the gamification of the online self, online sociability, 
or mediated city interaction, one thing becomes clear. It is the users’ data 
that is at stake and the mechanisms of gamification have come to facilitate 
access by the networks and other third parties to this very data. Social media 
networks sit “on an enormous treasure chest of datafied information that, 
once analysed, will shed light on social dynamics at all levels”, Mayer-Schon-
berger and Cukier clarify (2013, 94). The question, however, is at what cost. 
On social networking sites, as Andrejevic frames it, “every image we write, 
every video we post, every item we buy or view, our time-space paths and 
patterns of social interaction all become data points in algorithms for sort-
ing, predicting and managing our behaviour” (Andrejevic 2010). And if our 
networked algorithmic culture has already entered this path, the introduc-
tion of game elements makes particular processes connected to data collec-
tion, organisation, and analysis easier today. These processes could briefly be 
described as follows:
First, gamification assists in narrowing identity down to identification. 
As de Lange specifically argues, online social media platforms are coded 
spaces that define users by their personal taste and attributes (2010, 172). 
The inclusion of progress bars, the standardised questions, and the rapid 
flow of status updates demand information, which needs to be real and often 
updated. The user-generated data bodies created are based on one hand on 
the personal data the users willingly fill in – such as their date of birth, their 
relationship status, their religious views, etc. – and on the other on the in-
formation they provide regarding their interests and preferences. From this 
perspective, game mechanics assist in the formation of what Richard Rogers 
calls “post-demographics”, that is the demographics which are being shaped 
by online profiles based on joined groups, accepted invitations, and installed 
apps, and not on race, ethnicity, age, income, and educational level, like the 
traditional ones (Rogers 2009, 30). 
Second, gamification succeeds in applying new forms of measure-
ment and capitalisation. Gerlitz and Helmond particularly discuss how 
data and numbers today have gained performative and productive capac-
ities, how “they can generate user affects, enact more activities, and thus 
multiply themselves” (2013, 13). Different forms of affective responses are 
translated as “likes”. They become productive while also opening the way to 
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advertisements, merely through their placement on web pages. Addition-
ally, Evans specifically explains how a giant resource is formed for platforms 
like Foursquare by the check-ins of the users, who are not only checking 
in somewhere, but also work for the particular places, creating the entries 
themselves (Evans 2013, 196). And finally, at this point, one should not for-
get that that it is not only data, but also metadata which are constantly gen-
erated. Data’s value does not diminish. On the contrary it can be processed 
and again constitute an open resource for the future (Mayer-Schonberger 
and Cukier 2013, 101).
Third, taking into consideration the aforementioned points, as identi-
ties are logged and behaviours can be predicted, processes of homogenisation 
and normalisation are also facilitated. As Grosser argues, “the more one’s per-
sonal details are shared with the world, the harder it is to retrieve or change 
them without others noticing [. . .]” (2011). Accordingly, Mayer-Schonberger 
and Cukier note that “measure leaves little room for change in a person’s 
life” (2013, 167). Being limited to lists of shares and likes, users learn to 
“cycle through trends” (Dean 2013, 137). On-
line friendships are based on sameness, while 
datafied and gamified urban interactions ac-
cordingly seem to be limiting unexpected 
encounters and spontaneous city exploration 
(Dragona 2011). In the social media world, as 
Dean argues, in the era of post-disciplinary so-
cieties, there are no more normative expecta-
tions or institutional norms imposed by the school, the church, or the family 
(ibid.). The new norm is now rather defined by an audience, a network of 
users one feels that she or he presents oneself to. And this is unavoidably 
dependent on metrics, algorithms, and social software. 
Gamification came in at a time when “software is the invisible glue that 
ties it all together” (Manovich 2013, 8), when it is software that “regulates 
and disciplines” (Kitchin and Dodge 2011, 133). Within this context, little 
possibility for any counter-action seemed to be an option. After all, this can 
only be possible “if an application’s underlying calculative algorithms and 
communicative protocols are encoded to support such actions” (ibid.). So 
what options are today’s users left with? Does data govern an increasing part 
of their reality? To what extent are current game-like structures responsible 
What options 
are users left with 
to oppose gamification, 
when quantification  
governs an increasing 
part of their lives?
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for pacifying citizens? Gamification is the mode, the way used to enable ex-
ploitation and control. Networks can rule “through freedom” (Rose in Ar-
vidsson 2007) while users might not even realise that they are playing by the 
rules of a gamified system. They might be in a state of unaware gaming, as 
Fuchs puts it, recalling Montola and Waern (Fuchs 2012).
Game mechanics therefore appear to have assisted the formation of 
new contemporary apparatuses, of mechanisms that have the capacity “to 
capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, 
behaviors, opinions or discourses of living beings”, to follow Agamben’s defi-
nition (2009, 14). They came to contribute to the process of datafication and 
to facilitate the sovereignty of algorithmic control. With game elements that 
might not be directly perceived as such – as there are often no leaderboards, 
no winners and losers – and with the application of rules and modes of con-
trol, which in networks are “light” and “soft” (Terranova 2004, 100) – as 
users are never told how data is collected and processed and for whom – 
gamification in the case of the social networking sites is a practice that goes 
hand in hand with the market’s practices and interests. 
6 defining and locating counteR-gamification 
Is the current gamified condition irreversible? Enabling processes of identi-
fication, capitalisation, and normalisation, play became “functional” (Wark 
2013a), rendering personal information traceable, social relationships ex-
ploitable, and behavioural patterns recognisable as expected in a progres-
sively datafying world. And like it is often said in relation to different fields 
of the post-fordist society, there seems to be no outside. These processes 
cannot be undone; they can only progressively be developed into something 
else, possibly more controlled and centralised. danah boyd, when discussing 
the future of gamification, argues that it will seep into even more aspects 
of life without people even acknowledging it (Anderson and Rainie 2012, 
15). Susan Crawford, on the other hand, disagrees; “[. . .] there have to be 
ways to explore, invent, create, and avoid – it can’t be that we’ll be adding 
up points for every salient element of our lives”, she says (Crawford in ibid., 
16). But which are these ways? How can the processes of gamification and 
datafication be disrupted or rendered non-valid or non-reliable? How can 
the expropriation of users’ data based on the new mechanisms of capturing 
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and quantifying stop? How can users be empowered? Do such modes of re-
sistance exist and how would a notion like counter-gamification be defined?
Etymologically, the prefix counter denotes opposition, retaliation, or 
rivalry. It has been used by philosophers and scholars in order to express 
different forms of resistance, highlighting the importance of the power to 
against the power over. Gilles Deleuze introduced the term “counter-actu-
alisation” to describe the possibility of one becoming the actor of her own 
events (1999, 155, 161) while Hardt and Negri have framed as “counter-em-
pire” the potentiality of multitude for resistance (2000). Respectively, ad-
dressing resistance within the networks, Castells names as “counterpower” 
the possibility – lying in collective action – to introduce new codes or to alter 
the existing codes (2009, 38) while Galloway and Thacker argue that coun-
terprotocological practices can be found when power differentials within the 
system are located and exploited (2007, 13). But, interestingly, it is Agam-
ben’s approach on the “counter-apparatus” which seems to be of special in-
terest when addressing resistance within gamified and datafied systems. Op-
position against mechanisms of power equals de-activation or profanation 
for Agamben, and this property can only be found in the element of play. 
Apparatuses need to be played, he claims, in order to not only abolish and 
erase the separations existing within them, but also to reverse and change 
their use (Agamben 2009).
So what if ultimately the network needs to be played, as Dmytri Kleiner 
impulsively also argued when discussing forms of resistance at the Transme-
diale festival in Berlin in 2013? What if the current gamespace – that is the 
ways with which data regulate today’s world – can be redesigned as Wark 
also suggests, through play (2013a)? This does not mean that play itself can 
become a form of resistance; it cannot be. But if elements of game can facil-
itate exploitation, capitalisation, and control, on this same ground elements 
of play can assist in activating mechanisms of counter-gamification, reveal-
ing the functioning of network structures and raising awareness. 
Such an approach brings of course the old battle between game and 
play, between ludus and paidia as Caillois famously addressed the two no-
tions as two opposing poles (2001, 13), back to the foreground while at the 
same time offering an opportunity for their redefinition and a re-framing of 
their use in present time. With one word, this could be framed ambiguously 
as datenspiel in German, and be translated as the game of data, but also play-
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ing with data or else dataplay in English. And while the game of data refers 
to a new form of infinite and asymmetrical game algorithmically controlled, 
dataplay comes to express the potentiality of resistance against the rule of 
numbers and the power of the algorithm. 
The fact that there is no outside does not mean that there is no room to 
move within the structures of the networks. One only needs to imagine the 
“emerging gaps and cracks”, as Wark says; good play is still possible when the 
“internal tensions, ambiguities and possibilities within systems” are discov-
ered: “The time for the hack or the exploit is at hand” (Wark 2013b).  
Counter-gamification therefore can be described as a form of opposi-
tion to the increasing use of game elements within non-game systems, which 
aims to disrupt the processing and exploitation of users’ data; it calls for a 
gaming with the system, for a disruptive play with its rules and content while 
being within it. For this reason, this form of resistance seems to be very close 
to hacking. Its actors might be artists, programmers, and very often skilful 
users who purposefully apply rules in unexpected ways, ignoring and sur-
passing the ones imposed by the platforms. They know that there might be 
no outside and no undoing. They know that there is no winning and losing 
in these systems. But they do move towards a changing and a re-designing of 
the system. They are the ones that Jan Rune Holmevick calls “electrate” inven-
tors, as contemporary bricoleurs that use ad hoc strategies while also build-
ing a discourse around them (2012, 2–5, 23–25). Perhaps they could rather 
be addressed as “critical engineers” instead of artists (Oliver, Savicic and 
Vasiliev 2011). But at the same time, one can not ignore that they are equally 
connected to a long tradition of art based on “dismeasure” and “dispropor-
tion” (Virno 2012), on a revolt “against the rule of the number” (Caffetzis 
2005, 100), confronting enclosures, commodification, and capitalism. 
In the following section, different practices and tactics are discussed 
as acts of creative and playful opposition which aim to stop, confuse, sub-
vert, or change the processes of gamification in order to enhance users’ un-
derstanding and empower resistance. An attempt for their categorisation 
is made following different strategies that have been developed by various 
scholars. 
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6.1  obfuscation
Obfuscation is a term introduced by Helen Nissenbaum and Finn Brunton, 
used to describe a form of vernacular resistance, which is based on 
the idea of providing misleading, false, or ambiguous data in order to 
make data gathering less reliable and therefore less valuable. As a coun-
ter-logic, it is proposed as an ad hoc strategy, a weapon for the weak, a 
practice potentially beyond moral codes with the mission to protect the 
privacy of the individual. Some well-known examples the writers refer to 
are Tor, TrackMeNot, and Facecloack (Brunton and Nissenbaum 2011). 
Turning to events and projects initiated by creators, it is worth mentioning 
the CryptoParties that invite users to learn how to defend their right to an-
onymity, pseudonymity, and privacy, or the work conducted by the Unlike 
Us network and particularly the Unlike Art project (2012). Playful and hu-
morous extensions have been developed such as the John Smith Extension, 
for example, which transforms any users in Facebook and Google+ to John 
Smith, the most common name in the social media.
6.2  overidentification 
Overidentification is a form of resistance based on the appropriation of the 
sovereign ideology in order to criticise it. It is an aesthetic strategy that was 
initiated first back in the late 80s by the band Laibach and the art collective 
Neue Slowenische Kunst in Ljubljana (Pasquinelli 2010). Slavoj Žižek has 
explained how the particular practice, or rather in this case strategy, “frus-
trates” the system not as its ironic imitation, but rather by over-identifying 
with it, by bringing to light the obscene superego underside of the system 
(Žižek 1999).
In social networking platforms, creators have often used similar tactics 
of appropriation to oppose the system in an ironic way. Such an example is 
the work of the artist Tobias Leingruber. In February 2012, he set up a Social 
ID Bureau in Berlin, which would print Facebook ID cards for people inter-
ested in it. Setting up a fake office, appropriating the aesthetics of Facebook 
for the production of the card, and playing himself the Facebook person, the 
artist purposefully identified with the sovereign network, in order to un-
derline the power of control it possesses and imply its connection to any 
government and third parties with interests.  
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6.3  desertion – exodus
Desertion, connected to exodus and nomadism, stands for the evacuation of 
places of power. Hardt and Negri have defined desertion as a contemporary 
form of resistance, which followed sabotage that was an act of opposition 
for the disciplinary society (2000, 212), whereas Galloway and Thacker, go-
ing even further, see it as resistive act for the future, which will follow what 
subversion was for the society of control (2007, 101). The challenge is one 
of “existence without representation” (ibid., 138). In times when everything 
can be aggregated and measured, an act of desertion signifies leaving a space 
of control. 
Two famous applications that can be related to this act were Seppukoo 
by Les Liens Invisibles and Web 2.0 Suicide Machine by Moddr, which co-
incidentally developed similar software at the same time in 2009 enabling 
users to delete their accounts from social networking sites. Gathering tes-
timonials from the suiciders and – especially in the case of Seppukoo – en-
couraging competition among them, the creators of both platforms playfully 
introduced the idea of an online suicide as a social experience that can ulti-
mately free users and their data. It is important to note that the two projects 
were initiated in a period when Facebook users were only able to de-activate 
and not to delete their accounts. Following the appearance of such projects 
and users’ demands, the option for users to delete an account and conse-
quently their data was added. 
6.4  hypertrophy 
In this case “the goal is not to destroy technology in some neo-Luddite delu-
sion but to push technology into a hypertrophic state”, Galloway and Thacker 
explain, while introducing a notion of resistance that actually encourages 
acts of mismeasurement (Galloway and Thacker 2007, 98). “Allowing to be 
measured now and again for false behaviours, thereby attracting incongru-
ent and ineffective control responses, can’t hurt”, they clarify (ibid., 136). 
Sean Dockray, in his Suicide Facebook (Bomb) Manifesto, similarly writes: 
“If we really want to fight the system we should drown it in data, we should 
catch as many viruses as possible; click on as many Like buttons as possible; 
join as many groups as possible; request as many friends as possible [. . .] 
Become a machine for platforms and engines” (Dockray 2010).
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On Facebook, users have been playing with tagging and linking from 
the start in order to confuse the system and to break the productivity chain 
for the profit of the market. On Foursquare also, users have been found act-
ing similarly when they repeatedly check-in into their home for instance, or 
when they name uncommon check-in places and therefore confuse the sys-
tem (Cramer et al. 2011). Artist and researcher Benjamin Grosser, however, 
went a step further. He created Reload the Love (2011), a project that auto-
matically and fictitiously inflates the notification numbers of a user’s profile, 
playing with the value lying behind them for the user and for the network.
6.5  exposure of game mechanics 
Another tactic embraced by creators is the exposure of the gamefulness of 
the system. In this case, the game mechanics and dynamics involved are be-
ing appropriated and used in a new context, possibly a platform, a game, or 
an application. Such projects do not have as a goal to over-identify with the 
networks, but rather to imitate and ultimately reveal their game-like struc-
tures, highlighting the impact they have on users’ behaviour. 
An early example of this direction is the Folded-In game by Personal 
Cinema & the Erasers, created in 2008. Based on YouTube video wars, Fold-
ed-In highlighted the rating system of the videos and the competitiveness 
found within the popular video platform. A more recent example is Ian 
Bogost’s Cow Clicker (2010), an application developed for Facebook, which 
invited people to click on a Farmville-like cow every six hours, simply to 
gain more clicks. Commenting on social games, clicktivism, and the mon-
etisation of simple game-like interactions, Bogost made a successful satire 
about the “numerical socialization”, as he says, of our times (Dragona 2012).
6.6  de-gamification
De-gamification is a term introduced by Margaret Robertson in her critique 
of gamification where she argues that the latter unavoidably also means the 
former. For her, when fictional elements of games vanish, the game itself 
also vanishes (Robertson 2010). But, interestingly, this idea can also equally 
express the negation of gamification, the will that is to remove the game 
mechanics and dynamics added. Such is the position of game designer Holly 
Gramazio, who supports the idea of removing points, leaderboards, and 
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game elements added to non-game contexts, that force people to be compet-
itive in game-like contexts (2010).
The Facebook Demetricator (2012) is a project that seems to be embrac-
ing Gramazio’s logic. It is a web browser extension by Benjamin Grosser 
that removes all metrics from the platform connected to a user’s perfor-
mance and sociability. The demetricator invites people to experience how a 
non-quantified reality may be, how motivations and interests would change, 
and respectively how the market could be affected. The demetricator there-
fore both de-gamifies and de-datafies, one could say. 
6.7  Re-appropriation / devaluation
This category is proposed to be included as one that can reflect practices and 
tactics embraced by creators who wish to render the algorithmic processes 
and the network structures visible and understandable to the users. If gam-
ification works by applying game elements on datafied social networking 
platforms and by facilitating the processing of data, this practice is rather 
a form of reverse engineering. It invites people to get involved in networks’ 
obscure mechanisms and become aware of how data is really used. 
Such examples are the following projects. Commodify.us (2012) al-
lows users to export their data from the social media, to view them, inspect 
their contents, and create a new account where their data is verified and 
anonymised. They are invited to explore and understand how their infor-
mation looks to “potential licensors” of data and social media companies 
while also deciding how to license their data and leverage their monetary 
and creative potential. A similar approach is followed by the creators of the 
Data Dealer (Averintsev et al. 2013) game, which allows users to become 
data vendors and “build up their assets by trading in personal information”, 
capturing the entire population in a database. 
7 cloSing thoughtS 
“Gamification is the latest and most sophisticated strategy of the vectoral 
class, its aim being on one hand to manage networks and extracting data on 
the other”, Wark (2013c, 74) writes in a single phrase summarising the main 
arguments behind gamification critique and highlighting the differentiations 
of power between those who own the means of producing and valorising in-
formation and the ones, the users that is, who produce data. Locating and 
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quantifying relationships, interests, and desires, gamification does indeed 
seem to be market’s current weapon of choice as it greatly facilitates pro-
cesses of identification, capitalisation, and normalisation. But what about 
the intentions, the effects, values, virtues, and aspirations lying behind these 
processes, one could ask. When discussing the impact of phenomena such as 
gamification, we should also consider those elements, as Sebastian Deterding 
(2012) argues. If game mechanics are only brought in to serve the market, 
what is left for the users? And how perceivable is this profound asymmetry? 
Aiming to highlight the urge for critical awareness and understanding, the 
paper presented different practices and tactics developed today by creators 
who wish to render control impossible, to re-appropriate content and dis-
rupt the strategy of gamification. Empowering cryptography, embracing 
anonymity or pseudonymity, exposing networks structures and functions 
while also impeding metrics and building awareness, the aforementioned 
examples can be considered as emerging modes of counter-gamification, 
which play with the data and the networks’ rules. Perhaps they are “allu-
sions” – a notion political philosopher Paolo Virno (2012) uses to refer to 
contemporary forms of disobedience – in relation to what real resistance 
could be. But yet their existence is crucial as they highlight the potential-
ity users have to act and think differently while being within the gamified 
contexts. Changes can happen when dynamic elements, which are playful 
– rather than gameful – are introduced in order to disrupt predicted expec-
tations and reinforce free movement within networked systems.  
Despite the increasing datafication, gamification, and capitalisation of 
our times, there is always something that cannot be captured, which is yet 
to come. “The spark of invention becomes what the data does not say. This 
is something that no amount of data can ever confirm or corroborate since 
it has yet to exist”, as Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier write (2013, 196). The 
excess, uncertainty, and potentiality for change are the elements that can be 
found within what can be defined as counter-gamification today. And possi-
bly its creators – whether they are artists, programmers, or skilful users – are 
the “datapunks” that Wark claims we are in need of (2013d); the ones that, 
while playing “from within”, will discover the gamespace’s “internal tensions, 
ambiguities and possibilities” and possibly “redesign” it beyond systems of 
control (ibid.).
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gamed agencieS: affectively  
modulating ouR ScReen- and  
aPP-BaSed digital futuReS
by matthew tiessen
In other words: the internet, like a pack of cigarettes or lots of cocaine, 
lets you just sit in a room and repeatedly trigger reward chemicals that, 
back in the environment of our evolution, you could trigger only with 
more work and only less frequently. That’s why an internet habit, like a 
cocaine habit, can reach dysfunctional levels [. . . W]hat the internet does 
is take lots of things that natural selection designed us to find gratifying 
and make them much easier to get. (Wright 2012)
Imagine waking up on Monday morning with your web-connected alarm 
clock awarding your “Early Bird” account 175 points for getting out of bed 
in less than a minute. Imagine slowly shuffling to the kitchen anticipating 
that your refrigerator will reward you 55 “Health Superstar” points if you 
choose the low-fat organic yoghurt as a topping for your breakfast granola. 
Your shuffling immersion into digital forms of distraction continues when 
you swipe the finger-grease covered screen of your smartphone to check for 
messages – the government reminds you that digitally geo-tagging “suspi-
cious activity” on your commute to work will lead to refunds come tax time. 
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Suddenly, your smartphone vibrates and you anxiously check the status of 
your Facebook page to see if your comments recommending Google’s latest 
wearable technologies on a friend’s “Wall” have received any “Thumbs Up” 
votes – not to mention whether Google’s web-crawlers have credited your 
bank account given your positive comments about their products (Kalwar et 
al. 2012; Weidman et al. 2012). Having finished your yoghurt and granola, 
you trundle to the bathroom to brush your teeth with your digitally-enabled 
BeamBrush toothbrush1, which you know will add “Sparkly Smile” badges via 
your smartphone to your online account if you brush for a solid three min-
utes. But your favourite part of your morning ritual is your commute to the 
office in your new hybrid automobile. You experience such a profound thrill 
watching the digital readouts of your Ford Fusion Hybrid playfully depict 
growing virtual plants on your instrument panel as a digital reflection of your 
attempts to drive as efficiently as possible (Zichermann and Cunningham 
2011, 78). The fact that driving this way is better for the environment is also 
a bonus. Upon arriving at your job for a Web 3.0 venture-capital supported 
startup, you feel great about your morning, about your contributions to so-
ciety, about games well played, and about your chances of success in your of-
fice’s new Worker Incentivisation Challenge… (Heisler 2012; Meister 2012).
This hypothetical vignette of future morning rituals gives us a glimpse 
of a not too distant world in which everyday activities are overrun by digi-
tally mediated gamification – a world in which the embedding of game-like 
logics and game-like mechanics into the screens and digital devices that 
mediate between us and our everyday routines adds “value” and a layer of 
quantification-derived incentives to previously non-game contexts. This is a 
digitally and visually mediated world in which intrinsic values aren’t quite 
valuable, profitable or affectively desirable enough and so are overcoded and 
re-coded by icons, graphs, statistics, points, and badges, all in pursuit of ac-
cess, privileges, productivity, prestige, and feelings of satisfaction. This is a 
world in which the awarding, redeeming, gifting, and trading of credits, dig-
ital achievements, and virtual trophies has become an end in itself. 
1 See: www.beamtoothbrush.com (accessed May 6, 2014).
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Increasingly, gamification software applications are embedding digitally 
and virtually readable metrics into people’s everyday lives (Anderson 2012; 
Juul 2010; Kohler 2010) in order, for instance, to encourage individuals to: 
1. Embrace repetitive chores
2. Complete customer surveys
3. Promote socially desirable behaviour (Greitemeyer and Osswald 2010; 
Harris 2010)
4. Engage more deeply with social media and company websites (Curran 
2012)
5. Achieve fitness and health goals (Read and Shortell 2011; Lin et al. 2006; 
Woods 2012)
6. Contribute to e-learning contexts (Kapp 2012; Tannahill, Tissington 
and Senior 2012)
7. Support desirable financial behaviour (Shin and Shin 2011; Yamakami 
2012)
8. Even make crowd-sourced scientific discoveries (Cooper et al. 2010) 
Indeed, the increasing role being played by visual and digital representa-
tions of quantified success finds emerging and market-driven modes of dig-
ital discipline, such as gamification, encroaching upon and colonising new 
areas of life that presumably require “added value” in order to be meaning-
ful. Consider the number of “likes” you get on Facebook, the number of 
followers you have on Twitter, not to mention your salary, your credit score, 
your investment returns as examples of “values” in a valueless world. This is 
the very type of meaning making that Nietzsche once diagnosed as typical 
for our valueless and nihilistic era. For Nietzsche, nihilism was in part a 
disheartening product of his historical moment, one in which he diagnosed 
humanity to have become corrupt insofar as it had lost “its instincts”. As 
Nietzsche explains it, a species becomes corrupt “when it loses its instincts, 
when it chooses, when it prefers, things that will harm it” (Nietzsche 2005, 6). 
In Nietzsche’s view, a life full of value and health must manifest “an instinct 
for growth, for endurance, for the accumulation of force, of power” since 
“when there is no will to power, there is decline” (ibid.). Nietzsche, then, was 
compelled to announce to all who would hear that “nihilistic values, values 
of decline, have taken control under the aegis of the holiest of names” (ibid.). 
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While Nietzsche’s bombastic admonitions that we have lost our instincts can 
be regarded as ever so slightly extreme, are they not also illuminating for 
us as we live through this era of gamified toothbrushes and algorithmically 
driven online dating platforms?
A future overrun by gamification – whether we deem it nihilistic or 
not – won’t be one in which the rules, conditions, and incentives of the 
“games” – and of our gamed lives – remain static; rather, by layering high-
speed computational capacities on top of digitally enabled everyday objects, 
context-bound information is able to be fed to game-players in real time, 
creating adaptive game-spaces capable of modulating gamer behaviour in 
milliseconds by providing game-based inputs based on the game-player’s 
outputs. In other words, in the hypothetical total-game-space of the future, 
it won’t be us creatively adapting to our games, but our games creatively 
adapting to us (in real time). Drawing on high-speed algorithmic techniques 
already at work in the financial world, the gamification of the future is being 
developed today. The goal of this capital-obsessed development: to develop 
new forms of digital distraction and sensory stimulation capable of overcod-
ing self-reflexive and, as Nietzsche might say, “instinctual” ways of negotiat-
ing life’s challenges and choices (Martin 2002).  
gamification’S PRehiStoRy
In the face of the burgeoning gamification explosion, my objective here is 
to develop a more critical understanding of the affective dimensions of our 
increasingly mobile and screen-based economy by interrogating some of the 
social, political, and expanding economic implications of gamification. More 
specifically, I want to objectify and critically examine two ways gamification 
is reshaping everyday social relations between humans (and machines): 
First, the ways game-like apps and game-based modes of incentivisa-
tion are affecting relations between humans and other humans, humans 
and nonhumans, and even nonhumans and nonhumans as they become an 
increasingly prominent phenomenon in our digitally mobile and wireless 
world, infiltrating the realms of business, education, health, public policy, 
and “global governance” (Pearce 2009; Schreiner 2008). 
Second, the idea that while the gamification of everyday life affords so-
cieties, businesses, institutions, and communities the ability to encourage 
and support socially, politically, and economically “desirable” behaviour 
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(Deterding et al. 2010; Whitson and Dormann 2011), the desirability of 
organisations attempting to use real-time managerial control in a deliberate 
attempt to direct “dividualized” (Deleuze 1992) behaviour through affec-
tively charged modulations of desire (Dormann and Biddle 2008) and point-
based modes of incentivisation and quantification might not be so desirable 
after all.
Of course, attempts to control, train, coerce, and compel populations 
using seductively designed new media platforms are not by any stretch 
new. We recall that in the 1920s, modern propaganda’s founding father 
Edward Bernays seized on the power of what was the “new media” of the 
time in order, in his words, to “manipulate” and to “mould” public opinion. 
Bernays understood then what gamification’s proponents are mobilising 
today – the idea that, through the “mass distribution of ideas” using new 
media platforms, public opinion could be “moved, directed, and formed” 
(Bernays 1928, 971). Moreover, Bernays understood that to appropriately 
“move” people, you needed to define, activate, and in turn fulfil the public’s 
yearnings and desires – their (apparent) longings for success, achievement, 
recognition, and so on. As he explained: 
Public opinion can be moved, directed, and formed by such a technique. 
But at the core of this great heterogeneous body of public opinion is a te-
nacious will to live, to progress, to move in the direction of ultimate social 
and individual benefit. He who seeks to manipulate public opinion must 
always heed it. (Ibid., 971)
For Bernays, those wishing to control the individuals within the mass had to 
gain access to the “great basic motivations” which he described as: “self-pres-
ervation, ambition, pride, hunger, love [. . .] imitativeness, the desire to be a 
leader, [and] love of play”. “[T]hese and others”, he wrote, “are the psycho-
logical raw materials of which every leader must be aware in his endeavour 
to win the public to his point of view” (Bernays 1935, 83). They are also, of 
course, the targets of gamification’s designers, practitioners, and boosters. 
Indeed, it’s interesting just how apparently natural and intuitive this logic of 
affectively modulated control and persuasion is to gamification’s practition-
ers whose ideas and strategies could be regarded as being at the forefront of 
current academic thought insofar as they are, in many respects, premised on 
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thinking “the human” as a potential cyborg (Hayles 1999), as an affectively 
motivated “desiring machine” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987), and as one agen-
tial actor among others (Latour 2005; Thrift 2008).
Later on, Marshall McLuhan echoed Bernays’ promise of mediated pub-
lics in his famed Playboy interview from 1967 when he noted that through 
the use of a pre-iPhone screen-based technology the public could be manip-
ulated and affectively modulated through the power of sensorial – primarily 
visual – stimulation. As McLuhan explained: “There’s nothing at all difficult 
about putting computers in the position where they will be able to conduct 
carefully orchestrated programming of the sensory life of whole popula-
tions” (McLuhan 1969, 19). 
Similarly, in the early 1990s Deleuze was warning us of the dark side 
of digital quantification. In his “societies of control” article, he warned us 
that future modes of discipline and control would be, at once, more focused 
on targeting the individual (consider, for instance, your debt score or credit 
rating) and more capable of dividing us up into numerical strata – of dividu-
alizing us. As he explains: 
The disciplinary societies have two poles: the signature that designates the 
individual, and the number [. . .] that indicates his or her position within 
a mass. This is because the disciplines never saw any incompatibility be-
tween these two, and because at the same time power individualises and 
masses together, that is, constitutes those over whom it exercises power 
into a body and molds the individuality of each member of that body. 
(Deleuze 1992, 5)
For Deleuze, digital forms of dividualising quantification would offer “power” 
the means to control subjects using a light – almost imperceptible – touch. 
Digital “control mechanisms” – as he called them – would form a system of 
“variable geometry the language of which is numerical”. These control mech-
anism would work using modulation, they would be responsive to subtle 
changes, to invisible variations. He explains that the controlling mechanisms 
of the future (of our present) would operate almost intuitively, “like a self-de-
forming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, 
or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point” (ibid., 4).
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More recently, in the late 1990s, techno-sceptics like the artist/activist 
group the Critical Art Ensemble were feverishly warning us of the dangers 
of our post-visual data-bodies and the ways they will – in the future – begin 
to define what our fleshy selves are capable of. As they explained in 1997: 
With the virtual body came its fascist sibling, the data body – a much more 
highly developed virtual form, and one that exists in complete service to 
the corporate and police state [. . .] What brought the data body to ma-
turity is the technological apparatus. With its immense storage capacity 
and its mechanisms for quickly ordering and retrieving information, no 
detail of social life is too insignificant to record and to scrutinize. From 
the moment we are born and our birth certificate goes online, until the 
day we die and our death certificate goes online, the trajectory of our  
individual lives is recorded in scrupulous detail [. . .] The desire of author-
itarian power to make the lives of its subordinates perfectly transparent 
achieves satisfaction through the data body. Everyone is under perma-
nent surveillance by virtue of their necessary interaction with the mar-
ketplace. Just how detailed data body information actually may be is a 
matter of speculation, but we can be certain that it is more detailed than 
we would like it to be, or care to think [. . .] But the most frightening 
thing about the data body is that it is the center of an individual’s social 
being [. . .] We are powerless to contradict the data body. Its word is the 
law [. . .] The corporate intention for deploying this technology (in ad-
dition to profit) is so transparent, it’s painful. The only possible rejoin-
der is: ‘Have you ever been at a work station... 24 hours a day, 365 days 
a year? You will’. Now the virtual sweat shop can go anywhere you do! 
(Critical Art Ensemble 1997, 145–146)
For the Critical Art Ensemble, the emergence of the “virtual” digital platform 
created the conditions for the immaterial expansion of capital-driven ways 
of being, thinking, and doing. The Internet, in their view, would emerge as a 
computerised tool for the powers that be who were – as they are now – intent 
on maintaining, quite literally, business as usual. In their view, “the most 
significant use of the electronic apparatus is to keep order, to replicate dom-
inant pancapitalist ideology, and to develop new markets” (ibid., 141). In the 
face of this imminent future (our NSA-surveilled present [Gellman, Soltani 
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and Peterson 2013; Risen and Poitras 2013]), they urged anyone who would 
listen that the “need for Net criticism certainly is a matter of overwhelming 
urgency”. Critical Art Ensemble acknowledges that “a number of critics have 
approached the new world of computerised communications with a healthy 
amount of scepticism”. They fear that “their message has been lost in the noise 
and spectacle of corporate hype – the unstoppable tidal wave of seduction has 
enveloped so many in its dynamic utopian beauty that little time for care-
ful reflection is left” (ibid., 139). Their hyperbolic observations might even 
give us pause by encouraging us to ask: If that was then, what about now?
Well, for one thing we could observe that social media platforms, the 
touch screens and mobile technologies that help enable them, and emerging 
gamification protocols and databases are valuable not because they involve 
data, statistics, tweets, and desires expressive of the general experience of 
being alive, but because this data produces a useful resources for organi-
sation whose professional interest is in surveilling us once we “go public”, 
as Greg Elmer (2013) has observed. Moreover, as is increasingly becoming 
clear, once we’ve rendered ourselves transparent to the digital apparatus, our 
desires are parsed before being fed back to us in a virtuous – and seemingly 
benign – loop of desiring rewards and rewarding desires. 
gamification hyPe-noSiS
But let’s look a bit more closely at gamification today – as a market, a prom-
ise, a quasi-religion, an incentivisation tool, a way to manufacture “better” 
human beings… Over the past few years, gamification has been taking the 
digital – and especially the mobile – world by storm, promising at once to 
increase bottom lines, promote healthy behaviour, while extending and 
deepening social as well as virtual relationships. The hype surrounding gam-
ification has generated a certain level of debate about its merits, its relation-
ship to gaming-culture more generally, whether it works at all, etc. Indeed, 
“real” gamers – those who use consoles like the just released Xbox One or 
PlayStation 4 – are embarrassed by the gamification upstarts who want to 
associate with them. But whether or not gamification lives up to the hype, 
its strategists and proponents persist in their attempts to embed game-based 
logics into more and more of the screens and devices that define our every-
day (digital) lives. 
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But the hype surrounding gamification was – and is – certainly real, and 
occasionally breathless. For example, gamification guru Jane McGonigal has 
insisted that “reality is broken” and that digital games can “save the world” 
(2011). Similarly, game designer Jesse Schell wondered in a recent TED talk 
whether using “game-like external rewards” can “make people lead better 
lives?” (2010). The scale of today’s gamification industry is enormous and 
growing; for example, in 2011 the profits from social gaming company Zynga 
– which recently held its initial public offering (IPO) – made up 12% of Face-
book’s entire revenue stream prior to Facebook’s own controversial IPO (i.e. 
of Facebook’s $3.71 billion in sales in 2011, Zynga contributed $445 million) 
(Geron 2012). Indeed, gamification-based companies such as Bunchball.
com, Badgeville.com, and Bigdoor.com are helping global corporations like 
Adobe, eBay, Intel, ABC, CBS, ESPN, NBC, CISCO, Microsoft, Toyota, and 
Ford connect digitally with their customers through mobile communication 
technologies (smartphones, tablets, laptops, etc.), “Corporate Game De-
sign” and “Emotion Hacking” by embedding game-driven incentives into, 
for example, employee training programs, financial services websites, shop-
ping websites, enhanced loyalty programmes, social networks, e-surveys, 
call-centre protocols, and market research. Other gamification companies 
such as Strava and Fitocracy (more about Strava later) turn fitness into a 
game by encouraging users to upload GPS data onto the web from their 
mobile devices where it is data-mined and quantified in order to provide us-
ers with feedback and graphs that not only contain information about their 
individual athletic performances and newly “quantified selves” (Wolf 2010), 
but help place their performances among an athletic hierarchy of digitally 
equipped athletes. Additionally, e-learning companies such as the Canadian 
company Desire2Learn are applying game-based strategies to the field of 
learning management systems, embedding digital technologies into “real” 
and “virtual” classrooms, and enabling instructors at, for example, the Uni-
versity of Waterloo, to make “data-driven decisions” in order to design, cus-
tomise, develop, and deliver online “social learning” experiences capable of 
catering to students at a “granular” level across mobile platforms by allowing 
them to collaborate virtually while being data-mined and assessed by their 
teachers (Desire2Learn 2011). 
The basic strategic motivation driving gamification’s designers is to pro-
vide rewards for repetitive tasks at regular and random intervals in order 
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to allow for the perception of constant im-
provement, thus providing an addictive mo-
tivation for gamers to keep playing the game 
(Wills 2009). Essentially, the thinking goes, if 
gamification can provide the right set of data-driven and sensorial stimuli, 
our brains will treat software-based digital representations like a drug, po-
tentially resulting in the Pavlovian responses marketers dream about. The 
potential result of the gamification of everyday life is that, over time, more 
and more daily events and professional activities will develop a sort of vir-
tual “achievement layer” that primarily reflects gamers’ abilities to fulfil their 
desire to click buttons, remain distracted, follow guidelines, achieve top 
scores, and make it to the next level. Indeed, the ideal gamification scenario, 
we might say, would result not so much in gamers playing games as it would 
in gamers being played by their games. It would also result, let’s not forget, 
in digital metadata pertaining to the patterns of everyday life to be uploaded 
and instrumentalised in new and powerful ways, resulting in the creation of 
yet more information-driven markets capable of absorbing the seemingly 
endless flows of liquidity flowing from central bank “printing presses”. 
As I’ve already suggested, given the unrelenting process of gamifying 
everyday life, gamification has its critics. For instance, Ian Bogost, a prom-
inent game-theorist, describes game-based digital strategies – particularly 
those designed to sell merchandise and manipulate customers – as “exploita-
tionware” (Bogost 2011) due to the ways these games prey on affective and 
emotional needs for quantifiable achievement and re-value “play” as a mere 
product promotion strategy. Moreover, Bogost – also an object-oriented on-
tology philosopher (Bogost 2012) – cautions us about the potential for life 
in a future gamocracy to become one in which the relationship between hu-
man, machine, and digital agency becomes increasingly blurred. As he ex-
plains: “When people act because incentives compel them toward particular 
choices, they cannot be said to be making choices at all” (Bogost 2010).
Indeed, it is this “beyond the human”, or posthuman (Barad 2003; 
Braidotti 2013; Hayles 1999), dimension of gamification that is perhaps 
most interesting and will become increasingly worthy of critical examina-
tion, particularly as attempts at algorithmic and digitally modulated control 
intersect with social, legal, moral, and ontological conventions that regard 
the so-called “human” as the locus for agency, decision-making, and desire. 
Will we live in a “gamocracy” 
where we’re 
the ones being played?
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As has already been demonstrated and critiqued, 21st-century digital algo-
rithms and computational capacities are increasingly being used to analyse 
and represent complex streams of what’s known as “big data” in order to 
attempt to pre-emptively modulate, customise, and control the (actual and 
virtual) world before we encounter it (Andrejevic 2011; Best 2010; Bratich 
2006; Crang and Graham 2007; Elmer 2003; Elmer and Opel 2006; Fuchs et 
al. 2012; Lyon 2001; Lyon 2003; Massumi 2007). Gamification, then, has the 
potential to short-circuit or pre-empt our desires by being better and faster 
at being contextually aware of a world increasingly overlayed with – and de-
termined by – the data we generate as we go about our lives (not to mention 
the data that has already been accumulated and mined from the past). That 
is, the persistent extension of gamification and achievement-driven metrics 
of value has the potential to result in a corresponding decrease in the once 
“inherent” value of things like health, education, friendship, and communi-
ty-building insofar as they will become increasingly obscured or replaced 
by quantified metrics and credits such that the act of choosing and making 
everyday decisions is pre-emptively short-circuited or modulated (Deleuze 
1992) by not only extra-subjective motivations, but also by nonhuman algo-
rithms whose secret “understanding” (Tiessen and Seigworth 2012) of de-
sires is perpetually being discerned and translated into computer-readable 
binary code and other virtual quanta (Galloway 2004; Munster 2011).
oveRcoding the out of dooRS: mountain Biking, Road 
cycling, and StRava
At this point, in the spirit of peering into the darker sides of the digital, I 
want to shift gears a bit to focus on some of the very tangible effects of the 
overlaying of gamified logics onto previously non-game contexts, namely 
mountain biking and road cycling. I want to focus on these sporting activi-
ties and some of the ways they intersect with a gamification-facilitating web 
platform named Strava, in order to examine what can happen when digital 
data comes to overcode the immersive continuity of what, in this case, we 
might describe as the thrill-seeking pursuit of flow, adrenalin, speed, and en-
counters with “nature”. Indeed, as an avid mountain biker, the implications 
of the digital overcoding of the woods, mountains, and trails is a topic that 
is of great interest to me.
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As you may know, mountain biking is usually an activity that allows us 
to encounter the beauty of our natural environments while, at the same time, 
seeking out spills, thrills, physical challenges, and – when done with others 
– social camaraderie. This changes on the race course, but this description 
is fairly comprehensive. This bucolic bubble, however, is increasingly being 
burst by the adoption by mountain bikers of mobile GPS units that allow 
them to visually map their ride and digitally data-mine their adventures be-
fore uploading the metadata generated by the ride to websites like Strava.com 
(2009) where this data is pooled with the data – the heart-rates, the dis-
tances, the speeds, the caloric output, the number of rides, times, and biom-
etric data – of other riders. The experience of mountain biking, then, is in-
creasingly being quantified – and overcoded. This quantification, in turn, has 
led to measurement and measurement, in turn, has led to comparison, and 
comparison has led to competition where it didn’t exist before. Competition 
is then catalogued, represented, and shared by Strava, which gives riders the 
ability to transform even solo rides into “social” – as in, social media – expe-
riences. The thing is, though, riders are finding that the virtual and digital 
social spaces created by Strava are feeding back into the analogue spaces 
of the mountain bike trails in not so desirable ways. Indeed, increasingly 
riders are commenting that their rides are becoming less bucolic, less social, 
less sensorially immersive and satisfying as those riders pursuing virtual tro-
phies or seeking to become “KOMs” (Kings of the Mountain on Strava) in 
order to impress their online followers and “friends”, holler at fellow riders to 
“Get outta the way! Strava! Strava!” as they ride past at a pace that turns the 
once immersive and flow-centric experience into nothing but a statistically 
focused blur. As Tom Vanderbilt recently wrote in Outside Magazine, Strava 
has led to the quantified self-equipped cyclist having to ask herself or him-
self: “Is the unexamined ride worth riding?” (Vanderbilt 2013).
According to Strava’s “About” page, the website and gamification plat-
form grew out of the needs of its digitally connected designers to create 
quasi-social athletic experiences in the face of their professional lives which 
were exceedingly busy and usually only allowed for solo cycling excursions. 
They explain: 
We missed the sense of camaraderie and friendly competition that drove 
us to achieve our best through training with others. We envisioned Strava 
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as the means to put our workouts and races into context. We call that  
social fitness. Today, Strava lets athletes all over the world experience so-
cial fitness – sharing, comparing and competing with each other’s personal 
fitness data via mobile and online apps. Currently focused on the needs 
of avid cyclists and runners, Strava lets you track your rides and runs via 
your iPhone, Android or dedicated GPS device to analyze and quantify 
your performance. Strava makes fitness a social experience, providing 
motivation and camaraderie even if you’re exercising alone. (Strava 2013) 
Obviously, the intentions of Strava’s designers are more or less straightfor-
ward and noble ones. But like gamification itself, Strava’s infiltration of cy-
cling’s ranks – not to mention its disturbance of the once less competitive 
and more casual and flow-centric thrill-seeking of mountain biking – has 
been the target of some unsubtle critique by those with a pulpit in the moun-
tain biking world. Author Seb Kemp’s rant from Bike Magazine – an influen-
tial mountain bike publication – sums up the situation without pulling any 
punches. In his view:
The Strava app helps you become more and more of a desperate loser by 
creating an imaginary world where every moment on your bicycle can be 
turned into a race. Not against yourself, but against other people. Other 
imaginary people. Each part of your ride becomes a series of timed sec-
tions where you compete with the virtual world for the title of KOM (King 
Of the Mountain). It is sort of like internet gaming except the people that 
play Strava actually go outside. 
Anyway, Strava has become very popular in a very short amount of time, 
which goes to show that not that many people actually ever enjoyed rid-
ing their bike. Strava gave internet [surfers] a reason to grin and bare the 
drudgery of riding because now they could be in contact with their in-
ternet friends and, better still, compete with them for an imaginary title. 
(Kemp 2012) 
But Strava’s gamified effects on non-digital space and time go beyond its 
ability to transform random stretches of road or trail into time-trail-like 
segments of a quasi-virtual or quasi-actual race course. In fact, Seb Kemp’s 
commentary in Bike Magazine is a response to another story involving, in 
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this case, Strava, virtual competition, and death – what has become known 
as “Stravacide”. The virtual recognition afforded by Strava is a gamified re-
ward in recognition of the speed cyclists can achieve while passing through 
given sections of road and trail. The faster, the better! To paraphrase me-
dia theorist Paul Virilio: “In the world of Strava, speed is power” (Virilio 
2006). Of course, KOM (King of the Mountain) recognition does not only 
go to those with the best climbing speeds, it also gets bestowed upon those 
capable of the quickest descents. For one cyclist – William K. Flint, Jr. – the 
overlay of digital incentives onto his everyday life while out for a ride in the 
hills above Berkeley, California proved fatal (Darlington 2013). Flint, an avid 
Strava user, twitterer, and computer coder, died on a descent after running 
into a car at the intersection of Grizzly Peak Blvd. and South Park Drive. It 
seems Flint’s King of the Mountain time on that stretch had just been beaten 
by some other unnamed and faceless virtual nemesis, and in an attempt to 
reclaim the crown he crashed into a sport utility vehicle driven by a mother 
and her daughter and met his demise (McLaughlin 2012). 
But what’s perhaps most interesting about this tragic situation – this 
tragic conflagration of virtual and actual environments and desires – is what 
happened next: Flint’s parents decided to sue Strava – which they claimed 
had developed a sort of nonhuman agency in excess of that of its user, 
William K. Flint – and was now at fault for “failing to warn cyclists compet-
ing in KOM challenges that the road conditions were not suited for racing” 
and “encouraging dangerous behaviour” (Bicycle Retailer 2012). According 
to Flint’s parents, Strava failed “to host a safe competition” (ibid.). By ex-
tension, the Flints’ legal argument can be seen as representing the nascent 
emergence among an increasingly digitally and algorithmically modulated 
public of what will become a more widespread – and ontologically significant 
(Bennett 2010; Bogost 2012; Pickering 1995) – notion: that when faced with 
the right digital and algorithmic architecture, humans will be unable to resist 
its plans for them. In this case, of course, the plan was to go faster and farther 
at any cost. What this case objectifies and even foreshadows, is that popu-
lar understandings of the lines that distinguish between human agency and 
the “agency” of computer code and digital devices will increasingly become 
blurred and destabilised in the popular imagination in the not too distant fu-
ture, giving rise to ontological and existential questions and complexities that 
will increasingly challenge legal, political, and philosophical paradigms – 
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all thanks to the affectively enticing lure of online achievements and the per-
petual pursuit of virtual supremacy and digitally designed deliverance.
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why fun matteRS: in SeaRch  
of emeRgent Playful exPeRienceS 
by Sonia fizek
gamification afteR BullShit
In his article, which became the cornerstone for vehement critique of gami-
fication, Ian Bogost boldly claims that: 
[. . .] gamification is marketing bullshit, invented by consultants as a means 
to capture the wild, coveted beast that is videogames and to domesticate 
it for use in the grey, hopeless wasteland of big business. (Bogost 2011b)
Indeed, much discussion, especially with marketing background, has been 
focused on taming the beast and closing it within reproducible score-based 
structures. The phenomenon has been scrutinised predominantly from the 
perspective of the mechanical and iterative capacity of gamified systems, 
which rely on the adaptation of game mechanics to daily activities in order 
to influence the individual’s behaviour and drive engagement (Gartner Inc. 
2011; Radoff 2011; Zichermann and Linder 2010 and 2013; Zichermann and 
Cunningham 2011; Tkaczyk 2011). And the latter are believed to be achieved 
by implementing the elements of challenge and competition. These require 
the winning condition, which in most cases translates to a point system 
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Gabe Zichermann is a vehement advocate of. In his Google Tech Talk, 
promoting “Game-based Marketing” (2010), Zichermann mentions the 
gamification loop, a mechanism based on the allocation of points through 
creating challenges, win conditions, leaderboards, badges, and social net-
working, which in turn lead to the achievement of status. Those simple 
game mechanics elements form the essence of gamification also for Gamify, 
a San Francisco based technology company, whose official mission is to 
achieve business goals and influence the customers’ behaviours by means of 
gamified systems implementing levels, badges, quests, rewards and more 
(Gamify 2014).
The rhetoric around gamification seems to be predominantly structured 
around accumulation and pointsification.1 Whereas, as Bogost vehemently 
notices, “games or points isn’t the point” (2011a). He also encourages re-
searchers critical of the marketing usage of gamification, to stop using the 
word entirely and replace it with exploitationware or develop innovative ap-
proaches to the use of games in different contexts (ibid.). Despite those fer-
vent reactions in the academic and game designer communities, neither the 
term nor the gamified “Viagra for engagement dysfunction” (Bogost 2011b) 
have disappeared from the digital horizon. Game designers, gamers, and re-
searchers all seem to have agreed that gamification is bullshit, and yet they 
still keep stumbling upon it. In 2014 the Gamification World Championship 
takes place (Gamify 2014). It is enough to take a look at the event’s partners 
to notice the major worldwide business players, among them Amazon Web 
Services, Deloitte Digital, and Badgeville. Numerous marketing prognoses 
still portray a bright and profitable future covered with billions of dollars 
(Corry 2011, Gartner Inc. 2011). However, if gamification refuses to com-
plement its hype factor with more than easily predictable repetitive reward 
structures, it may as well considerably slow down or even “[. . .] fail to de-
liver” (Fleming 2012). 
The question remains: What will the post-bullshit era of gamification 
concentrate on once a simple replication of points and badges loses its initial 
impact? The answer may be found in Gamify’s CEO and Co-founder’s re-
1 “Gamification is the wrong word for the right idea. The word for what’s happening at the 
moment is pointsification” (Robertson 2010).
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sponse post to Bogost’s “Gamification is bullshit” (2011b). Nathan Lands, 
whose company’s official slogans still promise its customers effective point-
based solutions to engagement, when confronted with harsh criticism, puts 
a more friendly face to the profit-driven marketing machine. He might not 
have realised what a simple and powerful message was delivered when he 
emphasised the importance of playfulness and fun, defining gamification as 
“re-imagining experiences with fun in mind” and “an amazing opportunity 
to experiment with creating a more fun world” (ibid.).2    
It seems that the most powerful driver for player’s engagement is not 
based on quantification methods artificially imposed onto every possible 
context, but indeed on fun. And fun, as Sebastian Deterding notices, is nei-
ther about extrinsic motivation powered by rewards nor about adding game 
features to random products (2012). If the recipe towards meaningful en-
gagement is contained within three simple letters, why is it so difficult to 
successfully implement it and why does it seem so scarce in existing gam-
ified practices? In order to address this question, I propose to embrace the 
seemingly ungraspable concept of fun through the lens of emergent playful-
ness, which may guide researchers and practitioners in explaining the fun-
driven mechanism of successfully gamified activities. The concept describes 
the experience of fun as an activity deriving from gameplay and allowed by 
a system “[. . .] flexible enough for players to inhabit and explore through 
meaningful play” (Salen and Zimmerman 2004, 165).
Playful veRSuS PlayaBle
It is not an easy task to define the ephemeral concept of fun, even when nar-
rowing it down to the medium of games. Taking into consideration all the 
varied video game genres and player typologies (Bartle 1996, Yee 2004), it 
becomes even more challenging. Jesper Juul voices his concerns about delin-
eating the enjoyable ingredients of games by emphasising that:  
 
[. . .] there is ultimately no one-sentence description of what makes all 
games fun; different games emphasize different types of enjoyment and 
2 Land’s reply may be found under Bogost’s blog entry: http://www.bogost.com/blog/gami-
fication_is_bullshit.shtml (accessed May 6, 2014).
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different players may even enjoy the same game for entirely different  
reasons. (Juul 2005, 19)
Despite the complexity of the phenomenon and the multitude of game gen-
res, most gamified applications seem to be relying on a simple point-based 
structure, which is believed to provide enjoyment in all possible contexts. 
To gamification evangelists such as Zichermann the formula is simple: “If 
air-trafficking can be fun, anything can be fun” (Zichermann 2010). He 
transferred this rule to Livecube, one of the latest gamified inventions by 
Dopamine, a creative agency co-founded by himself. Livecube is a gamified 
environment, the aim of which is to trigger maximum audience engagement 
during a live event. This may be achieved by incorporating game mechanics 
and linking it with a social interaction tool. As the creators emphasise, “we 
use the latest engagement technology to motivate the audience with points, 
badges and real-world rewards” (Livecube 2014). Yet again, the proposed 
tool reveals Zichermann’s grammar of a successfully gamified experience, 
based on the point system, which ultimately leads to the achievement of sta-
tus. And status, according to another gamification leader, is everything. Sim-
ilarly to Dopamine’s solutions, Badgeville has developed its Behavior Plat-
form (2014), on an intricate scoring system. The cloud-based tool may be 
adapted to the brand’s digital ecosystem and performs four basic functions: 
it rewards the users, elevates their status, provides social proof, and analyses 
the brand’s success. The platform’s creators emphasise its innovativeness in 
comparison to other score-based systems by assuring they are “[. . .] leaving 
rudimentary point, badge and leaderboard systems in the dust” (Badgeville 
2014). However, the only new approach they seem to be adding to an already 
proven model is a personalised point distribution system they wittingly and 
enigmatically refer to as contextual game mechanics. 
The above examples very accurate illustrate what Robertson refers to as 
pointsification (2010) and Bogost as exploitationware (2011a). They seem 
to derive from a formal notion of what constitutes games and playing, con-
centrating on reapplying proven game mechanics to different scenarios. The 
design of the gamified experiences certainly makes them playable. But are 
they playful? Playfulness, after all, is a much more complex and volatile state 
and may not be easily transplanted by predictable iterative structures.  
see also 
Schrape
p.24–25
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In order to pin down this slippery phenomenon, I will turn to Eric 
Zimmerman’s gaming literacy, which explains “how playing, understanding, 
and designing games all embody crucial ways of looking at and being in the 
world” (Zimmerman 2009, 30). His research contributes to my understand-
ing of emergent playfulness, a concept developed in a later section of this 
article and attempting to shed more light into what makes games fun.
gaming liteRacy
According to Zimmerman literacy has been formulated as “[. . .] the ability to 
understand, exchange, and create meaning through text, speech, and other 
forms of language” (2009, 23). However, as he emphasises, diverse forms 
of media, including images, films, music, and television among others, re-
quire a new set of competences in order for them to be produced and un-
derstood. The situation becomes even more complex when we think about 
games (including video or electronic games), constituting elaborate systems, 
which may include all the above phenomena. Games in all their shapes have 
already left the safe confinement of the magic circle and no longer seem 
to stand outside ordinary life or within the boundaries of time and space. 
They are now, more than ever before, used in a myriad of contexts (learning, 
medicine, marketing) and have become the tools for creating meaning out-
side of their self-contained systems. According to Zimmerman, an impor-
tant question to ask in the light of the current status of games is not “What 
does gaming look like? but instead: What does the world look like from the 
point of view of gaming?” (ibid., 24). And the latter question seems to be 
partially answered by the current examples of gamified every day practices, 
such as participating in events (Livecube, 2014), prioritising e-mails (At-
tent, 2014), reading books (ReadSocial App, 2014), or even brushing teeth 
(Kolibree, 2014). All the above examples seem to be turning daily activities 
into games. However, experiencing the world via gaming is not only about 
upward movement, rewards, scoring, ranks, and the achievement of status 
displayed in corresponding social platforms. The process of “[. . .] assigning 
a new game-like character to people’s daily rhythm” (Dragona 2013, 1) does 
not have to be defined solely by points and rewards. It may be a little bit more 
fun to play with. 
Interestingly, when referring to the playful world in which “the way 
we live and learn, work and relax, communicate and create, will more and 
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more resemble how we play games”, Zimmerman does not even mention the 
term gamification (Zimmerman 2009, 30). Whether he did it consciously, or 
whether the term was not yet such a popular buzzword at the time of shap-
ing the concept, the phenomenon he describes to a certain degree seems to 
be illustrated by gamified practices. But only partially. Gaming literacy ex-
plains those practices and creates a meaningful framework, which surpasses 
the point-based structure and focuses equally on the importance of play and 
meaningful contextual design. 
The concept involves three interweaving phenomena – systems, play 
and design – which demand a new set of cognitive, creative, and social skills 
from the participants (ibid., 25). Being systems literate is the ability to un-
derstand the world in terms of dynamic structures formed out of changing 
elements. This way of understanding cultural texts in their broad sense, is 
very much useful with reference to games, which are systemic constructs 
based on sets of rules. When those very same rules are put into action and 
interacted with, the concept of play emerges. As Zimmerman emphasises, 
“[j]ust as games are more than their structures of rules, gaming literacy is 
more than the concept of systems. It is also play.” (ibid., 26). Rules are fixed 
and rational, whereas the activity of play may be subversive and improvi-
sational. Play may be understood as a “free movement within a more rigid 
structure” (Salen and Zimmerman 2004, 304) or it may as well refer to play 
within or with that very same structure. Zimmerman supports this obser-
vation with the examples of players modding games, engaging in playful 
discourse between games, and developing whole cultures around certain 
game titles (2009, 27).3 Systems are crucial for the proper understanding of 
gamified practices, but without the play component, they do not make much 
sense. As Zimmerman rightfully notices, systemic literacy centres on games 
whereas playful literacy shifts the focus towards the very action of playing 
and players who are at its core. It diverges from structures of rules towards 
structures of human interaction (ibid.). The third component focuses on 
creating meaning through game design. It differs from system design in that 
it refers to a particular social and cultural context. Not only is it based on 
3 Such creative practices and shadow economy surrounding games have been extensively 
discussed by James Newman in Playing with Videogames (2008).
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logic and rules, more importantly it demands the understanding of culture 
and entertainment environment in general.  
towaRdS emeRgent PlayfulneSS
Being game literate equals being playful, which translates into “[. . .] a ludic 
attitude that sees the world’s structures as opportunities for playful engage-
ment” (Zimmerman 2009, 27). In accordance with Zimmerman’s concept, 
in order for engagement to appear, one needs not only a system of rules, but 
also human interaction with it and culturally significant design. Playfulness 
then does not reside solely within the systemic infrastructure of games, but 
seems to be a quality deriving from the very interaction with the system. 
Following this observation, I propose the following definition of fun with 
reference to games: an enjoyable emotional reaction deriving from the ca-
pacity to engage in playful behaviour, which emerges out of the interaction 
with the game. This may be achieved in numerous ways, for instance condi-
tioned by the implemented rules, and/or as a result of autonomous player’s 
actions not directly predicted by the system.4 In the case of the first scenario, 
the player’s satisfaction is achieved only through the actions performed in 
accordance with the strict and fixed rules of a given ludic system. The latter 
one points towards all the unexpected activities that happen in and around 
the game, creative interpretation of rules, modding, shadow economy (New-
man 2008), or to go back to Zimmerman’s concept, play within and play with 
the game (Zimmerman 2009). It is this second component, which is not as 
easily replicable as the intended interaction with the system itself. Fun, de-
fined in this way, seems to be relying on play as “[. . .] a voluntary activity” 
(Huizinga 1950/1938, 7), providing the player with a certain amount of au-
tonomy (Deterding 2012), which in turn creates space for playful behaviour. 
This free movement within a given structure ultimately leads to what I refer 
to as emergent playfulness.
4 For Raph Koster, for instance, fun emerges as a result of the mental mastery of a task, and 
is specifically related to the learning scenario (Koster 2005, 2012). He supports his claim 
with Chris Crawford’s remark on fun as “[. . .] the emotional response to learning” (in 
Koster 2005, 228).
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The concept bears noticeable terminological affinity to emergent game-
play, which describes a basic game structure combining simple rules to pro-
duce large numbers of variations (Juul 2002 and 2005). Emergence as such 
may also indicate a general term for player behaviours that have not been 
predicted by game designers (Smith 2001). It is a phenomenon arising “[. . .] 
out of complexity [and . . .] unplanned patterns appearing from within a 
system” (Salen and Zimmerman 2004, 152). Juul juxtaposes games of emer-
gence to games of progression (2005, 67). To him, both present the players 
with different types of challenges. In the first case, the challenge is set up 
by means of interacting rules. The latter one requires each challenge to be 
presented consecutively, as it is done in classic adventure games. It is also 
important to emphasise that “many games can be found on a scale between 
emergence and progression” (ibid., 71). Emergent playfulness draws from 
the above understandings of emergence, and links them with the idea of 
fun as a process originating from the more open design allowing for some 
level of improvisation on the part of the player. 
The improvisational quality of play, as demon-
strated in the previous paragraph, is also a cru-
cial component in Zimmerman’s gaming literacy. 
However, it should be noticed here that emergent playfulness, unlike 
emergent gameplay, is not understood in a strictly design-focused way and 
does not have to refer to a gameplay style or to a structural way of providing 
challenges. It designates a joyful activity, which is the result of meaningful 
gameplay. Just as Zimmerman shifts his focus from systemic literacy occu-
pied with game structures to playful literacy referring to playing, I propose 
to look at playfulness as a quality emerging from play rather than a frame-
work describing a certain design schema. In the case of emergent playfulness 
the space of possibility (Salen and Zimmerman 2004, 165) or landscape of 
possibilities (Juul 2005, 73), do not have to be exclusively tied to the patterns 
of emergence. The rewarding experience may result from the enjoyment of 
rules (emergence) or fictional worlds and storylines (progression) or both 
(emergence with progression components or progression with emergence 
components), but more importantly it does not have to be tied to strictly 
defined design frameworks. The concept detaches the notion of fun from a 
systemic understanding and elevates it to a more general quality expressed 
by gaming literacy.  
How will gamification look 
like in the post-bullshit era?
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The above reasoning may help us understand why such applications as 
the previously mentioned Attent and Kolibree do not translate the world’s 
structures into playful interactions but more so into well thought through 
fixed game structures. Let us have a closer look at the two examples and their 
mechanics keeping emergent playfulness and gaming literacy as reference 
points. 
Attent is a simple tool, the purpose of which is to develop more cautious 
behavioural patterns of e-mail distribution. The main function of the appli-
cation is to facilitate the prioritisation of sent messages. This simple quanti-
fication mechanism is based on the Serios currency, which enables the users 
to attach value to distributed information. The allocation process needs to be 
considerate as the number of points is finite. The systemic solution offered 
by Seriosity may greatly influence communication efficiency within a cor-
poration. However, its relation to games seems far-fetched and disguises a 
marketing strategy to increase product sales. The company claims that their 
currency solutions are inspired by multiplayer online games. This simple 
currency exchange rule, however, does not turn reading e-mails into a game 
or an inherently playful experience.  
Zicherman claims to be able to change the behaviour and motivational 
patterns by gamification loop where the point system consists of six ele-
ments: challenges, win conditions, leaderboards, badges, social networks, 
and status. The creators of Attent selected points as the only means of game-
ness, resigning from leader boards, badges, status, or win conditions. And 
such a simplified solution may be a perfect choice to deal with information 
overload. It should be, however, taken for what it really is, a well-designed 
pointsification system, not a game, and certainly not one allowing for emer-
gent playfulness. Juxtaposing Attent with the three concepts forming gam-
ing literacy (see figure 1), further exposes its simplicity.  
The core of Attent is its currency allocation system, which constitutes 
a simple structure devoid of the mechanism that would further contextu-
alise the activity. There seem to be no apparent challenges, winning con-
ditions, or rewards. The closed design of the system does not allow for any 
improvisation. Furthermore, the action of e-mail prioritisation has not been 
embedded in any storyline scenario. Lack of those elements makes play-
fulness difficult to achieve, if not impossible. The user neither plays within 
nor with the system, but rather interacts with a familiar interface structure, 
see also 
Razcowski
p. 154–155
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attaching points to the outgoing messages. Attent does not provide any win 
conditions and rewards for the challenge of witty point management. The 
user may of course try to create a meaningful game-like scenario for the 
application and in that sense play with the lack of imagination on the part 
of its designers. The main goal may be the attempt to win the attention of 
the receiver by allocating the right number of points. Such a perspective still 
does not turn Attent into a game, but rather creates potential for a non-ex-
istent meaningful ludic scenario. 
The gameness of Seriosity’s first gamified application may be question-
able. However, the company’s aspirations to design their products as ludic 
experiences have been articulated in black and white. In their blog post de-
voted to games and work, Seriosity refers to Byron Reeves, a professor at the 
Department of Communication at Stanford University, who emphasises that 
highly engaging features of games may become ingredients, recombined in 
different scenarios to make them more game-like (Reeves 2011). As one of 
the participants at the Business Innovation Factory-7 Summit, Reeves was 
wondering how to combine gaming with work, so that a boring interface 
incites a similar level of excitement to a World of Warcraft (2004) session. 
Maybe, if the creators of Attent turned directors or managers into guild mas-
ters, and applied reward conditions for or a possibility to trade Serios among 
the employees, they could be successful in creating a game-like experience. 
However, a simple point distribution system does not turn e-mail boxes into 
a World of Warcraft gameworld.
Points are not inherently bad, but gamified practices devoid of emergent 
playfulness and meaningful design in favour of raw pointsification systems, 
may seem futile and a little less, if at all, fun to play with. In order for play 
Figure 1: Gaming Literacy and Its Components (based on Zimmerman 2009)
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to take place, a certain level of improvisation is needed (Zimmerman 2009, 
26). Let us see whether Kolibree, a gamified teeth-brushing experience, fos-
ters emergent playfulness and enables the shift from systemic interaction 
towards player-centred involvement and meaningful design. Kolibree is a 
new product by a French start-up, which is launching its Kickstarter cam-
paign in the summer of 2014. If successful, it will be one of the first attempts 
to deliver a smart toothbrush with an integrated gamified smartphone ap-
plication. The device and the corresponding software will track long-term 
progress and analyse brushing habits, moves, and frequency. The results 
will be displayed on scoring scales and assigned to a personalised account, 
which may incorporate up to five users / players. The brushing progress will 
be rewarded with points where each score corresponds to a certain brushing 
accomplishment. The scores will ultimately be translated into rewards and 
badges, and the overall performance will be shared via social networks. 
If we removed the name of the product from the above description, it 
could certainly refer to most gamified applications available on the market. 
Similar to Attent, Kolibree operates on the systemic level. The interaction 
with the device incorporates progress measurement and score-based reward 
system, which ultimately may lead to the achievement of status in social net-
works. This rule-driven design seems to correspond very accurately with 
Zicherman’s gamification loop (challenges, win conditions, leaderboards, 
badges, social networks, status). However, when juxtaposed with the three 
concepts underlying gaming literacy, Kolibree fails to integrate the aspects of 
playfulness and meaningful design. Again, the constrained rule-based struc-
ture does not create space for improvisation. The big question remains. How 
to go beyond points and purely systemic features of games, and move the 
experience onto the remaining two levels of gaming literacy that might lead 
to emergent playfulness? 
The Brusheads (2014) concept proposed by PA Consulting seems to 
be addressing the above concern. Most importantly, the game-like proper-
ties of Brusheads start at the level of its design. The prototype comes in five 
different versions, modelled as cartoon characters. As Ahmad Bitar, PA ex-
pert in product design, explains, children identify with their character and 
the personified toothbrush influences their behaviour in playful ways. The 
toy toothbrush has a built-in microphone, so if the child does not complete 
a two-minute brushing cycle, a pre-recorded voice of the character could 
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encourage them to finish the otherwise mundane task. The characters may 
be further brought to life in a corresponding smartphone or computer ap-
plication, which enables the competition between friends. Each account is 
assigned to a selected toothbrush character. On the level of the system, PA 
Consulting’s gamified application does not seem to differ from the previ-
ous example. However, by placing the activity of brushing teeth in a wider 
context, building storyline and fostering emotional attachment to charac-
ters, the Brusheads concept creates ample space for playful behaviours, also 
literally outside of the provided structure. For instance, the design of the 
toothbrush makes it possible for the child to take it outside of the bathroom 
scenario. The brush is encapsulated in a handy portable structure resem-
bling a marker pen, and has a suction cup underneath, so it may be applied 
to different surfaces.  
The Brusheads case emphasises the fact that a game design process in-
volves not only a formal rule-based system, it should also incorporate play-
ful experience set in a socio-cultural context. I would like to conclude this 
section with the definition of a meaningful game design as understood by 
Zimmerman:
Game design involves math and logic, aesthetics and storytelling, writing 
and communication, visual and audio design, human psychology and be-
havior, and understanding culture through art, entertainment, and popu-
lar media. (Zimmerman 2009, 29)
After all, design is a holistic process and only when it is kept as such, emer-
gent playfulness has the chance to develop. Reapplying a uniform well-tai-
lored point system to all possible contexts does not create enough space for 
fun to arise.
concluSionS: fun iS the futuRe 
The broad importance of playfulness as a socio-cultural concept was raised 
as early as in 1938 by Johan Huizinga (Homo Ludens). However, as this article 
demonstrates, almost a century later it continues to be a highly disputed topic 
in game studies. Fun, although originally deriving from the ludic system, 
remains an aspect of play, which is not easily encapsulated within and repli-
cated by rigid structures. Additionally, various genres of gamified practices 
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may implement different strategies leading to emergent playfulness. Thanks 
to Zimmerman’s understanding of what any game should comprise of, this 
ephemeral quality becomes translatable to practical design hints, which take 
into consideration the complexity of ludic entertainment. In order to make 
more engaging gamified experiences, it is crucial to understand the phe-
nomenon of game-related fun not only as a quality deriving from their sys-
temic nature, but equally importantly from the playful engagement with that 
very system. If fun is the future as Gabe Zichermann assures us (2010), it 
should become apparent that successful and fun-driven gamification can no 
longer be the result of a simple replication of the standard point-based struc-
ture in accordance with the one-size-fits-all rule. Weather it is described as 
a voluntary activity (Huizinga 1950 / 1938, 7), an autonomous experience 
(Deterding 2012) stemming from games of emergence (Juul 2002 and 2005), 
play with or within the system (Zimmerman 2009), or emergent playfulness, 
fun is a quality which should inform the post-bullshit era of gamification 
and pave the way towards more meaningful and enjoyable design. The path 
may be a little more serpentine than the marketing gamification gurus ex-
pect. After all, drafting emergent playfulness requires a mind-set of an artist, 
not necessarily that of a craftsman. 
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exPloRing the endgame  
of gamification
by Scott nicholson
Gamification is the application of gameful or playful layers to motivate 
involvement within a specific context. Most current applications of gam-
ification focus on offering points and rewards to motivate users. This re-
ward-based gamification takes only a small part of gaming – a scoring sys-
tem – and uses it to create the same type of loyalty system that has been in 
existence for decades.
These systems are designed around the concept of a core currency, 
such as a “point”. The name of this currency may be different. It may be 
gold or experience or happiness, but for purposes of simplification in this 
article, the word point will be used to represent the basic unit of exchange 
that players earn for taking on certain behaviours. The underlying concept 
of reward-based gamification is simple – offer points to manipulate players.
conSideRing the Point
Motivating players through points is no different than motivating people 
through other forms of incentives like money or grades; people are used 
to doing things for a reward. Using a virtual reward like points is less ex-
pensive than using a tangible reward, and can, at least in the short term, 
have the same effect. Many citizen science projects, where researchers use 
game mechanisms to allow players to perform a task that moves a large-scale 
research project forward, are thin veneers of narrative, points, and other 
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virtual rewards used to motivate people to do work that is traditionally done 
by students in a lab for a stipend or extra credit.
From a game design perspective, points are used to manipulate the 
actions of a player. Players are offered points or other in-game awards for 
taking certain actions and receive punishments (which, according to Kohn 
[1999, 50], are the same as rewards) for taking other actions. Video game 
design used to be about taking “lives” from the player as a punishment, but 
now many games just take time from the player’s real life as the player has to 
repeat a section of the game. Few gamification systems employ the punish-
ment aspects of game design, and focus mainly on the reward. 
Since gamification is based upon game design elements, the concept of 
points being used to control behaviour is not surprising. But what are points 
used for? In many loyalty programs, points are good for tangible rewards, but 
to avoid giving out tangible rewards, gamification designers focus more on 
virtual rewards. The mechanics of massively multiplayer online roleplaying 
games (MMORPGs) have served as an inspiration for many reward-based 
gamification systems.
the gRind of mmoRPgS
Many MMORPGs follow a uniform pattern of rewarding and motivating 
players:
•	 Experience Points – Players earn points for taking on challenges in a 
game. In many MMORPGs, the highest number of points per hour of 
play are awarded through combat, and more difficult combats award 
more points. Some games award experience points for exploration, for 
using craft skills to create new objects, or for helping others. More re-
cently developed games better balance experience points for these dif-
ferent types of activities so that players can do what they find most en-
joyable and meaningful. 
•	 Levels – As players reach a certain number of experience points, they 
go up to a new level. New levels provide players with additional skills 
and higher status in the game. The level structure is designed so that, as 
players advance, it takes progressively more points to move from level 
to level. Players must then take on more difficult challenges and play 
for longer periods of time before reaching a new level. This system is 
designed to get players addicted to the excitement of achievement early 
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by providing them with new abilities frequently. Then, as the player ad-
vances, it becomes increasingly harder to reach additional levels.
•	 Items – Another form of rewards in MMORPGs is item distribution. By 
defeating enemies, players can gain items and earn in-game currency 
that can be used to purchase more powerful items that make their char-
acter stronger so that they can take on more difficult challenges. The 
games are designed around a player having an appropriate number of 
these items for his or her level in order to defeat monsters.
This combination of points, levels, challenges, and items creates a style of 
play that is known as “grinding”. In most MMORPGs, a monster reappears 
a short time after it is defeated. In addition, in-game locations are designed 
with a certain level in mind, so that players do not run into challenges that 
are too easy, and therefore reward few experience points, or challenges that 
are far too hard. Players remain in one area of the virtual world until they 
finish the storyline in that area through quests. They might also find out that 
fighting monsters offers little reward and then move on to a new location. 
Since the monsters continually re-appear on the map, the player can grind 
simply by hunting and killing the same monster types again and again until 
he or she has gained enough experience to move on.
As the player progresses from level to level, grinding becomes more 
time-consuming and tedious, as each level requires more points to achieve 
than the previous level. Sometimes monsters will randomly drop a specific 
item that a player wants, so the player must repeatedly hunt and kill the 
same monster type (frequently while other players are doing the same thing) 
with the hope of finding that rare item. What keeps the players going is the 
promise of new abilities, continuing the storyline, and new areas to explore. 
This grinding process is shown in figure 1.
In recent years, MMORPGs have added achievements and badges to 
their offerings of virtual rewards. Achievements are specific tasks that may 
or may not also give the player other rewards in the game. Badges are public 
displays of accomplishments. Sometimes to earn an achievement or a badge, 
the player has to go against the normal paths to get points, which creates 
new experiences for the player.
This system came into existence because many MMORPGs charge a 
monthly fee. Because of this, the designers of these games need to develop a 
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game system that encourages players to continue playing (and subscribing) 
without a “game over” feature. Traditional digital role-playing games have 
a similar structure where players move from one location to another, but 
these journeys are designed with a finish line in mind as soon as the nar-
rative comes to an end. With the MMORPG structure, the game company 
needs the players to continue paying each month even after players have 
finished the main storyline. While players are interacting with the current 
game world, the designers are creating additional content to keep them en-
gaged. As a result, players will engage with an MMORPG game for years and 
years, long after other standalone digital games they purchased at the same 
time have been retired to the shelf.
the gRind of gamification
Many gamification systems have been developed around traditional 
MMORPG concepts, so much so that I coined the term BLAP for re-
ward-based gamification focused on badges, levels and leaderboards, 
achievements, and points (Nicholson 2012a). Users perform actions deter-
mined by the designer to earn points and badges. These may be used to rank 
players on a leaderboard and may also be converted to levels. Achievements 
Figure 1: The Grind in a Traditional MMORPG
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encourage the player to explore the game in different ways. Badges are used 
as public indicators of accomplishments. This is shown in figure 2.
 But what about the new powers and skills granted by an MMORPG? 
In theory, this is where the real-world setting for gamification comes into 
play. The user makes purchases, does chores, gains knowledge, or does what-
ever activity is worth points in the system, and in doing so, changes himself 
or herself or the world in some way. The gamification system can help the 
player realise when he or she has levelled up in life by acknowledging when 
a new skill has been mastered. This concept of mastery is one of the three key 
elements of self-determination theory, which is a theory that explains how 
people develop a positive self-image (Deci and Ryan 2004). 
There is an element of the MMORPG model that is missing in many 
gamification structures: the concept of moving to a new area. Without this 
element, players grow weary of a grind with no end in sight. Some gamifi-
cation systems create new areas by providing different types of content. For 
example, Codecademy (2014) is a gamified system where users can learn 
how to program. After users grind in one area, they can move into a dif-
ferent area and learn more complex tasks. Foldit (2008) is a citizen science 
project where users first explore puzzles and end up developing new protein 
Figure 2: The Grind in a Gamification System
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sequences to meet specific needs; the best sequences are synthesised, which 
is said to have led to real-world advances in scientific research (Burke 2012). 
Sometimes, reward systems can be appropriate. If the system is de-
signed to bring about a short-term goal, such as marketing an event, then 
rewards can be a simple way to do this. Even with a marketing goal, however, 
focusing on building longer-term loyalty for engagement with an organisa-
tion can be more beneficial in the long term than continually bribing par-
ticipants with rewards. Pink (2011) argues that rewards raise performance 
if the task requires no creativity or personal engagement. Some successful 
reward-based gamification systems are developed as short-term systems to 
teach a specific skill where the utility of being able to use that skill is greater 
than the value of waiting to be rewarded to use the skill. However, if the 
goal of the gamification involves a long-term change or work that involves 
creativity, a basic reward-based system can fail to keep users engaged (ibid.). 
There are several problems with using a basic reward-based system for 
long-term change. Once a user becomes accustomed to receiving a reward 
for an activity, the intrinsic motivation to perform that activity is replaced 
with extrinsic motivation. This means that the gamification system will have 
to run forever to keep the user engaged (Zichermann and Cunningham 
2011). In addition, users will grow weary of one reward level and will expect 
the reward to change or increase over time to keep their interest. If the goal is 
to move users into the real-world setting without a continued reliance on the 
gamification system, then something has to be changed from the traditional 
BLAP-based system to engage users in a different way. 
the endgame of mmoRPgS
There is a point in MMORPGs where a player reaches the end of the grind. 
This usually happens when he or she has reached the highest level that the 
game designers have planned for. The player can continue to fight monsters 
and take on quests, but the experience points gained are now meaningless. 
This creates a design challenge – how does a designer keep players interested 
when the grind that they have been engaged with for months or years has 
come to an end? This concept is known as the “endgame” and represents a 
different way that the player now engages with the game.
In some ways, this can be quite the existential challenge for a player. 
He or she has come to the game every day to earn more points and levels 
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in order to defeat bigger monsters so that they can earn more points and 
levels. Then, with a final flash of light and “level up” message, the player’s pri-
mary way of tracking accomplishments is over. Some want to settle back into 
the comfort of the grind and start a new character. Many MMORPGS have 
different races, factions, and character classes, each with different stories to 
explore. In these cases, this becomes a valid path of exploration. Many of the 
games allow players to pass money, items, or other benefits on to their new 
characters to reduce the typical penny-pinching grind found in the early 
stages of many MMORPGS.
Another way the games continue to engage players is by replacing one 
grind for another. In World of Warcraft (2004), for example, once players hit 
the level cap, they begin to focus their grind for specific items. These items 
may complement their play-style or may be upgrades to things they already 
have. Many of these rare items will be dropped at random from a specific 
monster, so some players will then fight the same monster again and again 
until they get the item. There are activities that can be done once per day 
that give awards of various currency, so players at their level cap will find the 
game can become one of doing the same set of things every day in order to 
build up their character.
There are two main reasons players want to build up their characters: 
to engage in battles with other players or to engage in the most challenging 
endgame content. Many MMORPGs encourage players to battle with others 
during the grind to level cap, and some of them will allow players to raise in 
levels just as effectively through player vs. player activities as they do if they 
engage with the main storyline of the game. But once players reach the top 
level, they must then get more powerful items if they wish to be competitive 
with other players at the highest level in the game.
Another method for keeping players engaged after they reach the high-
est level in the game is to provide them with content designed specifically 
for them, which is known as endgame content. This content is designed 
for small or large groups of players to work together in order to overcome 
significant challenges. In many cases, these challenges introduce new types 
of obstacles and risks that the players did not face during the grind to the 
level cap. For example, in World of Warcraft, some of the original endgame 
content had teams running from place to place to avoid ground-based ob-
stacles while fighting a large boss. As the designers increased the level cap, 
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this old content originally designed for the endgame became part of what 
players could do while levelling up, and so the challenge of ground-bases 
obstacles became more commonplace. Designers then had to come up with 
more complex endgame challenges to go up against higher level characters. 
This cycle has resulted in extremely complex team-based challenges requir-
ing players to study video strategy guides and spend hours to prepare for a 
short, but intense, combat. This also has resulted in a much tighter commu-
nity-based structure, as players come together from different guilds to share 
strategies on how to defeat these challenges.
Many players participate in all of these endgame activities: player vs. 
player, team-based challenges, and grinding through the levels as they move 
toward the endgame. Well designed MMORPGs provide them with a mul-
titude of choices to play the game, and then funnel players together for a 
shared endgame experience. Poorly designed MMORPGs do not have dif-
ferent storylines or well developed endgame content and end up losing play-
ers once they work through the storyline, as there is nothing left to challenge 
them in the game world.
One important aspect of MMORPGs that keeps players in the game 
is something that designers cannot control: the social aspect. Some players 
engage in MMORPGs with current friends or acquaintances from a previous 
stage in their lives. The game can serve as an activity that people share with 
friends from around the globe or across the street. In this way, playing with 
others turns it into a chat room built around a shared activity. Another social 
aspect is engaging with online friends. Many MMORPGs use the concept of 
guilds that provide the players with an opportunity to meet a specific group 
of other players. The guilds may schedule activities and expect players to 
perform a specific role when working together to take on challenges in the 
game. People who are part of the same guild can become friends after taking 
on challenge after challenge together.
In this way, the MMORPG constitutes a community of practice, which 
may be defined as a “group of people who share a concern or passion for 
something they do and learn how to do it better as they interact regularly” 
(Wenger-Trayner 2006, 1). By their design, MMORPGs are cloaked in mys-
tery. Many aspects of the game are not explained through rules. Instead, 
the players must work together to figure out the different subsystems in 
the game, and communicate through chat within the game and on external 
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forums attempting to figure out how the game works. Guilds form sub-com-
munities who come together to share resources, plan ahead of time, and 
meet at a specific time to attempt to complete the game’s challenging end-
game content. A player who is immersed in an MMORPG community is 
more likely to return and engage with others than a player who is working 
through the game by himself or herself. 
Each MMORPG is working to create alternatives to the grind and end-
game model. EVE Online (2003) does not use levels; but rather is based 
upon skill development, so players can always continue to work to develop 
their character. Guild Wars 2 (2012) provides a continuing chain of special 
events, and allows players to join any group working on an event, so players 
can always be involved in something different instead of repeating the same 
task. Tabletop RPGs do not have grinding issues because a game master’s 
task is keeping the adventure new for each play session. This concept is chal-
lenging for a game with millions of players, but will serve to provide players 
with an alternative to grinding.  
the endgame of gamification
What is the endgame of gamification? The endgame of an MMORPG occurs 
when the user is no longer involved with the grind, and, instead, moves into 
other ways to engage with the game. If the goal of gamification is to engage a 
user in a non-game setting, then the endgame of gamification is the process 
by which the user is moved from the gamification reward-based grind into 
the non-game setting. This matters most when the gamification is focused 
on long-term change, such as losing weight, exercising, making better fi-
nancial choices, or brand loyalty. Without a planned endgame, the users are 
trapped within an ongoing grind that requires a continual outlay of rewards 
(Zichermann and Cunningnahm 2011).
Looking at different alternatives to the grind in MMORPGs can provide 
gamification designers with different paths to keep users engaged with their 
gamification system. Before players tire of earning the basic points in the 
gamification system, designers need to provide players with other ways to 
engage with the real-world setting. For a robust gamification system, the 
designers should provide players with a wide variety of activities to choose 
from instead of creating linear paths to follow (Nicholson 2012a).
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The different design concepts used by MMORPGs for endgame content 
are useful in thinking about different ways of creating post-reward gami-
fication activities that can move people from the reward-based grind into 
deeper engagement with the real world. 
Creating a Different Grind – The easiest way to move players out of one 
grind is to give them another grind. This starts the cycle again and can keep 
people engaged for a longer period of time, but the same problem will come 
up once they reach the end of or tire of the new grind. Theoretically, once 
the user has worked through the first grind, they have some knowledge and 
expertise that can be tapped in order to make the next grind more trans-
parent in connecting it with the real-world situation. The user may be more 
ready to take on information and grind more directly toward the real-world 
benefit than they were at the beginning. In addition, as the user understands 
more about the real-world setting, he or she can be given more meaningful 
choices about the goals of the new grind.
Nike+ (2006) uses this model. When users start, they are just collecting 
points as they do activities. As they get into the gamification system, they are 
given a chance to set their own fitness goals and grind toward those goals. 
The overall points are still being counted in the background, but they are less 
important than the goals that the user sets for himself or herself.
One way to do this is to value new experiences and activities. Many 
gamification systems have a single system, so that players who are expe-
rienced are seeing the same challenges as they saw when they started. To 
add variety, designers can develop different types of challenges and create 
mini-grinds around each challenge. The users will be more likely to stay 
engaged because of the novelty effect. SuperBetter (2012) does this by pre-
senting a continuous stream of new challenges and ties in the information 
about why these challenges matter. By creating moments of information and 
reflection, designers can raise the chance for players to find their own con-
nection to the real world context.
Creating Larger Challenges – Another approach to creating the gamifi-
cation endgame is to present users with larger-scale challenges. Players will 
either need to tap significant expertise or work with others to accomplish 
these difficult goals. If these large-scale challenges are more directly tied into 
the needs of the real world, then this can serve as a segue to move players 
from a focus on the gamification system to a focus on the real world.  
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The aforementioned Foldit does exactly this. Users grind through chal-
lenges and puzzles in a game-like setting, but as they do so, they are gaining 
the knowledge and expertise needed to then engage with real research prob-
lems with unknown answers. The result is that the researchers have training 
and motivated research partners who are engaged in real-world problem 
solving.
In The Multiplayer Classroom (2011), Sheldon has used a similar model 
in his gamification of the classroom. Throughout the class, the students 
grind through challenges and quests. After the 
students acquire knowledge and skills, the class 
has to come together to work against a “boss 
fight”, which is a greater challenge that requires 
cooperation. This works to bring students out 
of the daily grind and into larger challenges 
that can be more meaningful.
Creating Competition between Users – An-
other route is to let the users create challenges for one another. In many 
games, after players have spent many hours working through challenges and 
improving their characters, they are eager to see how their characters stack 
up against those controlled by other players. In a gamification system, the 
designer could create competitive challenges where users work alone or with 
others to compete over real-world goals.
Foldit uses this method to keep expert users of the system engaged. 
While users are given real world challenges, only the most promising pro-
teins created by users are synthesised and tested. It is important to note that 
this level of competition is only tapped once users have become confident 
with the tools. If users are put into a competitive space too early and are 
quickly crushed, it can be a disincentive to continue. This is one of the prob-
lems with leaderboards; while they can motivate those at the top, they can 
demotivate those at the bottom.
Another scenario where this model makes sense is where there is al-
ready competition, such as a sales force in a company. When participants are 
already used to competition and rewards, adding a game layer to help track 
more nuances of the competition can enhance the existing structures.
As grinding for points  
loses its lustre,  
meaningful gamification 
moves players to strive  
for the rewards  
of the real world.
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making gamification meaningful
The larger concept that all of these ideas play into is what I call meaningful 
gamification. The concept of meaningful gamification is that it focuses on 
using game design elements to help users find a meaningful connection to 
the real-world setting. It reduces the emphasis on or avoids rewards, and, 
instead, focuses on the non-reward based aspects of game design (Nicholson 
2012b).
In order to help designers consider alternatives to point-based rewards, 
I created a framework known as the RECIPE for Meaningful Gamification 
(Nicholson 2012c), where the letters of the word RECIPE spell out different 
ways of using game design elements to build meaning:
•	 Reflection – creating situations where users reflect to discover personal 
connections with the real-world setting
•	 Exposition – using narrative and user-created stories to create deeper 
connections to the real-world setting
•	 Choice – allowing the user to select paths and develop goals within the 
real-world setting that are more meaningful to him or her
•	 Information – providing the user with information about the connec-
tions between the gamification activities and the real-world setting
•	 Play – creating a safe space and set of boundaries where the user can 
choose how he or she wishes to engage with different gamification ac-
tivities in the real-world setting 
•	 Engagement – using the gamification system to connect users to a com-
munity of practice that surrounds the real-world setting 
By thinking about the endgame of gamification, designers can create sys-
tems that may start with rewards, but are designed to bring players into more 
meaningful connections. By doing this, chances are that the user will find a 
connection into the real-world setting and will no longer require the gamifi-
cation system for engagement. The gamification system could be developed 
as a short-term activity, as shown in figure 3. It could be hoped that as a re-
sult of this users will make differences in the real world instead of just trying 
to earn one more point.
The goal of gamification is to motivate people to engage in a context. In 
the short-term, using rewards like points, levels, and badges can be used as 
the sole motivational tool to bring about this engagement. But if the purpose 
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of the system is to bring about long-term change, these shallow rewards are 
not enough to maintain the interest of most users, and can even do harm to 
someone’s pre-existing motivations (Deci & Ryan 2004). Some gamification 
systems allow players to earn real-world rewards and benefits, and this can 
serve as an ongoing motivational tool; however, this can be a costly long-
term proposition.
For long-term change, the gamification designer needs to create a sys-
tem that is designed to engage someone in an authentic manner directly with 
the real-world setting. This means that the gamification system is designed 
to help people get engaged with existing communities and information re-
sources that already surround the real-world context. As the player becomes 
more of an expert user of the gamification system, there is less and less of 
the system to engage with and more of the real-world context. The eventual 
goal is to help the player find the aspects of the real world that are mean-
ingful and to diminish the role of gamification, until the player is left in the 
Figure 3: Bringing Together BLAP and Meaningful Gamification
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real-world context. Instead of trapping users in a reward-based grind, using 
these concepts allows designers to create a gamification journey, where the 
end of the journey leaves the user immersed in and connected to the real 
world.  
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eudaimonic deSign, oR: Six 
invitationS to Rethink gamification
by Sebastian deterding
1 intRoduction
In his seminal book Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience, Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi writes: “Mowing the lawn or waiting in a dentist’s office can 
become enjoyable provided one restructures the activity by providing goals, 
rules, and the other elements of enjoyment” found in games (1990, 51). This 
idea – that game design holds valuable principles for making even the most 
mundane activity more engaging – has a long history in human-computer 
interaction, design, and education, regularly re-emerging under names like 
funology, ludic design, serious games, game-based learning, or playful inter-
action (Deterding forthcoming a). Its most recent iteration has come to be 
known as “gamification”: using game design elements in non-game contexts 
(Deterding et al. 2011).
The title of this volume invites us to rethink gamification, and this is 
indeed a timely demand. A mere four years ago, in 2010, the main challenge 
was to think gamification, to talk and think and act it into being as a thing to 
begin with. There was no shared gestalt yet, no established set of experien-
tial and discursive reference points what we talk about when we talk about 
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gamification – not even agreement whether to use that very word (Deterding 
forthcoming a). 
Things have changed. Today, the main challenge has become to work 
against the grain of existing preconceptions of gamification (be they apoca-
lyptic or utopian), established by evangelists, critics, industry practices, and 
mass media reporting. Many have rightfully questioned whether gamifica-
tion is anything more than a marketing ruse to sell the next digital snake oil 
(Juul 2011). The current field is certainly littered with shallow interpreta-
tions and implementations – essentially incentive and customer loyalty pro-
grams repackaged with a superficial “gamy” veneer as software services that 
disregard decades of research on the limited effectiveness and manifold un-
intended consequences of such systems. In addition, these forms dominate 
the collective imagination: If one were to elicit 
the prevalent framing of gamification in indus-
try, design, academia, or mass media today, it 
would presumably be something like “driving 
any desired activity by tracking it and adding a feedback layer of points, 
badges, leaderboards, and incentives ontop” – the blueprint established in 
2009 by the social, mobile, local application Foursquare (Deterding forth-
coming b).
And that is worrisome. For one, this prevalent conception of gamifica-
tion doesn’t even begin to engage with the psychology and sociology of game 
enjoyment, let alone realise the promise of translating its insights into other 
fields (Deterding forthcoming b). Instead, current gamification evangelists 
have turned away many with troublesome ethics and a disregard for the 
complexities of design and motivation. And as their overwrought promises 
will inevitably fail to realise, they risk leaving scorched earth behind. 
However, cases like the Quest to Learn schools demonstrate that the 
very notion and promise of gamification far surpasses the confines of its 
currently dominant form, and that this promise can be realised (Salen et 
al. 2011). Thus, the main task of rethinking gamification today is to rescue 
it from the gamifiers: to provide a positive vision of gamification that ad-
dresses the valid criticism it has received, and realises the actual promise of 
learning from game design as a holistic, systemic practice. Or put differently: 
to try and establish an alternative, more promising framing of gamification 
before discourses and institutions have fully solidified.
The main task of rethinking 
gamification today is to  
rescue it from the gamifiers.
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To this end, this article presents six critiques of the currently dominant 
rendition of gamification, and six invitations to rethink it. The empirical ba-
sis for this critique I draw from previous analyses of gamification rhetoric 
(Deterding forthcoming a) and gamification design literature (Deterding 
forthcoming b). I suggest expanding the remit of gamification (1) from the 
structuring of objects to the framing of contexts, and (2) from game de-
sign elements to motivational affordances. In its current form, gamification 
presents an additive, atomistic and deterministic conception of experience 
design. Truly learning from game design, I suggest, means to adopt a (3) 
relational account of experience, and (4) an emergent-systemic method of 
experience design. When it comes to the ethics and aspirations of gamifi-
cation, I invite designers to move (5) from avoiding harm and coercion to 
facilitating the good life, and (6) from the instrumental perfection of exist-
ing orders to their critical transformation. A rethought, positive vision of 
gamification, then, is that of a critical, transformative, socio-technical sys-
tems design practice for motivational affordances in the service of human 
flourishing – in a word, eudaimonic design.
2. fRom oBJectS to contextS: Rethinking the ScoPe 
of gamification
What is the first thing that comes to your mind when you hear the word 
“video game”? Likely, it will be a box, some square screen, some interface 
tied to a piece of hardware running a piece of software. That is, you are 
thinking of a game as a designed object. There is nothing to say against that: 
It is a lasting achievement of game studies to have demonstrated in detail 
how the design of games makes and breaks their experience and potential 
effects – and we are still far from understanding these matters fully.
Still I would argue that this box is what currently most limits our think-
ing about games and gamified systems, because it disregards what happens 
outside of it: the specific ways and contexts in which people come to interact 
with games. Simply put, it ignores that people are usually playing them. For 
although games are certainly designed to be played with, there is no necessary 
connection between the two. We can do very many things with games – 
we can build, test, debug, review, analyse and play them, and we can work 
in them, as gold farming demonstrates. Likewise, there are many things we 
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can play with – our hands, sticks and stones, passing cars on a long highway 
drive, games, even work assignments.
Is this a trivial point? Well, a growing number of games scholars urge us 
to extend our attention “from content to context” (Squire 2006), towards the 
broader “ecology of games” (Salen 2008), to the many ways games are being 
played, and to the way both, games and playing, interact to create the unique 
affordances of fun, motivation, learning that we are hoping to make use of 
(Taylor 2009; Hung 2011; Sicart 2011). When it comes to gamification, there 
are at least three crucial ways in which the context mediates the effects of any 
gamified system: autonomy, situational norms, and embarrassment.
2.1  “the electronic whip”: autonomy
In a recent news story in the LA Times, journalist Steve Lopez (2011) has 
chronicled the use of gamification by Disney: In the basement floors of the 
Disneyland hotels, large flat screens showed leaderboards pitching the work-
ing speeds of the laundry workers against each other. However, instead of 
the device spurring fun competition – as standard gamification logic would 
suggest – workers reported that they felt pressured and controlled by this 
“electronic whip” of their management.
This little story points to a crucial feature of gameplay often overlooked 
in gamification: As scholars from Johan Huizinga (1955 / 1938) onwards 
have stressed, playing games is a voluntary activity. And the voluntariness 
of gameplay is mainly constituted by its social context: to what extent others 
coerce an individual to do something, and to what extent the individual, in 
light of such actions of others, comes to define said activity as autonomous, 
self-determined or not.
Growing empirical evidence suggests that situational autonomy sup-
port indeed poses an issue for serious games and gamification: Forced se-
rious game play is less enjoyable and effective (Heeter et al. 2011). When 
workers do not consent to games at their workplace, their use decreases pos-
itive affect and performance (Mollick and Rothbard 2013). Having to play 
games as part of one’s profession is generally described as less enjoyable and 
less engaging by practitioners, and comes with more frequent unpleasant 
experiences of being controlled (Deterding 2013).
Why is that? A rich literature in psychology has demonstrated that au-
tonomy – the sense of acting with volition, willingness, and in congruence 
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with one’s own goals, needs, values, and identity – is a basic psychological 
need and core part of intrinsic motivation: What makes activities feel en-
joyable or worth pursuing for their own sake is that they satisfy basic psy-
chological needs like autonomy, relatedness, or competence (Deci and Ryan 
2012). Conversely, research indicates that a person’s sense of autonomy can 
be thwarted by attaching material rewards or punishments to an activity – or 
even just verbal admonitions that evoke internalised controlling voices of 
guilt, shame, or social pressure. If a child is already intrinsically motivated 
to read, for instance, paying or reprimanding it to read may paradoxically 
reduce its overall motivation: It adds some extrinsic motivation (a monetary 
incentive and guilt), but reduces some pre-existing intrinsic one by the same 
token (Deci, Koestner and Ryan 1999).
Importantly, the controlling, autonomy-thwarting quality of environ-
mental events – their “functional significance” – results from an active inter-
pretation. Take a supervisor’s feedback on worker performance: How that 
feedback impacts motivation depends on whether the worker understands 
it as informational (“the supervisor is helping me see how I can improve”), 
which supports an experience of competence and relatedness, or as con-
trolling (“the supervisor tells me what I ought to do”), which thwarts auton-
omy (Ryan and Deci 2002).
We typically think that games are so enjoyable that people play them 
voluntarily. But to a certain extent, the causal arrow points in the oppo-
site direction: Because gameplay is a voluntary activity – something we can 
choose to do and cease doing – it satisfies our need for autonomy, and that 
satisfaction we experience as “enjoyment”. Several studies have found evi-
dence that playing video games is motivating because (among other things) 
it delivers strong experiences of autonomy: In games, we can choose who to 
be, what goals to pursue, and how to pursue them (Przybylski, Rigby and 
Ryan 2010). Even more fundamentally, playing a game is an autonomous 
act in itself: Playing games – especially single-player games – is an activity we 
typically feel we do following our own interest, where we decide what to 
play, when, how, and how long, with no social or material pressures or con-
sequences affixed (Deterding 2013).
In sum, if gamified systems are deployed for activities happening 
within mandatory and consequential contexts (such as work or formalised 
education), they run the risk of being perceived as “electronic whips” 
310
that effectively reduce rather than enhance motivation, enjoyment, and 
performance.
2.2  gamespersonship and gaming the System:  
Situational norms
Every society has social norms and conventions how to understand what 
is happening within different types of social situations, and how to behave 
“appropriately” in them. Sociologist Erving Goffman (1986) has called these 
clusters of understandings, norms, and practices around types of situations 
“frames”. In the “doctor’s visit” frame, for instance, it is considered appropri-
ate when a patient gets undressed in front of a doctor and understood to be 
“for medical purposes”: whereas the same person getting undressed in front 
of the same doctor in a public bus would appear absurd and inappropriate.
The same holds for the “playing games” frame (Deterding 2013), which 
among other things is characterised by a “bracketed morality” (Shields and 
Bredemeier 1995). In competitive sports and playing games, we are allowed 
and in fact expected to act as strategic actors single-mindedly focused on 
maximising our individual payoff – winning. To not overtly care about and 
try to win characterises the half-hearted spoilsport. The cold-blooded bluff-
ing, double-talking, and out-manoeuvring that is positively valued as “good 
gamespersonship” in Poker (first half of 19th century) or Diplomacy (1959) 
would earn us the label “Machiavelli” or “psychopath” if enacted in everyday 
conversation with friends and colleagues. However, even in playing games, 
there is a limit: The allowed and valued egocentrism is “bracketed” in a 
larger care for fair play and the enjoyment of others. If a game player focuses 
too myopically on winning and their own enjoyment, ignoring her impact 
on the enjoyment of others, she becomes a “munchkin” (Gribble 1994). This 
larger bracket of fair play and collective enjoyment is enforced not so much 
by the rules of the game as by the constant monitoring, enactment, and sanc-
tioning of the “play community” (DeKoven 2013).
Which brings us to the frequently raised gamification issue of “gaming 
the system” (Werbach and Hunter 2012): Devise a game system of rules and 
goals, the standard version goes, and some of your users will find a way to 
exploit any rule loophole and min-max their way through. But following 
the notion of frames, this is not so much a moral failing of individual users 
as a systemic issue endemic to the very process of adding rules and goals: 
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By specifying goals and rules and explicit, quantitative forms of feedback, 
a gamified system creates social signals that the thus-gamified activity is to 
be taken as a “gaming” situation, where myopic min-maxing is allowed and 
expected. Without a play community enacting bracketing values of harmony 
and fair play, game-like systems on their own exert a strong pull towards stra-
tegic action that ignores any “negative externalities” not explicitly internal-
ised in or outlawed by the rule system. And since – following Wittgenstein – 
no rule can ever fully specify how to be enacted (Stueber 2005), relying on 
more rules to prevent gaming the system instead of the lived values of the 
enacting community is a losing proposition: It merely generates more op-
portunities for gaming (Deterding 2012b).
The opposite is likewise possible: Information systems research has 
demonstrated the lasting impact of “technological frames” – that is, prevail-
ing organisational understandings, practices, and norms – on the adoption 
and usage of new technologies (Orlikowski and Gash 1994). Often enough, 
if these technical frames are not changed, they just absorb new technologies 
into “business as usual”: new, different ways of doing things offered by the 
technology are never realised. The entailed manifest risk for gamification is 
that it becomes absorbed by companies as yet another customer loyalty or 
employee incentive programme, with slightly different language and visuals – 
rather than an actual transformation of business practices.
2.3  acting out of Bounds: embarrassment
For Goffman and many after him, the central mechanism by which situa-
tional norms and conventions are reproduced is embarrassment: Early in 
our socialisation, we learn from parents and peers how to behave properly in 
all kinds of situations, and are scolded by them if we misbehave. Over time, 
this instils an internalised view of others in us: Acting in any situation, we 
think about how others would think about us if they saw us – if they would 
approve or disapprove. Pride, in this logic, is the emotional experience of 
imagined approval of others, and shame of imagined disapproval. Socialised 
adults observe and regulate themselves in order to act situationally appropri-
ate and avoid feelings of shame or embarrassment (Scheff 2003).
The ramifications for serious games and gamification are obvious: Both 
by definition take games and game design into “serious”, non-gaming con-
texts, expecting people do playfully and / or gamefully engage with them. 
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However, if the situational norms of those non-gaming contexts – work, for-
malised education, politics, public spaces, etc. – do not entail “playing” as 
appropriate, engaging in play ought to be shunned because it would induce 
embarrassment. And indeed there is evidence for this. Installing a simple 
exergame that motivates users to do pull-ups in a public tram, Toprak and 
colleagues (2013) found that people would not use the game because people 
found it embarrassing to play-exercise in a public tram.
2.4  gamification as Socio-technical Systems design
Autonomy (and its subjective construal), situational and technical frames 
(and the communities enacting them), embarrassment: all these point to the 
importance of the contextual framing of a gamified system. Maybe more 
importantly, all can be intentionally designed for: Supervisors can do much 
to create an autonomy-supporting atmosphere even around mandatory 
work activities (Reeve 2006). Community building and change management 
acknowledge and entail the change of lived values, practices, narratives, 
frames, and mental models (Todnem By 2005). And every clown, comedian, 
or workshop facilitator worth her salt knows how to establish a trusting at-
mosphere where play is perceived as welcomed and non-embarrassing.
All of these practices operate outside the box of current gamification, 
which is narrowly understood as the design of (software) systems and inter-
faces. Thus, rethinking the remit of gamification entails expanding it from 
the mere re-structuring of activity through (largely software-based) rule 
systems towards re-framing activity as a specific type of situation (playing 
games) entailing specific norms, conventions, and understandings, using so-
cial signals and actors modelling, enacting, and sanctioning this framing. A 
good practical example can be seen in the playful performative interventions 
by former mayor of Bogota, Antanas Mockus, aimed at rebuilding the Bogo-
ta’s civic culture, by the time of his taking office a city with one of the highest 
rates of violence and traffic fatalities.
One such intervention involved mimes controlling traffic, helping 
pedestrians across streets, and mocking misbehaving, aggressive drivers. 
Instead of harsher rules and fines, the mimes signalled vulnerability and 
appealed to the drivers’ self-esteem as good citizens. They reframed traffic 
as a realm of civic-mindedness – more than halving the number of traf-
fic fatalities as a result (Singhal and Greiner 2008). Understood as such – a 
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unified whole of restructuration and reframing – gamification is a holistic 
socio-technical systems design practice (Withworth and Ahmad 2013), one 
that understands humans interacting with technology as assemblages, activ-
ity systems, or ecologies of heterogeneous and intertwined actors.
3 fRom uSing game deSign elementS to motivational 
deSign: Rethinking the goal of gamification
Current conceptions of gamification are not only problematic in the object 
of design they make out, but also in their design goal. They typically frame 
gamification as the application of elements, patterns, or “mechanics” of game 
design to motivate desired end-user behaviours (Deterding forthcoming b).
3.1  experiences not elements
The first issue with this framing is conceptual. As many authors have pointed 
out, it is impossible to clearly identify and distinguish “game design ele-
ments” from other design elements, or to identify a gamified system by their 
presence: Many design patterns commonly sold as part of gamification plat-
forms – such as notification streams – are not game design patterns to begin 
with (Björk and Holopainen 2005), but rather originate from social software 
(Crumlish and Malone 2009). Conversely, game designers frequently criti-
cise that core game design concerns and patterns such as interestingly hard 
challenges and meaningful choices are not even part of standard gamifica-
tion practice (Robertson 2010, Deterding forthcoming b). Furthermore, it is 
problematic to make sense of “patterns of source domain X in target domain 
Y” in general, because patterns and pattern languages are domain-bound 
and system-bound. It is always a kind of analogy, like speaking of the “anat-
omy” of a house with a “brain”, “lungs”, “arteries”, and so on. There can be 
direct morphological or functional symmetries between houses and bodies, 
and it is sometimes helpful to tease those out to help understanding or pro-
vide inspiration. But even if you would build, say, a ventilation system in 
the direct, immediate image of a human lung, you would not call this the 
“anatomy design element” of the house. You would call it ventilation, and 
it would serve a ventilation function. In the same way, it is just nonsensical 
to speak of the game design pattern “deadly traps” (Björk and Holopainen 
2005, 74–75) instantiating the function of “damage” in the context of a mo-
bile e-commerce app. 
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Finally, many design patterns core to games and gamification have iso-
morphic counterparts in other social domains that existed long before the 
rise of gamification: Goal-setting and quantitative feedback are pervasive 
in business and education, for instance. Yet isomorphisms across domains 
do not influences make. Else, we would have to relabel grading systems at 
schools or targets and key performance indicators in organisations “gam-
ification”. In fact, much popular gamification writing engages in this sort 
of facile retro-fitting, describing existing popular application and services 
(such as LinkedIn, Quora, or OkCupid) as gamification, with no solid ev-
idence whether (a) the “identified” design elements actually produce the 
proclaimed engagement effects through the proclaimed causal routes, nor 
whether (b) the designers at the point of design were actually and intention-
ally taking inspiration from games.
In response to these issues, several scholars have suggested delineating 
gamification (or gameful design) via the design goal of affording gameful 
experiences – that is, experiences characteristic for gameplay – rather than 
through an ill-defined bundle of design patterns (Deterding et al. 2011; 
Huotari and Hamari 2012; Werbach forthcoming). Yet whereas this does 
present a conceptual advancement, it remains unsatisfying in its narrow, 
tactical focus.
3.2  gameful and Playful experiences
In his book Man, Play, and Games, philosopher Roger Caillois (2001 / 1958) 
distinguished between two poles of play: paidia and ludus. Paidia captures 
the free-form, exploratory, autotelic recombination of behaviors, actions, 
and meanings prototypically found in children’s pretend play, whereas ludus 
denotes the rule-bound, goal-directed overcoming of challenges. Gamifica-
tion in its current form has focused squarely on the ludic: it almost invariably 
constitutes an addition of structure, of goals and rules to a given activity in 
order to afford gameful experiences of challenge and competition (Deterding 
forthcoming b). This focus is apt when competence or recognition are the 
main targeted motivations, and when the main design problem is that the 
given activity is poorly structured to afford these motivating experiences – 
that is, when it lacks clear goals, clear and immediate feedback, a good scaf-
folding of challenge, etc. Yet this focus also misses out on the paidic pole of 
playful experiences, which has been the focus of a significant body of work 
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in human-computer interaction (see ibid. for a review). Such playful experi-
ences are of utmost relevance when one wishes to tap into motivations like 
curiosity, or design for exploration, transgression, creativity, or innovation 
(Bateson and Martin 2013). Conceptually, framing gamification as design 
supporting gameful experiences may be sound, but practically, it is hard to 
justify why one would leave such a vast field of learnings and insights from 
game design untapped. This is why colleagues and I early on spoke of game-
ful and playful design (Deterding et al. 2011).
3.3  motivational experiences
Now following the majority of gamification design literature, gamification 
practitioners are not interested in creating gameful or playful experiences 
per se, but in motivating end user behaviours (Deterding forthcoming b). 
Thus, gameful and playful design describes a subset of motivational design 
(Zhang 2008), which in turn can be understood as a subset of persuasive 
design – for motivation is typically yet another proximate means towards the 
ultimate goal of some targeted change of behaviour in some targeted audi-
ence (Deterding 2012a). However, gameful and playful experiences are only 
a small subset of desired, enjoyable, motivating experiences (Desmet 2012, 
Hassenzahl, Diefenbach and Göritz 2010). Many more things (de)motivate 
human action (Reeve 2009), and many more factors affect human behaviour 
than motivation (Michie, van Stralen and West 2011).
Thus, relevant as creating playful and gameful experiences is to toy and 
game designers, and inspiring as it may be for motivational design, even 
gameful and playful design ultimately remain tactics. There is no principled 
reason – no persistent design problem – for “gamifying” things. The persis-
tent, principled design challenge gamification addresses is motivating users. 
By the same token, graphic designers can learn a lot from architecture when 
it comes to spatial drawing or negative and positive space for example. But 
nobody would expect there to exist an “architecturalisation expert”, because 
“taking design tactics from architecture” or “architecturalising graphics” is 
no ultimate design goal for graphic design: “communicating and idea” is. This 
is why gamification in its current form – defined via game design elements 
or gameful experiences – is destined to be a temporary gestalt, whereas mo-
tivational design (and / or persuasive design) have the potential to stay: For 
only the latter articulate a lasting, well-defined, domain-spanning strategic 
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goal. And just as importantly, if motivating user behaviour is one’s goal, it is 
practically nonsensical to limit the space of possible tactics and solutions to 
gameful (or playful) experiences. If a designer discovers that fears about the 
security of an online banking service is the main issue keeping people from 
signing up – and the most cost-benefit efficient way to fix this is adding trust 
indicators to the interface –, it would simply be poor design to instead make 
the experience of the service more gameful or playful. Approaching every 
motivational design challenge with gamification is a solution in search of a 
problem: fine for marketers selling said solution, but poor practice for any 
designer trying to find the best solution to her design problem.
4 fRom StimuluS-effect deteRminiSm to  
affoRdanceS: Rethinking “gameful exPeRienceS”
Speaking of experiences and design, the existing gamification design litera-
ture showcases an additive-deterministic notion of experience design remi-
niscent of the first generation of serious games. These “edutainment” games 
were predominantly grounded in behaviourist theories, assuming that in-
strumental activities like learning or work entail certain inherently unpleas-
ant and games certain inherently enjoyable elements (Egenfeldt-Nielsen 
2007). By analogy, sugar has inherent chemical features that, when imbibed 
by a living being with the respective dispositions (taste receptors, etc.), will 
infallibly result in the experience of sweetness. The resulting design para-
digm has been called “chocolate-covered broccoli” (Bruckman 1999): A pre-
sumed-inherently unenjoyable activity (learning) is made appealing by add-
ing presumed-inherently enjoyable gameplay. This is precisely the model of 
current gamification: It assumes that game design can be broken down into 
isolatable atomic units (“elements”, “patterns”, “mechanics”), whose addition 
reliably produces one and only one motivational effect across users.
However, based on years of research and failing applications, game-
based learning has largely abandoned the additive-deterministic paradigm. 
Instead, the current third generation of serious games subscribes to emer-
gent theories of game enjoyment (Egenfeldt-Nielsen 2007, Squire 2006). By 
analogy, whether a piece of pastry tastes good or not does not depend on its 
sugar content, but on the specific mixture and preparation of all the ingredi-
ents, and how the resulting whole suits the sensitivities of the specific person 
eating it. This aligns well with current views of user experience as subjective, 
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holistic, emergent, situated, and dynamic, afforded by and realised in the in-
teraction of specific, situated human beings with the systemic whole of a de-
signed artefact in its socio-material environment (Hassenzahl 2010, 6–31).
Now what does this mean applied to gamification? First, the motiva-
tional valence (or “functional significance”, cf. Ryan and Deci 2002) of a 
stimulus or design element depends on its situationally appraised meaning. 
Paying a waiter at a restaurant is proper and motivating, paying your friends 
for cooking you dinner at their home is a social affront. One and the same dol-
lar bill can evoke different, situationally negotiated and appraised meanings: 
I might angrily smack down a dollar bill as tip and signal social disapproval, 
and the waiter may or may not pick up on that (Benkler 2006, 92–99).
Second, one and the same stimulus or design element can have multiple 
different motivational functions. As Antin and Churchill (2011) outline, the 
seemingly straightforward design pattern “badges” can tie into at least five 
possible different motivational processes. There is no deterministic one-to-
one relationship between design elements and motivational effects (though 
there can be tendencies, see Hassenzahl 2010, 4–8). Vice versa, one and the 
same motivational process can be supported by very many different design 
elements: Quests, badges, leaderboards, high score lists etc. all can (but need 
not) be functionalised for goal-setting by a user.
Third, any motivational valence emerges from the relation between the 
object’s properties and the actor’s dispositions. This relationality is enshrined 
in the ecological concept of affordance (Gibson 1986, Chemero 2009), to-
day widely used in human-computer interaction, communication research, 
and sociology to model the interaction of humans and technology. An affor-
dance is not an objective feature of a design element, but a relational quality 
of both object and subject. Relative to my skills, a Sudoku puzzle affords 
frustration or competence experiences. Relative to my current level of sati-
ety, a slice of cake looks like the most delicious thing in the world, instilling a 
strong motivational pull, or induces sickness because I am currently overfed 
(Deterding 2011).
Fourth and finally, such motivational affordances emerge not from a 
single stimulus or design element, but the total animal-environment system. 
Whether slamming down a dollar bill on a table constitutes a rage-inducing 
insult or an unintentional slip of the hand depends on the total chain of pre-
vious and following interactions and social signals in which the slamming is 
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embedded. How satisfying beating a boss monster in a game is depends on 
the number of previous failed attempts and the actual challenge of beating 
the boss monster, which again is an emergent quality of the relation of player 
skills and monster difficulty, etc.
In sum, (motivational) experiences are emergent properties afforded 
(not determined) by the relation of actors and their total environment, aris-
ing from situated, subjectively appraised valences relative to multiple moti-
vational processes. And yet, the majority of gamification design literature 
claims or implies that one and the same game design element determinis-
tically produces one (and only one) kind of motivational experience across 
users and contexts (Deterding forthcoming b).
5 fRom PatteRnS to lenSeS: Rethinking gamification 
deSign
The obvious conclusion from an emergent, relational, systemic affordance 
view of motivation is that motivational design should revolve around de-
signing whole systems for motivational affordances, not adding elements 
with presumed-determined motivational effects. And yet, this is today’s 
standard operating procedure in gamification. Instead of outlining motiva-
tional processes, the currently available gamification design literature largely 
consists in the cataloguing of patterns like “points”, “achievements”, “lead-
erboards”, etc., and portrays gamification as the choice and customisation 
of pre-existing patterns (Deterding forthcoming b). The following quote is 
exemplary: “Putting all these [game] elements together is the central task 
of gamification design, and having knowledge of these game elements will 
make your gamification project compelling” (Werbach and Hunter 2012, 
81). In essence, current gamification design literature recommends a pat-
tern-based design approach (Seffah and Taleb 2011) – which as we have seen 
is at odds with an affordance perspective on motivation or experience more 
generally.
So what to do instead? It turns out that a promising answer is right 
before our eyes: game design. Rethinking gamification design means taking 
game design as a practice seriously. For game design has long acknowledged 
the emergent, systemic quality of experience, formalised in the MDA model 
(Hunicke, LeBlanc and Zubek 2004): A game’s mechanics – the rules speci-
fying possible player actions – together form a system that players interact 
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with, giving rise to interactional dynamics, which in turn give rise to expe-
riential aesthetics. And game design has answered to this systemic quality 
with a series of methods and tools that can fruitfully inform gamification, 
two of which are worth calling out (see Deterding forthcoming b for a fuller 
account).
The first are design lenses. Initially developed by Jesse Schell (2009) for 
game design, this concept was quickly adopted in interaction design, spe-
cifically to transfer concepts from game design (Scott 2010). Lenses provide 
general guidance in generating and evaluating design in a manner that de-
sign patterns do not. Design patterns articulate proven solutions to reoccur-
ring problems – yet as such, they are ultimately prescriptive, with little room 
for innovation or context-sensitivity (Seffah and Taleb 2011). 
Furthermore, as we have seen patterns are domain-bound, system-rel-
ative elements, often meaningless and non-functional outside this context: 
Just as it is nonsensical to speak of the game design pattern “deadly traps” 
(Björk and Holopainen 2005, 74–75) in the context of a mobile app, just 
adding a “deadly trap” to any given game (like Scrabble, 1948 or Poker) does 
not automatically make sense or generate a desired experience either.
In contrast, a design lens articulates a single design perspective in a 
form that is both inspiring and guiding. As Schell puts it, a lens is “a way of 
viewing your design” (2009, xxvi). Practically, a lens combines (a) a mem-
orable name, (b) a concise statement of a general design principle, includ-
ing a rationale for that principle, and (c) a set of focusing questions that 
allow the designer to take on the “mental perspective” of the lens, “illumi-
nating issues that may have been invisible before” (Scott 2010). By focusing 
a specific quality of a total system, design lenses avoid the decontextual-
ised, additive-deterministic design paradigm of contemporary gamification. 
By binding together said quality or principle with a rationale and focusing 
questions, they become self-contained, and thus easy to transfer from game 
design into other design disciplines.
The second game design method worth calling out is “playcentric de-
sign” (Fullerton 2008): A designer starts with specifying a target experience 
for a target audience. In an abductive process, she then ideates first systems 
of mechanics that might generate the desired experience. But because of 
the double emergence of player-system dynamics and resultant aesthetics, 
results cannot be reliably predicted. Instead, the designer creates and tests 
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functional prototypes of the total system as quickly as possible to observe 
what dynamics and aesthetics actually emerge. Based on their evaluation 
and analysis of how and why these diverge from the intended experience, 
she then ideates promising design changes and revises and tests the proto-
type again, repeating this process until the delta between desired and actual 
experience is satisfactorily closed.
Summarising once more, if the re-envisioned scope of gamification 
are socio-technical systems, if its re-envisioned goal is motivational expe-
riences, and if motivational experiences are systemic, emergent affordances, 
then a promising re-envisioned gamification design method would entail 
formalising desired motivational experiences in the form of design lenses, 
using these lenses to analyse target activities, and then engage in iterative 
experiential prototyping until the total prototyped socio-technical system 
affords the targeted motivational experiences (Deterding forthcoming b).
6 fRom avoiding haRm to living well: Rethinking 
gamification ethicS
Almost from day one, gamification has been criticised as inherently manip-
ulative, exploitive, or coercive (Bogost 2011, Rey forthcoming). On the one 
hand, given the statements of some gamification evangelists, this backlash 
is warranted. But on the other, it reveals a narrow conception of design eth-
ics. As communication scholar Paul Watzlawick once put it, “one cannot 
not communicate” (Watzlawick, Beavin Bavelas and Jackson 1967, 51). In 
much the same way, one cannot not influence others: Any communication 
(and non-communication), any action (and inaction), and any shaping (and 
non-shaping) of the environment affects ourselves and others. Intentionally 
or not, every designer is “materializing morality” (Verbeek 2006): Every de-
signed object makes certain actions and experiences easier or harder to re-
alise, communicates certain ways of being as normal or good, and opens or 
closes certain realms of being to ethical deliberation and decision-making. 
Gamification is therefore not inherently “more” unethical or even “more” 
ethically relevant: Its overt persuasive intent simply brings the ethical un-
conscious of all design to the fore.
And indeed, gamification designers (like persuasive designers) have 
found themselves compelled to engage in a constant (legitimising) ethical 
discourse around their practice (Berdichevsky and Neuenschwander 1999; 
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Fogg 2003; Zichermann 2012). This is to be welcomed. However, both con-
demning and legitimising voices typically frame design ethics in a bound, 
defensive, other-centred fashion: Acting ethically is construed as avoiding 
coercion or harm on others. Thus, gamification (and persuasive design) are 
ethical if they do not produce negative effects for users, and come with in-
formed consent (Fogg 2003; Zichermann 2012). The prototypical expression 
of this view is Thaler’s and Sunstein’s “libertarian paternalism,” which “tries 
to influence choices in a way that will make choosers better off, as judged by 
themselves” (2008, 5).1 
Against this stands a wider, positive framing of the morality of design 
grounded in Aristotelian virtue ethics and its contemporary descendants 
(Aristotle 2002, May 2010; Hursthouse 2013). Virtue ethics start not with 
the question what we owe to the other (be that a god or our fellow human be-
ings), but with the self and the question: What constitutes the ultimate goal 
of all our action? What is it that we do for its own sake, and everything else 
in the sake of it? According to Aristotle, this ultimate telos of human beings 
is not hedonistic sense pleasure, but eudaimonia, “the good life”: flourishing, 
bringing to full fruition and refinement our capacities as human beings (and 
modern virtue ethical interpretations allow for wide individual and cultural 
differences in what that entails). In this framing, we treat others well because 
as social animals, we could neither survive nor flourish without them: Living 
well with others is a condition and component of living well ourselves.
Viewed through this lens, “the ethical” is not a bounded domain of 
“negatively impinging on others”, but an all-pervasive, positive dimension of 
life: Every human act and object is ethical because it partakes in life, and can 
be performed or made in a way that realises fruition, refinement, excellence, 
eudaimonia: an act or thing done well for its own sake. Ethical gamification 
(as any other design practice) would thus mean (a) being a potential tool 
for “positive design” (Desmet 2013) actively supporting human flourishing, 
(b) a practice performed virtuously, excellently in itself, (c) something that 
realises, furthers, or is at least congruent with living a good life with others.
1 Thaler’s and Sunstein’s emphasis.
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7 fRom inStRumental PeRfection and tokeniSm to 
cRitical tRanSfoRmation: Rethinking gamification’S 
PuRPoSe
Minimally, any such ethical design practice involves (a) deliberating what 
constitutes the good life, and (b) understanding how design has an im-
pact on it. Contemporary gamification has been criticised for doing nei-
ther: Whereas many art and persuasive games emerge from and facilitate 
the critical reflection of values, ideally opening a space for the exploration 
and transformation of human practice (Bogost 2007; Raphael et al. 2009), 
current gamification merely promises technical solutions to achieve the 
given goals and perfect the given procedures of businesses, governments, 
and other institutions (Deterding forthcoming a). And instead of actually 
addressing the root cause of an issue, it presents a tokenist exercise in “virtu-
alpolitik” (Losh 2009) that merely signifies taking action, coolness, hipness, 
etc. (Bogost forthcoming).
A perfect case in point: the PlayPump (1994), a contraption for wa-
ter supply in developing nations popularised by retired advertising exec-
utive Trevor Field (Borland forthcoming). The pump replaces traditional 
pumping mechanics with a roundabout for kids to play with. Water would 
be pumped easy as child’s play, and advertising billboards on the reservoir 
tower would pay for the pumps. The images of happy African kids playing 
on a roundabout made for good media both in popular and design press. 
Thus, Field managed to get a commitment of 60 million US dollars in aid for 
installing PlayPumps. But in 2009, problems started to surface: The pump 
was more costly and less efficient than existing solutions. It required mainte-
nance by specially trained and approved PlayPump mechanics, resulting in 
many being left defunct once they broke. Advertisers interested in rural Af-
rican populations did not materialise. One calculation showed that children 
would have to operate the pump 27 continuous hours to pump the daily 
water demand of an average rural African village. Thus, women ended up 
working on the inefficient roundabouts, resulting in strained backs because 
they had to constantly bow down to operate a child-sized roundabout. In a 
word, the main purpose and success of the PlayPump was media attention 
and good feelings in the developed nations, while the pump was an utter fail-
ure for the actual people having to use it in developing nations (ibid.). This 
illustrates not only gamification as virtualpolitik in full bloom, but also that 
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successful design interventions require a deep understanding of and contin-
ued engagement with the actual people, sites, and systems they target – with 
the help of tools and frameworks for participatory design, sustainability, and 
systems thinking.
In an early classic of design ethics, Victor Papanek’s Design for the Real 
World (1971, 47), one finds an interesting diagram. It is a plain pyramid with 
a little horizontal line that separates a small tip from a vast body. The tip of 
the pyramid Papanek labeled “the designer’s share”, and its body, “the real 
problem”. Over the course of several pages, Papanek reapplies this diagram 
again and again to demonstrate how designers typically focus their energy 
and time on trivial matters: on what their clients want, not what their users 
need; on what a small, privileged consumer class wants, not what the whole 
population of their country needs; on the first world problems of their coun-
try, not the global challenges of hunger, war, inequality, or global warm-
ing. To this list we can add: on alleviating the symptoms of a societal issue, 
not eliminating its root causes. Rethinking the ethics of gamification, then, 
means seeing the whole pyramid: distancing ourselves from the day-to-day 
in order to work through, on all of these levels, what we as designers and 
scholars understand and aspire our vision of the good life, “the real prob-
lem”, and our share in solving it to be.
8 concluSion: towaRd eudaimonic deSign
If there has been one recurring theme of the preceding pages, it was to move 
outside the literal and figurative box: to abandon a narrow, atomistic, de-
contextualised notion of gamification as the implementation of technical 
design elements, and take into view the wider systems and contexts in which 
designed objects and their features are indexically embedded and implied: 
social situations, frames, meanings, norms, and practices; affordances as 
actor-environment relations; whole systems of game mechanics giving rise 
to gameplay dynamics that, in turn, give rise to experiential aesthetics; our 
individual and collective notions of the good life; our understanding of 
the root causes thwarting its realisation; and our moral share in striking at 
these roots.
So how would a rethought, positive vision of gamification look? It 
would aspire to critically understand, reflect, and transform the goals and 
systems of our society to facilitate human well-being, targeting motivation 
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as its main strategic lever. Well-aware of the situated, socio-material quality 
of human motivation and action, it would take into view objects and peo-
ple and their interactions, paying as much attention to the structuring of 
the material environment as to the framing of social contexts. Cognizant of 
the emergent quality of motivational experiences, it would use design lenses 
and iterative prototyping to design these total socio-technical systems for 
motivational affordances. One might call this re-envisioned, positive gami-
fication eudaimonic design.
In closing, let us return to Paul Watzlawick once more: “These are two 
types of change: one that occurs within a given system which itself remains 
unchanged, and one whose occurrence changes the system itself [. . .] Second- 
order change is thus change of change” (Watzlawick, Weakland and Fish 
1974, 10). If anything, this article has been attempting to reframe gamifica-
tion – on any level of theory and practice – from a first-order to a second- 
order change practice.
Now in one sense, this is what current gamification already engages in. 
“Traditional” serious game design deployed games as interventions within 
existing contexts like educational institutions to convey attitudes, knowl-
edge and skills, hoping and praying that these learnings might transfer into 
a different, final context of application: using condoms, being an active citi-
zen, noticing and counteracting discrimination, etc.
In contrast to this stands the recent line of reasoning in policy and 
design circles heavily informed by behavioural economics that goes under 
names like persuasive technology, choice architecture, or nudging (Thaler 
and Sunstein 2008; Deterding 2012a). It argues that traditional measures 
in health communication, civic engagement, and consumer education have 
seen only limited success not so much because people do not learn, or learn-
ing does not transfer, but because emotion, habit, cognitive biases and ma-
terial environments strongly shape and bound our conscious action and de-
cision-making. In other words, we do not necessarily do better just because 
we know better. Instead, proponents of persuasive technology argue that we 
should try to affect decisions and actions directly when and where they are 
happening, operating on the level of emotions, habits, cognitive biases, and 
material environments (Deterding 2012a).
This is exactly what current gamification attempts: It implements fea-
tures of games that are presumably conducive to desired actions right where 
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these occur: Instead of building a simulation game about personal budgeting 
to improve financial literacy, provide a personal financial management tool 
informed by good game design to make it fun. Thus, gamification is already 
a move from change in the system to change of the system: from designing 
games as interventions deployed within certain contexts to designing con-
texts as interventions, informed by game design.
Again, there are legitimate doubts as to whether this strategy is ulti-
mately effective and sustainable on its own: Should we not empower peo-
ple to reflect on and self-regulate their own conduct, rather than making 
them ever more dependent on technological environments “nudging” them? 
There is evidence that the abundant use of outer measures of control fore-
stalls the development of people’s ability to autonomously self-regulate (Deci 
and Ryan 2012). Then again, embodiment and distributed cognition have 
taught us that thinking, learning and acting always already involve tools – 
done well, gamification “just” improves the tools at our disposal. As Heath 
and Anderson (2010) suggest, for us humans to get anything done at all, we 
always did and always will rely on the “extended will” provided by social and 
material devices like to-do lists and public commitments. Ideally, gamifica-
tion not only “offloads” self-regulation, but helps us to develop the skills to 
self-regulate and enrol the tools our environment provides in the course. As 
such, gamification would immediately support a good life as understood by 
virtue ethics: For realising eudaimonia crucially requires the virtues to act in 
accordance with reason – that is, the trained, acquired habits or dispositions 
necessary to perform deliberate, planned, goal-directed, self-determined ac-
tion even against our impulses (May 2010).
On the one hand, then, gamification is conceptually a move towards sec-
ond-order change in support of human flourishing. On the other, current 
gamification very much remains an exercise in change in not of the sys-
tem: Calling key performance indicators and targets “experience points” and 
“levels” and tracking and displaying them via a new software-as-a-service 
platform to increase “employee engagement”, as so many business gamifi-
cation initiatives do, merely deploys a novel technical system for a given 
purpose in a given institution, instead of taking into view and re-designing 
the larger socio-technical system itself. It uncritically fits itself into and is 
co-opted by standing goals and procedures in businesses, governmental and 
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educational institutions. Instead of transforming society through and in the 
image of play, it instrumentalises play – and this is anathema to eudaimonia.
Following Aristotle, eudaimonia is the autotelic, self-determined exer-
cise and perfection of one’s innate capacities for its own sake and “proper 
pleasure” – in a sense, play is the prototypical realisation of eudaimonia. But 
more importantly, if such autotelic pursuit of excellence is the good life, then 
as long as we work for the sake of play, or play for the sake of work, as long 
as we instrumentalise one for the other, rather than cherish each for the 
excellence we find in it, we are living the false life. We realise the good life to 
the precise extent that we are able to transform whatever situation we find 
ourselves in into a self-determined pursuit where we find some measure of 
excellence, some focus on mastery and joy, some connection to our goals, 
needs, and values – as if it were a game we chose to play.
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